University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1985

The graduation of consultation and education units of
Massachusetts CMHCs from NIMH funding : implications for the
prevention mission of the community mental health center.
David J. Armstrong
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Armstrong, David J., "The graduation of consultation and education units of Massachusetts CMHCs from
NIMH funding : implications for the prevention mission of the community mental health center." (1985).
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1137.
https://doi.org/10.7275/bqj6-sm06 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1137

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THE GRADUATION OF CONSULTATION AND EDUCATION UNITS
OF

MASSACHUSETTS CMHCs FROM NIMH FUNDING:

IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE PREVENTION MISSION OF THE
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTER

A Dissertation Presented
By

DAVID J. ARMSTRONG, JR.

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February

Psychology

1985

DAVID

J.

AEMSTRONG, JR.

©
All Rights Reserved

THE GRADUATION OF CONSULTATION AND EDUCATION
UNITS OF

MASSACHUSETTS CMHCs FROM NIMH FUNDING:

IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE PREVENTION MISSION OF THE COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH CENTER

A Dissertation Presented
By

DAVID J. ARMSTRONG, JR.

Approved as to style and content by:

^Castellano B, Turner, Member

0
Ronnie Jarfotf tiyilman. Member

Richard

C.

Tessler, Member

Seymour M. Berger, Chaii
Department of Psychology

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost,

I

would like to thank JoAnne Baranoski for

her unflagging support, endurance and excellence of work
during the
arduous process of producing this dissertation.
I

can only begin to thank my chairperson, David Todd, for his

years of guidance, teaching and support during my graduate career.
His warmth and calm patience have been an invaluable source of

reassurance and encouragement.

I

can only hope that his concern for

people and their communities and his abilities to observe and reflect
on the complexities of both are reflected to some degree in my work.
I

want to thank my committee members, Cass Turner, Ronnie

Janof f-Bulman and Richard Tessler for their enthusiasm, encouragement,
support and suggestions, without which this task might never have

reached its successful conclusion.
I

am indebted to Tom Wolff for his many years of guidance,

supervision, support and teaching in the work of prevention and C&E.
I

want to express my deep appreciation for his support for me and

my career.

I

hope that this work reflects to some degree Tom's

passion for prevention services and community work, a passion which
clearly sparked this particular research.
I

also want to thank the numerous mental health professionals

who gave freely of their time to help provide the data and interviews
on which this research is based.

iv

.

I

am also indebted to Andrea Sodano, my
"boss," without whose

patience, support and encouragement I would
probably be unemployed.
Finally,

would have given up this process long ago
if it

I

were not for the love and personal support
given to me by my family
and friends.

I

particularly want to thank my parents, David and

Phyllis Armstrong, for their love and faith in me,
and my friends,

Deborah Hulihan, Peter Miller, Mary Cassesso, Matt
and Jan McDonough
and Jonathan Aronoff for their vital help and
encouragement during
the years of work with this effort.

V

ABSTRACT

The Graduation of Consultation and Education Units
of Massachusetts

CMHCs from NIMH Funding:

Implications for the Prevention

Mission of the Community Mental Health Center
February, 1985

David J. Armstrong, Jr., B.A., Antioch College
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor David M. Todd

Primary prevention was frequently understood to be a central goal
of the Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) movement.

and education (C&E)

,

Consultation

as one of the mandated services of federally

funded CMHCs, was frequently taken to be the vehicle of this goal.
C&E services suffered, however, from a lack of clear guidelines and a

marginal role in agencies whose chief tasks were those of direct clinical
service delivery.

With the elimination of CMHC grants from the

National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in 1980, CMHCs were faced
with the challenge of having to restructure services in line with
available funding sources.
This research examines the fate of C&E services in the state of

Massachusetts since the elimination of NIMH funding.

A history is

presented of prevention, consultation and education starting with the

mental hygiene movement and reviewing CMHC legislation, developments in

vi

NIMH and research on the nature of C&E services and their
funding.
The recent fate of C&E services in Massachusetts was
studied

through the use of NIMH grant records and a survey of CMHCs

.

A

structured interview was conducted with thirty-three respondents in
twenty of the twenty-five former CMHCs in the state.

Case studies of

C&E grant programs are presented and compared with survey results
for C&E services across the state.

Block grants and state funding for

CMHCs and C&E is reviewed.

Results compare pre-1981 serivces with 1984 services and indicate
that C&E is less frequently offered and has shifted in goal orienta-

tions, activities and target populations toward sources of funding in
the private sector and direct service functions within the CMHCs.

preventive mission of CMHCs was found to have been minimal.

The

Changes

in funding patterns, do, however, threaten the direct service mission
of CMHCs in restricting funds for services to the working poor.

The

future of C&E is mixed, with limited opportunities for work in specialist

areas of training and consultation.

The future of prevention may be

less tied to CMHCs, and more dependent on the possibility of

organizing citizen constituencies which will effectively lobby state
legislatures to fund discrete prevention programs.
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CHAPTER

I

A HISTORY OF CONSULTATION AND EDUCATION
IN
MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS
Prevention and the Mental Hygiene and Child
Guidance Clinic Movements

How one feels about the current status of
consultation and education services in mental health depends on how
one interprets history.
And, feelings ranging from optimism to
bitterness run strong among the

small cadre of mental health professionals who
have specialized in

consultation and education.
The Community Mental Health Centers Act (Title II of
the Mental

Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction
Act, P.L. 88-164, 1963) gave birth to Consultation and Education
(C&E)
as one of five mandated services to be delivered by federally funded

mental health centers.

In his address to congress, President Kennedy

introduced the legislation with a speech which continues to echo in the

writings of consultation, education and prevention professionals 20 years
later.

The Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) Act was to introduce a

new era in mental health services where treatment would be available to
all in their communities.

Services would be progressive in offering a

range of alternatives to state hospitals and would be delivered by a

new mix of workers, integrating specialist professionals with paraprofessionals drawn from the communities served.

Most strikingly to

C&E specialists, the CMHCs were to be a vanguard of prevention in the

community, attacking the incidence of disorder at its root.

.
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If one takes President Kennedy's
words on prevention as the

definitive key note of CMHCs

,

then the history of C&E is one of a

betrayal of the mission of the community
mental health movement.

If,

however, as Snow and Newton (1976) suggest,
the CMHC Act is seen more
as an Eisenhower-era attempt at fairness
in the rights of all to see

the doctor, then the history of C&E is
one of an entrepreneural spirit

within CMHCs which served to keep experimentation
in service innovation alive in the centers, link the centers to
the outside world,
and build collaborative service networks which
integrated a variety
of resources and teachings.

guidance movement,

bom

Heirs of the mental hygiene and child

in the era of civil rights activism and social

upheaval, C&E incorporated the contradictions of a value-based

commitment to community change, delivered from a mental health
treatment facility, and measured against public health models of

prevention

Consultation and education services may be seen as the most
recent episode in the cycling history of prevention in mental health.
As prevention, C&E is a movement "whose time has come not once, but

many times," as Saul Cooper (1980) punned with the title of NIMH's
hopefully titled book, Primary Prevention
Come (Klein and Goldston, 1977).

:

An Idea Whose Time Has

Spaulding and Balch (1983) provide

striking examples of similar goals, concerns and even phrases cycling

through the twentieth century, linking C&E to earlier mental hygiene
and child guidance movements.

Founded in the outcry following the publication of Clifford Beer's
1908 autobiography of life in state institutions for the insane, the

3

National Committee for Mental Hygiene represented
professional and
citizen reforms concerned with the promotion of
mental health.

The found-

ing Connecticut chapter stated in its 1908
proclamation:

The chief purpose of this Society shall be to work
for conservation of mental health:
to prevent
nervous and mental defects: to secure and
disseminate reliable information on these subjects...
(Winslow, 1934, cited in Spaulding & Balch, 1983
p. 61).
The proclamation of a movement since discredited (its national

committee changed its name to "Mental Health" in the mid-1950 's to avoid

association with its past) carries a strong similarity to the goal
statements of many C&E units.
Child guidance clinics, based on Dr. Douglas Thom's Boston "habit

clinics," were promoted in the early 1920's by the U.S. Children's Bureau
as a preventive mental health program.

Adopted by the Mental Hygiene

movement as a "favorite son" (Spaulding and Balch, 1983), the child
guidance clinic was to intervene with parents, teachers and children
in teaching the proper method of child rearing designed to promote mental

health (much as one might promote good moral character).

Indeed, much of

the early child guidance work incorporated the concerns of John Watson

and other pragmatic American behaviorists with "bad habits," their

consequences and prevention in infants.
The early 1900

's

were years of great power for the sciences of behavior

and American society turned to its scientists for instruction in rational

child rearing.

Lomax, Kagan and Rosenkrantz (1978) offer a fascinating

history of the relationship between science and society in their Science
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and Patterns of Child Care

.

In summarizing "Watson and the
American

Tradition," they offer an example of the
early health promotion ideal
that framed the mental hygiene movement:

Watson's message could be summarized succinctly
to
an American parent in a single one-hour
lecture:
reward the behavior that you want your child
to
maintain and punish him for the behavior that
you do
not want him to maintain; apply that principle
consistently for 10 years and you will have produced
your "dream child." (Lomax, et al
1978)
.

,

Science offered society the rational and proven means of
being able
to "produce" a child's fate.

Aside from the obvious flavor of capitalist

industrialization, highlighted by the writers, the message was a strong
one:

society, through its parents, could produce criminals and juvenile

delinquents or it could produce upstanding magnates of industry.

Given

the choice, citizen movements could not help but proclaim their

support for mental health promotion, a cause somewhat broader than the

contemporary prevention of discrete disorders.
While originally reflecting the behaviorist optimism, child guidance
clinics also spearheaded the introduction of analytic theory, with much
of the same fate as that of many prevention efforts in soliciting an

increased demand for direct intervention or treatment.

Peaking in

popularity in 1932 with 674 clinics in 34 states, the number had
dropped to 260 by 1946 (Spaulding and Balch, 1983) and by that time

much of their emphasis had shifted to treatment:
Early clinics set as their goals the prevention of
juvenile delinquency and of mental illness. Present
day standards are more modest ... 'outpatient
psychiatric help' is shown not be be an insurance
against future ill health, but an aide to currently

.
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better functioning.
(Lindt, 1950, cited in
Spaulding and Balch, 1983, p. 63.)
It is interesting to note that in
Massachusetts the child guidance

clinics were the first non-inpatient settings
to receive direct state
support for treatment staff.

State professionals were placed in local

clinics at the behest of community parent and mental
hygiene

associations, creating the state's "partnership clinic"
system.

This

"partnership clinic" system, in the wake of the repeal of CMHC
legislation, remains the dominant publically-supported outpatient
resource in the state (Note

1)

General health promotion or education was supported by many means
in addition to child guidance clinics.

offered to parents,

"Scientific" advice has been

in the country for at least the past 80 years,

often in popular magazines and best sellers

.

The Children's Bureau

instituted a series of pamphlets entitled. Infant Care (1914 through
1945, as cited in Lomax

e_t

al

.

,

1978).

Mrs. Max West, author of the

first edition, emphasizes the vital importance of early education:
It must not be forgotten that the period of infancy
is a period of education often of greater consequence than any other two years of life. Not only

are all the organs and functions given their primary
education, but the faculties of the mind as well
receive those initial impulses that determine very
largely their direction and efficiency through life.
The first nervous impulses which pass through the
baby's eyes, ears, fingers, or mouth to the tender
brain makes a pathway for itself; the next time another
impulse travels over the same path, it deepens the
impression of the first.
1914, cited in
( Child Care
Lomax et al.
1978.)
,

,
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It is tempting to hear echoes of
this same concern for promotion/

prevention f or infants in Pierre the Pelican

a periodic parent guide to

early childhood development distributed
currently by C&E units and
pediatric branches of hospitals.

The same ferverent respect for the

possibilities of infancy have certainly continued to
dominate prevention
and developmental screening efforts, albeit
in a much more refined and

focused manner.
The mental hygiene movement supported in principle the
usefulness
of education and training, targeting populations
later favored by

C&E such as parents, school children, and teachers.
at the First International Mental Hygiene Congress

1930) included:

Topics discussed
(Washington, DC,

"organization of community facilities for prevention,

care and treatment;" "parent and teacher training;" and "marital

relationships" (Spaulding and Balch, 1983).

By the early 1950's the

movement had promoted mental health via education in mental hygiene
and sex education classes for school children, parent and teacher

training, human relations classes, mothers' classes for pregnant women,
and marriage clinics (Spaulding and Balch, 1983).

Early Federal Involvement in Mental Health

The rise of the role of the federal government in mental health
care

led

eventually to the demise of the mental hygiene movement

in the mid-1950 's and plants the seeds of the CMHC legislation

,

the

major federal action to date in mental health service delivery.
The early precursors to the National Institute of Mental Health offer

.
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some interesting, if speculative,
hints as to the concerns of the federal

government.

The Children's Bureau, publisher of Infant
Care, and

promoter of child guidance clinics, was actually
a division of the
U.S. Department of Labor.

Could it be possible that the Children's

Bureau at the turn of the century predates
corporate human resource
departments by 70 years in its concern with promoting
a productive

workforce?

Certainly the Children's Bureau, like many federal
offices,

took on a life of its own separate from its host,
and industry of character
has long been viewed as a strength of American mental
health.

NIMH, for

its part, may be traced to a blend of the Departments
of Labor,

Treasury and the Public Health Service.

The Narcotics Division of the

Treasury Department changed its name in 1930 to the Division of Mental
Hygiene in an explicit attempt to attack criminal behavior at its root
(a tradition which has continued to the present with some C&E units

receiving prevention grants from the Law Enforcement Administration

Assistance program)
The Public Health Service, with the Surgeon General as its spokes-

person, had long been a federal branch on the forefront of the war on
disease.

Of all the traditions in prevention, perhaps that of public

health has enjoyed the greatest tangible success, hence prestige and
legitimacy.

A service branch designed to adminster to the public

welfare at large, the Public Health Service implemented the findings of

medical breakthroughs in nutrition and infectious diseases made in the
late 1800

's

and early 1900 's.

The advances were startling as epidemic

diseases were controlled through simple sanitation and dietary interven-
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tions even before the discovery of
antibiotics in the 1940's.
of prevention was straightforward.

The model

"Pure" scientific research identi-

fied the metabolic or cellular cause of
a disease and then an intervention was designed targeted on the most
accessible point in the cycle of
the illness.

A highly scientific medical model, the Public
Health

Service, benefited from the early wave of
optimism where a single

specific treatable cause could be expected to be
discovered for an
illness, given time.

This ideal of "proven" scientific causality con-,

tinues to weight on psychiatry and mental illness
prevention, embodied
in the breakthrough in the treatment of neurosyphillis
made by Kraft-Ebing

and others at the turn of the century.

Medical prevention, itself, has

long since evolved beyond the single proven credo of causality to
far

more complex models where certain conditions are understood to place

populations "at risk" regardless of the specific, as yet undiscovered,

etiological mechanism.

The early public health model remains a yard-

stick, however, against which mental illness prevention has often been

measured and found wanting (Bloom, 1979).
The science of public health provided mental health with its

definition of prevention.

In public health, primary prevention is a

reduction in the incidence of a disease or condition (it occurs less
often)

.

Secondary prevention is the identification of diseased people

for early treatment before much, if any, harm occurs.

Tertiary preven-

tion is the curtailing of damage done and rehabilitation of a person.
In mental health, primary prevention is often simply called prevention

,

secondary prevention is often called early identification , and tertiary

prevention may be called treatment

,

direct service

,

therapy

,

or

rehabilitation

.

The range of prevention reflects the
success, for

instance, of community clinics, early
identification and specialty

hospitals in lowering the incidence of
tuberculosis.

Early identi-

fication and treatment in mental health have
yet to be shown to
lower the incidence of other people going crazy,
so primary prevention
is often argued to be the only prevention
in mental health (President's

Commission on Mental Health, 1978).
Wars have frequently emphasized to society its own
moral and

psychological failings, much to the professional benefit
of psychiatry
and psychology.

Freud's discovery of the repetition compulsion in

shell-shocked soldiers of World War

I

is even now being reassessed in

research on Vietnam veterans and post-traumatic stress disorders
(Van der Koke and others, suggesting a possible addiction cycle to

endogenous opiates, Note 2).

Of greater concern to society at large

was the 12.5% rejection rate on psychiatric grounds of inductees for the

American armed forces during World War II.

This concern led to the

passage in 1946 of the National Mental Health Act, amending the Public

Health Act of 1944, and creating the National Institute of Mental Health
(Snow and Newton, 1976)

.

Testimony by representatives of the Division

of Mental Hygiene, Children's Bureau and the Office of the Surgeon

General before Senate subcommittees made it clear that the pressing

national needs were ones of research and prevention in mental illness
(Spaulding and Balch, 1983)

.

Placed under the National Institutes of

Health, a branch of the Public Health Service, NIMH became the new
focus of national initiatives in mental health.

Hygiene was disbanded by 1949.

The Division of Mental

10

Research and public interest in the
causes of emotional disorder
continued to exert considerable
influence during the 1950 's on
prevention
and social policy.
Following the Coconut Grove tragedy
of the late
1940 's (where hundreds of
patrons died in a dance club fire),
research

by Erich Lindeman on grief and
adjustment led to his crises theory of

adjustment and disorder.

He founded the Wellesly Human Relations

Service as a community mental health
program for his prevention services.
(Thirty years later the Erich Lindeman
Center in Boston is one of the

largest state-owned mental health facilities,
devoted mostly to the

remedial treatment of the poor and chronic
populations.)

Research on

social structure and causes of mental disorder
(such as Hollingshead and

Redlich's Social Class and Mental Diseases

,

1958 and Scole, Langer,

Michael, Opler and Rennie's 1962 Midtown Manhattan Study
reflected an

increasingly more sophisticated appreciation of "the effects
of poverty,
racism, and increasing urbanization and the relationships
between social

class and other social factors and mental illness (Snow and Newton,
1976,
p.

585)."

Research on the psychological effects of racism was taken

into consideration in the Supreme Court's 1954 ruling on desegregation.

Perhaps the Supreme Court decision and the civil rights movement
in general framed the later C&E endeavor more than is generally

acknowledged.

Here a major national movement pursued fundamental societal

change on an ethical, principled basis.

The movement provided galvanizing

ima ges of tragedy, confrontation and victory and drew on the methods of

ommunity organization and development to build the coalitions which
ould act on society.

There was the conviction that society had to change

,

.
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for the betterment of its individual
members and that such change would
be brought about not by medical
specialists using public health tech-

niques, but by citizens and community leaders
organizing for legal and

political power.

It is perhaps this movement more than any
other that

contributed to the value conflicts of C&E professionals,
subtly shaping
their sense of mission with an invisible heritage
quite different from
that of their professional roles and the treatment
facilities in which

th6y worked.

The Joint Commission on Mental Health

The National Institute of Mental Health, created with a public health

mandate (Snow and Newton, 1976), served chiefly to coordinate the
expansion of research and training during the early 1950 's.

The Veteran's

Administration greatly expanded its psychiatric facilities and with the
major increases in funding made available by NIMH and the VA, graduate and

medical students moved in large numbers into clinical training, swelling
the national ranks of clinical-treatment oriented professionals.

When

Congress mandated in 1955 that a national study of mental health be

undertaken (Mental Health Study Act)

,

NIMH was given the responsibility

of designating a nongovernmental, interdisciplinary study group.

NIMH

chose the Joint Commission on Mental Health, a study group formed earlier
that year by the American Medical and American Psychiatric Associstions

Comprised at it was of 25 M.D.s

members)jthe Commission's

(out of 45

findings were largely treatment-oriented

.

Submitted to President Kennedy in 1961

(

Action for Mental Health )

:
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the Commission's report states:

A national mental health program
should recognize
that major mental illness is the
core problem and
unfinished business of the mental health
move-

ment, and that intensive treatment
of patients
with critical and prolonged mental
breakdowns
should have first call on fully-trained
members of
the mental health professions,
(p. xiv)

The conclusions were clearly not a
mandate for the prevention of

mental illness.

In fact, the report was highly critical
of the mental

hygiene movement as having been premature,
unscientific and ineffectual.
In support of this view, the Commission
cited Robert Hunt, from his

1956 presentation to the Milbank Memorial Fund:

"Our hopes of pre-

venting mental illness by mental health education
and child guidance
clinics have been disappointed and there is no convincing
evidence that
anyone has ever been kept out of the state hospital
by such measures"
(p.

9).

The Commission's own research (Americans View their Mental
Health,

Gurin, Veroff and Feld, 1960), had indicated that the vast majority
of

citizens turn to neighbors, family, clergy and family doctors for help,

rather than to mental health professionals.

As Snow and Newton (1976)

note, however, these results did little to shape the Commission's

recommendations
Yet in the Commission's final report, little
emphasis was placed on secondary preventive
approaches. There was scant discussion of the
need for educational and consultative approaches
to community service agents as a response to the
manpower problem and as a means of developing a
service network for people in need.
(p. 587)
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The report was met by an outcry
of protest by prevention
advocates,
not the least of which was Gerald
Caplan.

Soon to publish his seminal

work, Principles of Preventive
Psychiatry (1964), Caplan had specialized
in the late 1950

's

in the study of the process of
consultation to parents,

teachers, and service providers.

Spaulding and Balch (1983) note that

Caplan, himself, had been critical of
child guidance clinics for their

drift toward direct service and away from
prevention (Caplan, 1961).
For his part, Caplan was reportedly assured
that prevention was again

placed in the spotlight by President Kennedy's
address to Congress in
February, 1963, calling for legislation (Caplan,
1965; Spaulding and
Balch, 1983).

Historical analysis suggests, however, that what changes

were made were due less to popular opinion and more to
internal political maneuvers within the Executive Branch (Chu and Trotter,
1974;

Musto, 1975; Snow and Newton, 1976).
The Joint Commission was not the only agency to submit a report with

recommendations to the President in 1961.

A power struggle had developed

between the Public Health Service (responsible for service delivery) and
the National Institutes of Health (previously responsible in large

part for research).

The Surgeon General, representing the PHS

,

sub-

mitted a plan which would chiefly have served to strengthen the state
mental hospital system.

A planning group of NIMH, representing NIH,

submitted an opposing viewpoint, arguing that monies should go directly
to localities and not to state departments of mental health (and by

extension, state hospitals).

The President appointed a Cabinet level

committee, chaired by HEW Secretary, Anthony Celebrezze, to study the
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plans and make recommendations.

The committee chose, as its working

staff, professionals from NIMH.

The subsequent legislation passed by

Congress in 1963 authorized monies to go
directly to localities and

appointed NIMH to administer the grants.

It is something of an irony

that many of the former NIMH staff who
administered the CMHC service

program during the 1970

's

may not be found under the employ of PHS

regional offices, as NIMH returns more to a research
role after 20 years.
This was a power struggle that was won only for the
moment.

The CMHC Act;

Did It Promise Prevention in C&E?

In 1963, Congress passed Public Law 88-164, the Mental
Retardation

Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Cbnsttuction Act.

Title II,

the Community Mental Health Centers Act, provided federal monies
to qualifying applicants for the construction of Community Mental Health

Centers.

Applicants were to be local private nonprofit agencies or

collaboratives serving populations of 75,000 to 200,000 residents as

designated by a state approved geographical "catchment area" service plan.

Applicants also had to provide five mandated services, which included:
(1)

emergency services;

(2)

outpatient services; (3) partial

hospitalization; (4) inpatient services; and (5) consultation and
education.
What exactly was meant by consultation and education services and
what the concrete task of C&E was to be has never been clear.

Many

writers agree that prevention was to be inferred as a goal of the CMHC
movement in general and of C&E services in particular:

;
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Primary prevention per se was not listed
as one of
the five essential services (perhaps
in partial
response to the attitude of the Joint
Commission)
but preventive interests were to be
served to some
degree under the requirement to include
consultation and education services and later under
the
added services of research and evaluation
(Spauldine
&
^
and Balch, 1983, p. 71)
.

Saul Cooper comments that, "the federal mandate
for consultation and

education was meant to assure prevention programming"
(1980,

253)

p.

and Backer, Levine and Erchul, in their NIMH-funded
evaluation of C&E

activities (1983) conclude that, "C&E services from the
beginning have
been seen as largely preventive in nature"
(p. 3).
This role was, however, clearly a "challenge" both to the C&E
unit (Raber, 1983) and to the center as a whole (Steve Goldston,

former Director of Prevention at NIMH, 1969; cited by Raber, 1983).
As the only indirect service of the five, C&E could be assumed to have
a wide range of responsibilities for those tasks left unaddressed by

the other four direct services.
C&E:

(1)

Gabbert (1980) suggests four tasks of

responsibility for continuity of client care through systems

consultation with other area providers (often termed "networking")
(2)

training of caregivers to help shift personnel to community-based

descriptions, increase the use of local paraprofessionals reflective
of community norms and values, and increase dissemination of innovation;
(3)

early identification or secondary prevention through case consultation

to non-mental health providers; and (4) primary prevention in education

and community development projects for high risk populations.

This list

of tasks suggests that primary prevention was in fact only one of four
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C&E tasks and stands in contrast
to the characterization of
C&E units
offered in the Backer, Levine and
Erchul evaluation of C&E activities
(1983).

Their report suggests that primary
prevention was central::
^^^^"^ definition of C&E given in
f^^^'^iJf
^""T
the 1963 enabling
legislation for conununity mental
health centers, several basic orientations
of
these services became clear: first,
that C&E is an
outreach function more likely to be
community-based
than CMHC-based. Second, that
prevention of mental
illness is the major emphasis of these
programs.
Third, that both educational efforts
and consultation
with programs that provide direct or
indirect
mental health services are included under
this rubric
services that ideally have a "ripple effect"
/in
spreading impacts to _numerous people not
directly seen
by C&E professionals_7 (p. 5).

—

This suggests a fairly clearly defined
legislated role for C&E and

prevention in the CMHC movement.

Retrospective research indicates,

however, that C&E units typically represented only
4% of the work force
and 2% to 5% of the total staff hours of CMHCs
(Bass and Rosenstein, 1978;

Ketterer &Bader, 1977; Hassler, 1979; Backer et al.

,

1983).

C&E directors

often occupied lower positions organizationally than other
program

directors (Ketterer

&

Bader, 1977).

In fact, it seems from writings in

the field and the history of C&E in Massachusetts compiled in this

research that C&E units were not in many cases even created until 1976,
13 years after the passage of the CMHC Act.

A central contributor to the confusion is to be found in the vague
and ambiguous guidelines for C&E promulgated by NIMH.

Published first

in 1966 (NIMH, 1966) and later revised in the 1971 Policy and Standards

Manual

,

CMHC Program Handbook

,

Part

assigned the following two tasks:

I

(NIMH, 1971), the guidelines
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(1) Consultation with key community
caregivers to
enhance their skills in addressing
the mental health
problems of their clients and in developing
mental
health programs within their own community
organizations and (2) the provision of educational
programs to make the CMHC more accessible
for all
residents of the catchment area and to
promote
mental health and prevent emotional
disturbance
through dissemination of relevant mental
health
knowledge (NIMH, 1977 p23).
,

While clear enough as paragraphs go, this
particular paragraph was
assumedly meant to be the basis for evaluating
one-fifth of the performance of a multi-million dollar mental health
center, part of a movement

with prevention as a core goal.

Snow and Newton (1976) characterize the

first task as, "a rather conservative mandate, and
one that is

basically clinical in nature" (p. 589).

They point out that the second

task is the only mention in the entire manual of "a beginning
of a

discussion on primary prevention" (p. 589).

As a basis of evaluation,

notes from the 1966 manual are even more clearly ambiguous:
What proportion of the mental health staff should be
concerned with consultation? How much time should be
dovoted to it? Where should it take place? No absolute
guidelines apply to these questions.
(NIMH, 1966, p.
25)

And no absolute guidelines were applied.

Seven years after his first

review, David Snow returned to summarize the guidelines in an article

written with Thomas Wolff (1983).

They conclude that the guidelines

never adequately represented the assumed promise of prevention contained
in the CMHC Act:

Fairly traditional views of C&E were contained in
these documents and little attention was given to
prevention, even though prevention was presumedly
to be a major thrust of community mental health
centers.
(p. 40)

.
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While the spirit of the CMHC Act was taken
by many as a significant
programmatic commitment to prevention in the
form of C&E services,
NIMH regulations which defined the letter
of the law failed to reflect
such a spirit
The issue of NIMH regulations is central to
the history of C&E

services in several respects.

A discrete service entity commonly

referred to as "consultation and education" had not
existed before the
legislation.

Now it did and, conceptually at least, as one of five

mandated services it could be assumed to represent
one-fifth of a
center's resources (Snow and Newton, 1976; Backer

et_

al., 1983).

Apparently the concept was a compromise mixture of indirect services,
integrating mental health education with consultive services which could
involve individual education, clinical training, case outreach and

identification and direct clinical interventions mediated through a
third party.

Caplan's work in preventive psychiatry and consultation

(Theory and Practice of Consultation , 1970), while influential, was

certainly not definitive or accepted widely enough to assume that it

represented C&E.

Without a formal, external definition, C&E as a

service unit lacked any practical unity.

D'Augelli

(1980) charac-

terized C&E as a "service in search of a technology, an ideological
stance in search of a professional identity" (p. 5).

This dilemma was

one that C&E shared with its parent movement, prevention:

Primary prevention must overcome conceptual
organizational and professional threats to its existence. This is equally true of C&E as the prime
operationalization of primary prevention in mental
health (D'Augelli, 1980, p. 17).

19

Prevention and C&E were, perhaps, more
of a cause than a profession
or an agreed upon technique at
the time of the CMHC Act.

As a service unit without definition
placed in an organization which

faced pressing demands for service,
C&E staff activities could be

expected to be pulled into more clearly
defined administrative or
clinical roles.

Even as late as 1977

,

Ketterer

and aader found that C&E

staff spent less than half their time delivering
consultive or

educational services to the community.

As a consequence of the lack

of definition, C&E took on many identities
ranging from public relations

for the CMHC, to grant development for other
center programs, to

implementation of community and social change efforts (Snow
and Wolff,
1983, p. 39).

The press for direct service and the daily administra-

tive business of delivering that service exerted a powerful
distorting

influence on C&E from the beginning, at least as far as primary
prevention
was concerned.

Along with current controversies of prevention, the C&E mandate inherited an organizational contradiction of need and demand.

While,

all CMHC activities were to be based on local and state-wide needs

assessments, the centers responded most naturally to service demand.
In contemporary American society there has rarely been a demand for

prevention services.

For C&E this was often, in fact, a contradiction.

Many of the at-risk constituencies. identified by C&E needs assessments were
unorganized, disempowered minorities who frequently were not organized
or coherent enough to demand direct or indirect services.

School

children at risk of incest, acquaintence rape or alcohol related deaths
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are not likely to come to the
executive director of a center and
demand
a preventive program.

At times their parents or
teachers would, but

more often, once sensitized by
C&E services to the issues at
hand, such
representatives would request direct
clinical services for those
people (or cases from the service
perspective) that they were worried
about.
The complaint that prevention had
never demonstrated a
reduction in demand for state hospital
beds cited by the Joint Commission

would haunt C&E.

C&E services by their nature tended to
mix early

identification with primary prevention, increasing
demand for the direct
clinical services they were not mandated to
provide (Gottlieb and Hall,
1980).

Clinically-oriented case consultation is often a useful
and

necessary step in establishing credibility and
gaining entry to a community
or agency, permitting later program consultation
or system change.

Unfortunately, the generalist model of C&E, when placed
in the context
of a major direct service agency, was easily pressed
into the reactive

case-consultation end of this spectrum.
it,

"We can't give prevention away.

look at the kid!" (Note 3).

As one executive director put

The teachers want us to take a

Fifteen years after the legislation, and

well into the first wave of "graduate-CMHCs" (those centers who have
graduated from federal funding), Ketterer

^ind

Bader

(1977)

would note that

C&E had long suffered under the "press for direct services."

They

predicted C&E would be the first units to disappear because of such a
press.

Snow and Newton conclude:
It is in the nature of the clinical case task that
it tends to overwhelm and heavily subordinate all
other tasks unless strenuous efforts are made to

protect the others (p. 588).
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Snow and Newton introduce the
concepts of social task, structure
and
process (Newton, 1973; Levinson,
1973) to explain the popular
misunderstandings surrounding the CMHC Act
and its prevention mission.
The
social task is that endeavor which
is superordinate over all others
in an organization's mission,
its reason for existence.

within the organization reflects
this primary task.

Structure

Social process is

the process of fantasy, ideology
or imagery which surrounds the organi-

zation.

Snow and Newton argue that social process,
arising from

desegration and anti-Vietnam war era protests,
characterized the CMHC
movement as a radical task of social change.

C&E and prevention

services were taken as the structural representatives
of such a mission.

The fantasies of a radical mission were further
augmented by writings
in the field of academic community psychology
which characterized

the CMHC legislation as a movement.

The primary task as reflected by

the enacted structure of CMHCs was not one of prevention,
however, but

that of the extension of direct service:
It is clear that
primary task (of
clinical service
service ran well

to an overwhelming extent, the
CMHCs) was to extend direct
and that the task of indirect
behind.
(Snow and Newton,

1976, p. 589)

They note that in its primary task the CMHC Act may be judged as
something of a success, in contrast to the reactions of disillusionment
and loss concerning the

f ailure-to-thrive

syndrome of its C&E component.

While the passage of the CMHC Act was greeted by many as

a

new

commitment to prevention, it was the ideology of prevention more than the

work of prevention which gained the greatest strength.

.
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In their history of prevention,
Spaulding and Balch suggest that
as a prevention movement, the
CMHC structure, like that of the
earlier

child guidance clinic, precluded the
success of prevention activity:
Our reading of this literature suggest
that two of
the major preventive movements (i.e.,
the child
guidance clinic movement and the comprehensive
mental
health center movement) have been ill-fated as
they
have found themselves too entrenched in
service delivery
issues and settings.
(1983, p. 76).

Much of the consequent history of prevention and
C&E (abbreviated in
recent writings as P, C&E) is that of advances in
technology and sophis-

tication of delivery, surprising in light of the barriers
faced by this
service

Legislative History of the CMHC Act and
Subsequent Bills

The legislative history of the CMHC Act is one of frequent amendments, a continuous expansion of required services and repeated

crises over the expiration deadlines for federal funding.

The conse-

quences of this history include ever-increasing red tape in reporting
procedures, expansion of clinical service staff and programs, largely

dependent on direct federal funds, and an enduring barrier to long-term
fiscal planning by the centers.

Histories of this legislation may be

found in Chu and Trotter, 1974; Morrison, 1977; Sharfstein and Wolfe,
1979; Gabbert,

1980; NIMH,

1981; and Backer et al.

,

1983).

The 1963 Community Mental Health Centers Act (P.L. 88-164) originally

authorized money only for the construction of physical plants.

The

Act was ammended in 1965 (P.L. 89-105) to provide funds for personnel
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in the form of staffing grants.

Centers were to be eligible for

staffing grants for 51 months on a
decreasing scale from 75% to 30% of
the staff costs for the center
overall.

This declining scale was

known as the seed funding concept and
carried in it the seeds of
contradiction.

Seed funding was designed to help create
local treatment

centers which would reflect the mission of
comprehensive services

expressed in the federal legislation.

The service design of compre-

hensive services would offer a balance to state
mental health services

which were mostly oriented toward chronic, inpatient
mental health and
retardation populations.

After independent creation by the federal

government, however, the centers were expected to successfully
solicit
state, local and private funds, thereby eventually "graduating"
to

self-sufficiency.

The legislation, in part, represented an attempt

to influence public priorities for service funding on the state
level

through creating a lobby of agencies and a public expectation of services
on the local level.
on federal funds.

In reality, the centers remained largely dependent
As Gabbert states, "once begun, no one expected

Congress to abandon CMHCs if they ran into trouble" (1980, p. 25).
The legislation was amended 13 times between 1963 and 1980, when
it was replaced by the Mental Health Systems Act.

Following the

creation of staffing grants in 1965, the Act was amended in 1967
(P.L.

90-31) to extend funding to 1970.

The Act was amended in 1968

(P.L. 90-574) to extend services to substance abusers.

Amendments

in 1970 (P.L. 91-211, 91-513, 91-515 and 91-616) extended funding until
1973.

Staff grants were extended in duration to eight years for each
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center and the scale was modified
for poverty areas.

Additional
staffing monies were made available
for consultation and new
categorical
grants for children's services
were added. Funds were extended
for
drug treatment and prevention
and treatment of alcoholism.
Additional
drug service provisions were added
in
1972 (P.L. 92-225) and in 1973

funding for staffing, construction,
children's and substance abuse
grants were extended one year, to
1974.
The short extensions of funding
and the frequent amendments in
the early 70 's reflect the change
in attitude of the President.

Presi-

dent Nixon impounded funds in
1970, leading to staff reductions in

centers and at NIMH.

Battles for renewal of funding met stiff

resistance in Congress, leading to the single
year extension of funding
in 1973.

NIMH was placed under a newly created Alcohol,
Drug Abuse,

and Mental Health Administration.

(The bureaucratic chain of command

now ran from the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, to the
Public Health Service, to ADAMHA, to NIMH, to the
Division of Mental

Health Service Programs, a division of an institute of an
administration
of a service of a department.) The National Council
of Community Mental

Health Centers was formed in 1974 during a bitter struggle for funding
in which Congress met two presidential vetoes before finally
passing

amendment P.L. 94-63 in 1975.
The struggle to overcome presidential vetoes entailed a considerable
amount of pork barrelling in Congress with a number of changes added
to the CMHC Act as a result.

The five mandated services were expanded

to twelve, with the addition of children, elders, screening, follow-up
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care, transitional living,
alcohol, and drug abuse services.
In Massachusetts, it is interesting
to note that this legislation
led

several general hospitals to surrender
fiscal authority over their
CMHC grants.

The earlier grants could easily be used
to construct and

staff inpatient units, while subcontracting
some funds to area vendors
of outpatient services.

The additional services and reporting

requirements apparently made under this arrangement
les^ feasible

In some

.

ways, this amendment created a second wave
of CMHCs which were younger,

more outpatient-oriented, and yet, middle-aged
in terms of their CMHC

funding cycle.

A number of grant changes were included in the amend-

ment to facilitate transitions.

Staffing grants were changed to

operation grants to permit support of administrative personnel.

Con-

version grants were instituted to help start up new mandated
services
and distress grants were added to assist those early CMHCs which
were

now completing their eight-year cycle and facing

a

graduation crisis.

A new sliding scale was created and planning grants were added to help
communities organize for a full CMHC application, thereby encouraging
an expansion in new centers.

was extended three years.

And, of course, funding for the CMHC Act

In all, the 1975 amendment represented a

forceful, if complex, reaffirmation of federal involvement in service
delivery, with increased "monitoring of the performance of all federally

funded centers to insure their responsiveness to community needs and

national goals relating to community mental health care" (NIMH, 1981).
Perhaps of greatest import to C&E, the 1975 amendments created a

new categorical grant for C&E services.

The funding was placed on a
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three-year declining scale, but would
bottom-out at a base rate which
would then continue. Centers
receiving both C&E and operations
grant,
:s
were required to have a full-time
C&E director with direct line
access
to the executive director of
the center.

This legislation was

designed to address the previous neglect
of C&E services, placing a
financial and organizational floor beneath
the C&E service mandate
(Snow and Newton, 1976; Gabbert,
1980).

Public Law 95-83 (1977) allowed for a three
year phase-in of the

new services.

In 1978, P.L. 95-622 extended distress
grants and allowed

centers to retain up to five percent of their
grant funds from one

year to another.

This, for the first time, allowed centers to
accumu-

late a cash reserve, allowing for longer range
planning and alleviating

the cash-flow crisis which plagued many centers
(Gabbert, 1980).

Funding was again extended for the Act, this time until
1980, when new,

comprehensive legislation was expected.

A final amendment in 1979,

P.L. 96-32, changed accounting procedures.
In all, funding provisions were amended 12 times, in the end allowing
a center to receive one planning grant, eight operation grants and three

distress grants, for a total of

12

continuous years of funding.

Chil-

dren's substance abuse and C&E grants could be received over many of
these same years.

By September, 1980, 789 CMHCs had received 2.659

billion dollars and served catchment areas representing 55% of the national population (NIMH, 1982; Backer et al.

,

1983)

.

C&E grants totaled

40.9 million dollars or approximately 1.5% of all CMHC grant monies.

The Community Mental Health Centers Act was rescinded in 1980 with
the passage of P.L. 96-398, the Mental Health Systems Act.

President
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Carter had appointed a President's
Commission on Mental Health in
1977
to study mental health needs
and make recommendations for
change.
The
Committee issues its report in
1978, which included a report
from the
Task Panel on Prevention. The
Commission identified four areas where
change was needed, including the
following:
(1) failure to serve the

neediest populations, including
children, elders and chronically
disabled;

(2)

failure to adequately involve states
in funding or

planning;

(3)

failure to connect with medical settings;
and (4) a need to

expand prevention activities.

Critics of the report complained that it

downplayed CMHCs and the comprehensive
service model in favor of
increased state control and emphasis on
priority populations like the

deinstitutionalized (Gabbert

,

1980).

Research with graduate centers

had already indicated that increased reliance
on state funding led to
an elimination of the comprehensive service
profile and of indirect

services such as prevention (Naierman

et^

al.,

1978).

The Mental Health Systems Act increased the authority
of states to

coordinate the priorities and distribution of funds.

At the same time,

the Act continued funding of C&E, planning, financial distress
and initial

operations grants to CMHCs for one more year.

A non -revenue producing

services grant was to provide additional funding for services that could
not be billed as direct clinical costs, including case management,

evaluation research and, to some extent, C&E.

Prevention was separated

from C&E in the legislation, "undoubtedly contributing to further confusion in actually implementing (C&E) services" (Raber, 1983, p. 32).

A prevention center was to be created under NIMH with

$6

million to
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fund prevention activities.

It was felt that, with the
expiration of

C&E grants in 1981, indirect
services grants, prevention grants,
and

possibly even special population treatment
grants could be applied
for by existing C&E units (Wolff,
Note 4).

The Mental Health Systems Act is not
studied widely as a legislative

entity because it lasted less than a year.

Without the benefit of a

national study commission, the Reagan
administration effectively
introduced into Congress, lobbied for and signed
into law, P.L. 97-35,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1982, known more simply as

"Block Grants."
funding;

(2)

The block grants did three things:

(1)

cut total

collapsed ten categorical grants under AMAHMA into a

single block grant; and (3) awarded these grants directly
to state

governments (GAO, 1984).
The precise amount of reduction varies according to the reporting
service.

General estimates by the Massachusetts Department of Mental

Health (DMH, 1984) and anecdotal reports by CMHC directors in the
state, place the cut in mental health dollars to around 25%.

Federal

figures from GAO obscure the impact somewhat by combining all ADAMHA
funds together and frequently reporting them incompletely within the

combined federal, state, and private funds, which have risen.

According

to GAO figures, total federal dollars for alcohol, drug abuse, and

mental health services were cut 21% between 1981 and 1982.

They note that

many of these cuts were not felt at the service level immediately because

categorical grants awarded under the old system continued well into
1982.

(In Massachusetts, 84% of all federal funds in 1982 were still in

.

29

the form of categorical grants.)

The trend is clear, however.

Total
federal dollars for ADAMHA services
between 1980 and 1984 were cut
26%. at least 37% when adjusted for inflation,
which is the connnon

budgetary practice (GAO, 1984).
The ten categorical grants combined
in the Alcohol, Drug Abuse
and Mental Health (ADM) block grants
were taken from the categorical
grant programs of NIMH, NIAAA (National
Institute of Alcohol Abuse and

Addiction) and NIDA (National Institute for
Drug Abuse)

The three

.

institutes had previously awarded grants in
various ways.
issuing state contracts (block grants) since the
mid-70 's.

NIDA had been

NIAAA

awarded some grants to states and some to agencies
and individuals.

NIMH had, of course, awarded monies directly to
agencies, preferring
private non-profit corporations.
The stated goals of P.L. 97-35 provided for comprehensive
and

preventive services for substance abuse, but placed greatest importance
in mental health on the chronically mentally ill, already
a traditional

priority to states.

The provisions of the law required, first, that

20% of federal substance abuse funds go to prevention.

Second, all

CMHCs were to continue fionding for those years they would have been

eligible for CMHC funding (at reduced rates, according to a state
formula).

In Massachusetts, 9 of 25 CMHCs funded by NIMH in 1981

received sole source block grant awards in 1984.

Finally, all CMHCs

receiving sole source awards had to maintain the five original services
(at what level and by what definition was unspecified)
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The original legal, financial
and organizational mandate for
C&E
units ended with the termination of
C&E and operations grants from
NIMH.
In Massachusetts, most, if not all,
of these grants ended in September.
On a national level, the NIMH
Center for Prevention Research

1982.

(now the Prevention Research Branch)
survived miraculously with its
$6

million annual budget, funding only research,
mostly university or

medical school based.

NIMH, itself, shrank enormously as it
returned

to a research mandate, withdrawing from
its roles in community services

and training almost entirely.

Seed Funding and CMHC

While the original CMHC legislation is now gone, the
CMHCs and
many C&E units are not.

To understand the present environment in which

C&E services may (or may not) continue, it is necessary
to examine the

effects of "graduation" of CMHCs from federal funding.

As is clear

from the above history of legislation, the end result of graduation
was always an anticipated (if ambivalently) goal of the legislation.

The

process and consequences of graduation were studied for at least ten
years before the repeal of the CMHC Act.

Issues of graduation are

reviewed in detail by a number of writers (Morrison, 1977; Naierman
et al

.

,

1978; Sharfstein and Wolfe,

1978; Wasserman et al.

Gabbert, 1980; Woy and Mazade, 1982).

,

1980;

A brief review of these reports

in chronological order provides a progressively detailed description of

the consequences of graduation even as the CMHCs were graduating in

increasing numbers.
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The Stanford Research Institutes
reported in 1970 (Harvey, 1970)
that less than half of CMHCs received
greater than 20% of their funding

from states.

While individual profiles varied greatly,
fees and

insurance rarely covered more than 20%
of the budget.
were negligible.

Other sources

The Stanford study, like those that
followed, focused

on sources of funding because in large
part the nature and sources of

funding determined what services the CMHC
would deliver.

A study by

Macro Systems, Inc. (MSI, 1973) confirmed the
Stanford study results,

noting a wide variability in centers' success
in getting funds other than
CMHC grants and noted a general lack of long term
planning in the

management of CMHCs.
The General Accounting Office (GAO)

(GAO, 1974) surveyed the

financial status of CMHCs and reported that third-party payments
were
too limited in availability and rates to offer a viable
replacement of

federal funds.

Fee-for-service was noted as inappropriate for many of

the lower income and poor populations that were to be reached by CMHCs.
It also commented on the poor quality of CMHC management and

accounting procedures.

In 1975, the National Council of Community

Mental Health Centers (NCCMHC) reported that 60% of centers graduating
from staffing grants were forced to reduce staff significantly and
realign their service priorities with the goal of acquiring funds.

They

noted a shift away from CMHC comprehensiveness and towards more medical
model /inpatient emphasis.

Landsberg and Hammer (1977) express similar

concerns that graduate CMHCs might be turned into outpatient and
intake screening branches of state hospitals.
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Naierman, Raskins and Robinson reported
one of the most thorough
studies to date in their book, Community
Decade Later (1977).
at that time (99)
5

^

They surveyed all centers which had
graduated

and categorized them by their age.

Centers between

and 8 years old evidenced some ability
to replace declining federal

dollars with fee-for-service and third-party
sources.

By the 10th year,

however, these sources had reached a maximum
plateau of utility.

State

and local dollars were either unavailable
or carried new restrictions

and priorities in service population (such
as emphasis on chronic

inpatient and deinstitutionalized clients).

In general, graduate

centers evidenced some tendency to "retrench" their
services, moving
away from C&E, prevention and even outpatient programs
in favor of

service for the more severely disabled.

They note that fiscal viability

for these centers stands almost at odds vrLth the CMHC ideology.

NIMH entered the scene in 1979, when some form of massive graduation
could be expected from upcoming legislation, with a series of studies.

Weiner, Woy, Sharf stein and Bass (1979) noted that graduate centers
could be divided into "true" and "quasi" graduates.

True graduates were

those centers that did not take advantage of distress grants and conversion

grants to delay the inevitable, but rather assumed total independence

from federal funding.
long as possible.

Quasi graduates did extend federal funding as

True graduates were found to be more assertive in

seeking funding, but also had moved further away from the CMHC mission
of comprehensive services for all.

this mission.

Quasi graduates retained more of

The authors challenged the seed funding concept and
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concluded that some floor-level
funding was necessary to continue
the CMHC-like center.

Wasserman, Woy, and Weiner-Pomerantz
(1980) confirm these
findings, noting a wide variability
in center profile, but a general
shift along the lines described
earlier.

They argued in their

sunnnary for continued funding,
especially for non-reimbursable services

such as C&E.

Reporting on a NIMH-sponsored "National
Conference on Graduate

Mental Health Centers" held in 1980, Woy
and Mazade (1982) summarize
the conclusions of executive directors
of CMHCs and state, local and

federal experts assembled by the Conference as
a working task force.

Participants saw the "original CMHC ideology and
template of mandated
services as disappearing" (p. 214).

Indirect services declined as a

"high clinical," "medical" orientation prevailed.

Participants

reported pressures from state departments of mental health
to focus
more on chronic populations and state officials saw services
declining
overall, with little prospect of increased state funding.

Attention

was focused on management, planning, reimbursement and private practice

models for survival.

The authors conclude with four core recommen-

dations, the second of which called for "ongoing 'floor funding' by
the federal government for CMHC service not readily reimbursable from

other funding sources" (p. 222).
To say that the seed funding approach failed would be simplistic.

Clearly the approach allowed for the creation of a number of mental

health centers and probably exerted an enduring impact on the profile of
available mental health services in America.

The full impact of the CMHC

:
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movement has yet to be evaluated and
it may be many years before
an
objective assessment can be made. The
research reviewed documents,
however, that state, local and
third-party funds failed to support
the service profile or "mission"
of CMHCs as conceived by federal

legislation.

The precise cause of this failure is
unclear and involves

far too many variables for this review.

Overall, it can be concluded

that the seed-funding concept entailed
an inherent contradiction, that
of expecting centers to successfully
market not only their clinical

products, but also their ideological basis.

Naierman and others in

1978 had observed that fiscal viability and continued
CMHC-like

structure often appeared to be at odds.

Backer and others (1983),

in evaluating C&E services for NIMH concluded that
centers which

failed to solicit new funding sources often suffered from the
mixed

message of the seed funding concept
Thus, CMHCs were not remiss in going after payments
for services, but rather were following the ideology
of the movement along with the unresolved issues
of the reality of seed money funding." (p. 4)

Reviewers such as Gabbert (1980) and Sodano (1982) point out a

number of barriers to self-sufficiency inherent in the CMHC legislation
and its enactment by NIMH.

The failure to involve state departments of

mental health in the development of a CMHC philosophy is central to
understanding the current situations of CMHCs, and by extension, of C&E.
As reviewed earlier, the original CMHC Act represented a victory of

sorts by NIMH in its attempt to prevent monies from being used for the
state hospital systems.

In rejecting the state hospital system (the
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dominant force in many state
departments of mental health)

,

the

legislation paved the road for the
later dilemma of CMHCs. States
were given merely a "tangential"
role by NIMH (Sodano, 1982).
While
there was great variability in
state's relationships with CMHCs,
in many cases the structure
and priorities of service delivery
by state

governments were unaffected by the
CMHC movement (Naierman et al

.

,

1978;

Gabbert, 1980).

Exceptions were noted in which decentralized
state departments of
mental health (DMHs) designated CMHCs
as their service representatives
and continue to this day to reflect
much of the CMHC orientation

(Naierman et al.

,

1978).

In many cases, however, NIMH and CMHCs

maintained antagonistic or neutral relations
with state DMHs (Gabbert,
1980)
.

The subsequent budget crises of many state
and local govern-

ments has served to exacerbate the resistance
of states to underwrite
CMHCs.

Robert Okin

,

then Commissioner of Mental Health in Massachusetts,

described a variety of barriers to the development of
a comprehensive
service profile in the state (Okin, 1978).

The largest portion of

DMH resources were devoted to inpatient services, despite an
ongoing

process of deinstitutionalization which lowered the average daily
inpatient census from more than 20,000 in 1960 to approximately 1,800
in 1983 (DMH, 1984).

Okin noted that the first patients to leave state

hospitals actually represented a hospital work force which had to be
replaced by hired staff.

Increasing demands for treatment over

custodial services also contributed to escalating costs with a decreasing
census.

Okin noted also the conservative resistance of public employee
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unions and local connnunities
which relied on the hospitals
for
employment.
In all, the priorities of
a focus on the neediest,
chronic
population, the increasing costs
of inpatient care, and the
neutral or
antagonistic relationships established
with NIMH all contributed to

resistance by many state DMHs to
adopting the CMHC program wholesale.
As noted by several researchers
above, the graduation of CMHCs

typically placed indirect services in
jeopardy first.

As non-

reimbursable services, much of program
evaluation, C&E and staff training
functions were not covered by highly
restrictive medicaid or insurance
plans.

A variety of "survival" plans were offered
to CMHCs during the

forced graduation of 1981 (conference
participants often termed it

"abandonment"

^oy

and Mazade,
1982 J), plans which frequently

recommended the reassessment and possible elimination
of non-fund

producing programs.

Illustrative of such advice are the "77 Action

Strategies for Survival" published by the Council of
Management of
the NCCMHC (Goplerud et al., 1983).

The second strategy recommends that

directors "reduce or eliminate services that do not produce
revenues"
(p.

65).

Other suggestions included the following:

"allow the govern-

ment to support its own priorities"; "focus on core mental health

services"; "cultivate middle and upper class clientele"; and "prioritize

non-billable services for cutbacks by their contributions to securing
revenue."

The author's conclusions predict significant elimination and

replacement of programs based chiefly on the income value of the service,

suggesting that executive directors:
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...review organizational
missions and priorities
To remain viable, centers
may have to lea^e tlllr
^'^'^^^ ^"'^
di^feren
staff
taff and programs.
To make these changes
centers may have to lay
off Starr
staff in oif
old programs
ofat
the same time new
programs are being
^
developed.
(p. 72)

^^^^

.

Needless to say. staff morale
in many CMHCs suffered
during the
early 1980s, with severe
cutbacks in staff, elimination
of entire programs, the introduction of
production quotas and a preference
for

fee-for-service staff positions.

The contradictions inherent
in the

seed funding concept left
C&E the most vulnerable of the
five

mandated services.

.

Frequently producing a minimum of
monies (an

average of 1% of CMHC revenue
in 1975 /Bass and Rosenstein,
19787 )
C&E was often defined as
administrative overhead, an overhead
which
had to be cut for suvival in the

.

1980s.

Developments in Preventi on, Consultation
Technology. 1960-1980: A Struggle of

;,nH Education
Paradigms

The practice and theory of consultation,
education and prevention

had continued to develop during the
1960s and 1970s, benefiting from

popular ideology of community mental health.

Something of a history

of developments is suggested in the series
of titles published by Gerald

Caplan and Ruth Caplan during this time:

Psychiatry (G
(G.

.

Principles of Preventive

Caplan, 1964); The Theory and Practice of Consultation

Caplan, 1970)

;

Helping the Helpers to Help (R.

Caplan, 1972);

Support Systems and Community Mental Health (G. Caplan,
1974); and
Support Systems and Mutual Hel£ (G. Caplan and M. Killilea,
1976).
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The consultee target
population evolved fro. case
consultation

With professionals to an
ever widening range of
fonnal and informal caregivers, including clergy,
teachers, police and active
neighbors or co^unity "gatekeepers."
D'Augelli (1980) sketches a useful
history of
developments in consultation and
education, noting the increasing
emphasis
placed on reaching the consultee
closest
to the case in the day to
day

life of the coHMunity.

Natural helpers and qualitatively
different styles

of informal caregiving and
social networks were more fully
explored.

(Collins and Pancoast

,

1976

;

Fr^_tod et al

.

,

1980).

The psychological

basis of community was reviewed
by community psychologists such
as
Seymour Sarason in his, The Ps^^cholo^ical

(1977a).

With the shift in populations came
a shift in target activity, with
consultation goals moving from individual
client improvement to general
systems change in organizations or
communities.

As such, consultation

began to include more education and group
training (D'Augelli, 1980),
and to include community development
activities such as coalition

building and linking between resource groups.

Theories of social networks

and social support gained credibility with
research results correlating

psychological well-being and even raw mortality rates with
structure and
frequency of personal social contact (Berkman and Syme

,

1979).

Mutual

help and self help increasingly were favored as goals
of community

interventions (Caplan and Killilea, 1976).

Network consultation frequently

integrated case-oriented consultation with natural caregivers with

community development, linking education and the promotion of mutual
help networks or organizations.

As such, issues such as individual change
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as opposed to systems change
and primary prevention as
opposed to early

Identification and treatment gradually
began to blur In a somewhat
fluid
community practice. It is perhaps
this generalist quality which
most
Characterized much of C&E activity.

Mental health education ranged in
development from center public
relations and inservice trainings
for CMHC staff, to workshops and
conferences for a wide range of formal
helpers, to seminars in self-help,
health promotion and wellness for the
general public.

Mass media was

enlisted as a direct vehicle for primary
prevention, most notably in the
field of alcoholism, spearheaded by
NIAAA and National Highway Safety
adds.

Despite criticisms that mental health educators
had "little or

nothing specific and practical to tell the
public" (Davis, 1965),
national interest had continued to grow (D'Augelli,
1980).

The National

Committee of Mental Health Education published
guidelines in 1977 which

provided a concrete definition of mental health education
targeted at
three populations:

the general public; "non-client", "non-patient"

populations at risk; and clients, patients and significant others
(NCMHE,
1977).

D'Augelli cites the last two

NCMHE objectives under the third

target population as examples of how consultation and education

practices had begin to "intertwine":
4.

5.

Education to those in the community who are
in a key position to effect the lives of others.
Education of those who are in a position of
influencing and effecting public policy.
(NCMHE, 1977, p.

3)

Not all consultation and education was prevention and not all prevention

was C&E, but the boundaries were quite overlapped by the later 1970s.

,
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The scientific legitimacy
of .ental illne.s
prevention had also gained
scewhat in stature, furthered
considerably by the annual
Vermont
Conference on Primary Prevention
organized by George Albee and
others,
starting in 1975. The conference
published an annual book of
proceedings and papers organized
around yearly topics such as
psychopathology
Children and socio-political
interventions. Reviewers of
literature noted
the growing evidence of the
efficacy of primary prevention
(Munoz
1976)
despite difficulties in evaluation
research design (Bloom, 1979}.
,

NIMH entered the fields on a
major level in 1976 with a Pilot

Conference in Primary Prevention.

Primary Prevention
1977)
,

:

Editions of the published proceedings,

An Idea Whose Time Has Come

,

(Klein and Goldstein,

advocated the importance of preventive
interventions while

criticizing the methodological inadequacies
of many prevention projects,

particularly in the specification and measurement
of effects or outcomes.
C&E activities were criticized specifically
by the authors as being

vague and imprecise to the point of not
actually practicing prevention:
...consultation and education, although a
required service, has become a term without
precise meaning used to encompass and legitmize
a variety of activities usually regarded to
be
of minor significance among CMHC top leadership.
The term 'prevention' is used frequently
in the same vague way to gain acceptance for a
range of popular activities having little or
no demonstrably significant preventive
impact.
(pgs. vi-vii)
This sharp criticism reflected both the nebulous definition
of C&E services
and the perspective of a particular group within the prevention
movement

which adhered to the public health model of medical research.

Prevention

.
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fro. this perspective could
only be Justified as
rigorous experimental
field research using precise
measurement techniques to test
hypothesis.
Unfortunately, debates over the
nature of true prevention
frequently
seemed to be more of a foil
for time-honored debates over
what is true
science, and true research
technique. C&E units, representing
the
small portion of CMHC resources
that they did and based in
service
delivery settings, were not ideal
sponsors of prevention research.
As with the Joint Commission in
the 1950s, the histories of
preven-

tion science and mental health
legislation again overlapped in a national
study. The President's Commission
on Mental Health (1978).
The Commis-

sion's Task Panel on Prevention assembled
a configuration of profes-

sionals different from that of the earlier
Joint Commission.
panel membership included:

The task

six Ph.D. psychologists, two M.D.s (one
with

a specialty in public health), an
M.S.W.. a lawyer, and an executive

director of a CMHC.

National advocates of the prevention movement
were

represented, including Emory Cowen, Bernard Bloom
and George Albee
The report of the Task Panel on Prevention
(President's Commission
on Mental Health, 1978) represented a forceful
reaffirmation of the

legitimacy and need for prevention in mental health services.

Prevention

was characterized as the fourth "revolution" in mental health
service

(following Pinel, Freud and CMHCs)

.

Arguments offered in support of

prevention maintained that there would never be "enough" direct clinical
service available, that no disorders had yet been reduced in incidence
by direct treatment alone, and that, in light of the proven efficacy of

prevention technology, society was forced by economic, moral and ethical

imperatives to .ove toward a
preventive practice in .ental
health
services.
Barrington Moore is cited In
support of this view:
'•Uu^^.n
society ought to be organized
in such a way as to
eliminate useless
suffering" (President's Coinmission
,

1978, p.

1828).

The Task Panel took clear
and definitive stands on a
number of
issues, not the least of which
was the definition of primary
prevention, in which they linked
lowered incidence of Illness with
health
promotion:

Primary prevention means lowering
the incidence of
emotional disorder (1) by reducing
stress and
by promoting conditions that
increase competence and coping skills.
It is proactive
it
often seeks to build adaptive
strengths through
education and reduce stress through
social
engineering (p. 1825)

—

.

This definition was illustrated by
Albee (1981) as a formula:

incidence of
emotional distress

organic factors and stress
Competence(skills) + Self-esteem +
Social-support

Interventions diagnosed to "prevent" the numerator
or to "promote" the

denominator would both lower the incidence rate.
The Panel observed in its summary that models of
prevention in

public health had made an important shift in paradigm,
^avoring high
risk concepts of etiology rather than, "the futility
of searching for
a unique cause for every emotional disorder"
(p.

1826).

As such, in

response to the academic debate on true science and prevention, they

argued for the moderate-left position that "successful efforts at
the prevention of a wide variety of disorders can occur without a theory
of disorder-specific positive causal mechanisms" (p.

1826).
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As part of their mandate,
the panel Identified
barriers to the
development of prevention,
barriers which take on added
slsniflcance
in light of the subsequent
repeal of the legislation
this report
supported. Barriers Included
the following:
(1) a crises orlentat:
:ion
in society which deprived
prevention of any "constituency
or
political clout"; (2) a history
of motivation, training and
identity
in mental health professionals
which valued direct clinical
service;
(3) the sensitive and "threatening"
nature of prevention as "social
and environmental change"; and
(4) the competition with clinical
service
demand for scarce resource dollars.

A final list of "Catch 22" barriers
reflected in many cases the
limits and failings of CMHCs and
C&E units.

Many of the conditions

listed below may be taken as direct
references to the plight of C&E

units as agents of prevention:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Fiscal allocations for primary prevention
dollars rarely exist, or at best are
pitifully small.
We lack appropriate administrative structures
charged with the responsibility of promoting
the development of primary prevention.
Personnel trained in the ways of primary
prevention are in extremely short supply.
Moreover, they tend to be the last hired
and the first fired.
Few professionals are assigned to primary
mental health activities on a sustained
full-time basis.
Activities that are labelled primary
prevention often, in fact, are not that
at all.
(p.

1836)

While not restricted to C&E services alone, the Panel's remarks did
appear to refer directly to the financial, organizationa,!; personhfl.

and progra^Mng difficulties
encountered by C.E units vrithln
their host
CMHCs.

A power struggle in the Commission
developed subsequently over the
Panel's positions and recommendations,
a struggle which reflected
many of
the barriers listed above
(Albee
1981; Spaulding and Balch, 1983).
The
.

Commission's report did. however, in
the end include a strong recommendation for prevention services.
In turn, this recommendation
encountered
resistance from an HEW Task Force
charged with proposing specific
•

legislation (HEW Task Force. 1978).

The concerns of the Task Force

seemed "well worn" at this point, echoing
concerns that seemed to

recycle "in many guises over the decades"
(Spaulding and Balch, 1983).

Critics noted that a specific cause of mental
illness had yet to be

proven and that without such proof, no prevention
program could be
shown to actually "innoculate" a specific
individual (HEW Task Panel,
1978).

The perseveraa:ive: quality of scientific criticisms of
prevention

services deserves comment.

Spaulding and Balch (1983) note the

similarities in language and argument of the HEW Task Panel's report
to those of critics of the mental hygiene movement.

The criticisms and

reservations concerning prevention in mental health mirror those of
tobacco industry experts concerning lung cancer.

While the Surgeon

General laments that smoking has yet to be banned, considerable
investments have been made in prevention messages on cigarette
packages.

These investments were made before the precise biological

mechanism of lung cancer has been discovered and even before strong proof
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existed that messages on the
cigarette package would be an
effect:ive
prevention intervention. A similar
federal and legislative attitude
has not existed in mental health
prevention.
If anything, the
perseverative quality of the stock
arguments pro and con (already

phrased with great accuracy by Munoz
in 1976) reflects a conflict
of
fundamental "paradigms" in society
and the professional sciences
of
service technology.

As such, the history of prevention
and C&E is not

so much one of developing technology
or scientific research, as it is

a

professional guild issue of ideology,
legitimization and world view
(Kuhn, 1978; Habermas

,

1973; Fay, 1975; Jacoby

,

1975).

It is perhaps a dawning appreciation
of this fact, in the context

of historical frustration, which led
to a trend in the writings of

prevention advocates during the later 1970s toward
social commentary.
This trend combined a new social realism with
an impatience with the

traditional approaches and goals of prevention technology.

Snow and

Newton (1976), reviewed above, pointed out with stark
clarity that the
source of disillusionment felt with the CMHC movement was
fed by fantasies of a new prevention mandate which was never really
encoded
in the actual legislation.

Albee, in his "Politics, Power,

Prevention and Social Change" (1979) and "Preventing Prevention
in CMHCs"(1981)

continued this realism by pointing out the failings of

CMHCs and emphasizing political power and social changes as keys to the
fate of prevention services in this society.

Others, such as Seymour

Sarason ("Community Psychology and the Anarchist Insight

Julian Rappaport
Over Prevention

,"

(

'In

Praise of Paradox

:t

,"

1977b)

,

and

Social Policy of Empowerment

1981) pointed out the contradiction of seeking social
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change through the sponsorship
of government agencies
(CMHCs)
Indeed,
social change itself was now
suggested as the most appropriate
goal
of prevention.
The Fifth Annual Vermont
Conference on Primary Prevention
(1979) had as its theme prevention
through political and social change.
The growth of this perspective
reflected both the realities of the
.

struggle for survival faced by C&E
in the CMHC legislation as well
as
a growing realization that the
argument of legitimization for prevention

was one that had to be made to society
at large, outside of the rules
and practices of "normal" science
(Kuhn, 1978).

Realities of Time, Structure and Practice
in C&E Units

Concerns about the lack of definition for C&E
services in the CMHC
Act and NIMH guidelines (reviewed above) were
reinforced in the early
1970s by indications that C&E services were not being
delivered in any

consistent form by CMHCs.

Legislation amending the CMHC Act in 1975

sought to provide "floor" funding for C&E services in
acknowledgement of
"the fact that a significant portion of such efforts constitute
a

public service for which reimbursement was not readily available"
(Backer

et_

al

.

,

1983, p.

7

and Pomerantz and Stockdill, 1983, p. 23).

New regulations for both CMHC operation grants and C&E grants required
that an identifiable C&E unit be headed by a full-time director with

direct line access to the center's executive director (that is, on a

par with other service heads).

In all, the legislation was designed

to provide special support for the "often misunderstood and neglected

.
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CE

service- (Gabbert, 1980.
p. 13).

The legislation was successful

to some degree in creating
.ore specialists and specialized
C.E programs
during the second half of the
1970s (Schelkin et al.
1980).
,

Little data had been collected
up to this time concerning
what
C&E services were and how they
functioned within centers. Rough
measures
had suggested that C&E hours
had peaked in 1973 at 4.8% to
5.5% of total
staff hours in CMHCs dropping
by 1977 to 3% of total staff hours
.

(Bloom, 1977; Hassler, 1979).

Backer and others (1983) cite NIMH

records which indicate an average
in the mid 1970s of C&E hours at
4.1%.

Bass and Rosenstein (NIMH, 1978)
offer a detailed analysis of

1975 government figures in which C&E is
combined with "public infor-

mation" and "public education" functions
(suggesting an enduring
confusion over the definition of C&E, which
supposedly already included
the latter functions)

.

Out of an average of 94 full-time staff

equivalent positions (PTE's) in CMHCs,
one FTE was devoted to PE/PI

hours.

,

3

FTEs were devoted to C&E and

for an average of 4% of total staff

It was noted that children, as a target
population, received

about half of C&E service time and that C&E staff hours
were divided

overall in approximately one-half case consultation, one-third
program
consutlation, and one-fifth staff development or continuing education

activities
The authors examined C&E time by age of the center and found
a trend in decreasing C&E hours as a fraction of total staff hours, a

decrease which reflected the diminishing federal support in seed
funding as CMHCs approached graduation.

.
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Ketterer and Bader (1977)
noted slightly different
trends in activity
tl.e using a .ore detailed
case analysis of four C.E
units in Michigan.
They noted that C.E staff
devoted only 49.6% of their
ti.e to actual
co^unity activities, with 22%
of C.E ti.e devoted to
administrative and
training services within the
host CMHC and 28.5% of time
connnitted to
C&E planning and maintenance.

In fact, C.E staff typically
spent a

fair amount of time attempting
to legitimize and justify
their own
existence to the host center
(D'Augelli, 1980). These concerns
were
reflected in C&E goal statements
which frequently targeted the host
center itself for education in an
attempt to increase the C&E unit's

standing (Ketterer and Bader,
1977).

The overall decline over time of

staff hours devoted to C&E was
understood to reflect the low priority
of C&E services as federal monies
decreased and centers placed a greater

emphasis on reimbursable services (Backer
et al.

,

1983)

The actual organization of C&E units
within CMHCs took several

different forms.

Ketterer and Bader (1977) proposed a list of
three

types of C&E units, including:
model; and the mixed type.

the specialist unit; the generalist

The specialist unit consisted of staff

designated for more than 50% of their time as C&E
specialists.
They typically worked together as a team.

Bergner (1981) notes that

specialist units tended to have higher levels of expertise in
P, C&E
activities, tended to protect C&E projects from encroachment by
demands
for direct service, and often became well known to the community
as a

discrete entity having a reputation of its own.

Specialist units were

also more isolated from the rest of the center, contributing to a

limited appreciation of the value of C&E by other center staff.

Specialist C&E units were easier targets than generalist models for lay-
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offs during ti.es of fiscal
crises in the centers (Backet
et al.
Specialist units probably also
produced the most prevention-like

.

1983).

activities of the three C&E unit
types.
Generalist models coordinated C&E
activities as a small fraction
(5% to 30%) of direct service staff
positions.

As such, generalist

models tended to integrate C&E as
one technique or orientation
within
clinical programs. Generalist C&E
activities reflected the concerns
of these programs, often without
a unified center goal or philosophy

concerning C&E.

While generalist models promoted a
greater appre-

ciation of the value of C&E throughout
the center, the model had distinct

weaknesses.

Chemiss (1977) portrayed these vulnerabilities
most

clearly in his case study of a generalist model
C&E unit in one CMHC.
C&E projects, carried out as a fraction of
clinicians' time, were

wiped out at a crucial point of development when
a service "crunch"
occurred which demanded all of the clinicians' time.

Integrated

generalist models had little visibility as discrete services
in the
community, and low priority under treatment pressures, allowing
poorly

defined projects to "erode" and disappear (Schelkin e^ al

.

,

1980).

Mixed models incorporated the strengths and weaknesses of
both structures with a core specialist team responsible for coordi-

nating some percentage of generalist staff time scattered throughout the
center.

Anecdotal reports suggest that mixed types frequently did not

integrate specialist

an'd

gereralist models so much as allow them to exist

side by side, with specialist staff pursuing C&E projects and

clinical staff doing case management, case conferences with other
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agencies and schools and service
networking on a case by case
basis as
perMtted by progra. directors.
Although few. If any, measures
are available. It could
be argued that .ost clinical
staff did so.,e for.
Of C&E of the case maHagement
variety.

Mixed and generalist models
both depended to a greater extent
than specialist units on
Institutional support to protect and
define
C&E activities. As such, C&E
activities within these models
frequently
reflected the philosophy of the
center's executive director and
his or her investment in
prevention conmlt at ion and education
goals.
,

Bergner (1981) recommends that
centers without a P. C&E "ideologycreate specialist units to protect
the integrity of the service.

She

also usefully notes that generalist
models actually enjoyed some

success in smaller centers (with greater
staff cohesion around a

unified

center identity) and in rural centers where
generalist roles

in mental health often proved more
effective across programs.

Innovations in structure and monitoring were
proposed during the
later years of 1970, due in part to the need to
protect C&E services
and make them cost-effective during center
graduation from federal funds.

A "matrix" model of management created C&E project
teams which
integrated specialist and generalist staff and rotated
leadership of
project teams based on the task at hand and the strengths of
the

team members (Schelkin et al

.

,

1980).

Of particular Interest were MIS

systems which allowed C&E directors to contract for and track the deliv-

ery of generalist C&E service time scattered throughout the center staff
(Kaghey, 1981).

It was hoped that such systems would allow C&E units
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to document their value
and take financial credit
for work and

income produced by generalist
C&E activity.
The frequency of the three
C&E unit types has not been
measured.
It appears that specialist
units were more common in those
CMHCs

which received categorical C&E
grants (149 of 789 or 19% of
CMHCs).
The actual formation of a C&E
unit was frequently, however,
a fiction
of record-keeping designed
to protect the center's
eligibility for
operation grants.

This condition is mentioned by
Backer and

others in their 1983 evaluation
of C&E activities:
Most CMHCs have tended to develop
"separate
C&E units" in name only, because of
previous
federal funding requirements, and in
actuality
have conducted C&E activities with
part-time
personnel in conjunction with direct service
and administrative programs of the
aeencv "
(p.

8)

They comment that this arrangement worked
well in many cases, "since many

successful C&E activities include a direct service
component" (Backer et
1983. p. 8).

A "successful C&E activity" in Backer's study
meant that it

had continued to survive, at least to the time
of their survey in January
of 1983.

It may be concluded that while generalist model,
clinically

oriented C&E activity probably survived fiscal crises more
easily than
the other models, such activities represented C&E more in
name than

otherwise and accounted in part for the frequent criticism that C&E

activities were not prevention.
The nature of C&E goals and activities varied greatly and probably
to some degree in relation to the type of organizational structure.

Specialist units were more likely than other types to have written

a

.
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goals, distinct C&E proiects
projects and a T-=.nr.o
^
i
range of daily
activities different
from that of the clinical staff.
The case research by Ketterer
and
•

Bader offered one of the few
summaries of C&E goals and activiti
lies
They found that there were
typically three groups of goals (Table
1)
including service goals for the
community (82% of all goals)
goals toward the host

QfflC

(4%)

.

service

and C&E su rvlyal/maintenance goals

Major service goals for the community
included general mental

(14%).

health education, promotion of program
development in the community,
increasing the skills of community
caregivers and responding to
"grass roots" needs (representing a
combined total of 66% of all
goals)
.

Less frequent service goals included
coordinating mental

health programs in the community, providing
program/administrative
consultation, increasing the skills of high-risk
and normal populations,

identifying high-risk populations for prevention
action and promoting
system change through social action (representing
16% of the total
goals)

.

The goals emphasize a mission of both prevention and
more

efficient identification and treatment on natural and formal
levels of
service delivery.

C&E based on such goals represents a general commit-

ment to indirect service as a favored mechanism in the pursuit of
CMHC objectives of treatment, early identification, and prevention.

Ketterer and Bader also categorized the kinds of daily activities
performed by C&E staff, organized by goal type.

Table

2

lists the

"services to community" activities in descending order of average
time devoted to each.

Mental health education and training and

53

Table

1

Stated and Unstated C&E
Goals

Goal Category
^'

Total Stated
and Unstat ed
Number Percent

Service goals directed toward
the community
To disseminate information
about CMHC
services and to educate community
groups
about general mental health
issues.

22

22.9

To promote the development of
formal and
informal social and mental health
programs.

16

16.7

To increase the skills of community
caregivers through consultation and
training

15

15.6

To take grass roots community needs
into
account in developing C&E programs

11

11.5

To coordinate social and mental
health
programs in the community

5.2

To provide program and administrative
consultation

4.2

To increase the knowledge and skills of
high-risk and normal populations through
in-depth educational programs

3.1

To identify high-risk individuals and groups
for prevention and treatment programming

2.1

To promote systems change through social
action programming

1.0

79

82.3

_4

4.2

5

4.2

Service goals directed toward the CMHC
1.

To provide services to larger CMHC systems
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Table

1

(continued)

Tool Cateeorv
r^t-^
Jjoal
^

—

—

Total Stated
and Uns tated
r
—
Number Percent

t;;^
.

.

—

C&E survival/maintenance goals
1.

To insure survival of C&E through
adherence to federal guidelines

5

5.2

To improve C&E's functioning through
documentation and self -evaluation

4

4.2

2

2

l

1.0

l

1.0

13

13TJ

96

100.0

To improve C&E's relative status/
resources within the CMHC through
clarification of C&E's role
To enhance C&E's position vis-a-vis
a variety of external groups through
educational strategies
To improve C&E staff knowledge and
skills through inservice training

1

Note
From Issues in the Development of Consultation and Education
Services in Community Mental Health Centers by R.F. Ketterer and
B.C.
Bader.
Final Report of the Detroit-Wayne County Consultation and
Education Project. Submitted to the Michigan Department of Mental
Health, Planning and Evaluation Unit, December, 1977.
:

Table

2

Service Activities of C&E
Staff, listed in
i
descending order of staff t
ime

Service Activity
1.

Public mental health education

2.

Caregiver consultation training

3.

Network/coalition building

4.

Program and administrative
consultation

5.

Competence training

6.

Grass roots consultation

7.

Community crises intervention

8.

Client advocacy

9.

Case consultation

Note
From Isues in the Development of Consulta
tion and
Education Services in Community Mental
Health Centers"b7
R.F. Ketterer and B.C. Bader.
Final Report of~thi
Detroit-Wayne County Consultation and
Education Project
Submitted to the Michigan Department of
Mental Health
Planning and Education Unit, December,
1977.
:

^
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systems-oriented consultation activities
are favored much more than
case consultation. This
suggests a greater frequency of
prevention-like
activity than of direct treatment
-like activity.
As mentioned above, Ketterer
and Bader documented the significant

amount of time in daily activity
devoted by C&E staff to the CMHC
(22%)
.

They reported that at least half
of all C&E staff surveyed

were involved in the following five
services during the preceeding year:
"(1)
(3)

information dissemination to CMHC;
(2) CMHC staff development;
needs assessment; (4) miscellaneous
tasks with CMHC (such as

grant writing for other programs)
(p.

25).

;

and (5) CMHC board consultation"

They note the discrepancy between the low
frequency of CMHC

goals (only 4.2% of all goals) and the moderate
frequency of CMHC-

oriented activity.

Ketterer and Bader suggest that most of the C&E

units performed similar chores for their host centers,
but under-

represented these activities in their goals because they
were not

considered to be "legitimate" C&E services.

As such, this discrepancy

illustrates the degree to which C&E staff performed activities outside
of their own preferred definition of what C&E "should be."
It is possible that C&E, as described by Ketterer and Bader,
repre-

sented a more developed ideal of diversity as found in some specialist
units and did not represent C&E as it was found in many centers, partic-

ularly those CMHCs that did not receive C&E grants.

Backer and his

associates (1983) have suggested not only that many C&E units existed
"in name only," but also that most C&E units did not reach special or

unusual populations using exotic prevention techniques:
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Most CiE programs continue
to serve a falrlv
limited range of clients,
mostly human servLe
agencies and schools,
providing case consultation on mental health
Issues,
(p. 8)
It is likely that a
majority of what was labelled
C.E across the 789

CMHCs was case consultation
and some training and
program networking
performed with schools and
human service agencies with
whom the center
shared clients, delivered by
clinicians as a part-time second
role
pursued when the opportunity
arose and time permitted.
m,lle, as Backer
and others suggest, this
activity Is useful and important
to comprehensive client care. It is
suggested here that such activity
does not
represent CSE as a service technology,
nor does It capture more than
a glimmer of the C&E philosophy.
Ah, and was there a C&E philosophy,
a C&E code?

Surprisingly there
seems to have been a strong and
distinct value base shared by staff who

specialized in C&E.

Ketterer and Bader identified an
ideological

concensus among C&E specialists expressed
in a commitment to five
values;

(1)

citizen involvement in CMHC activities;
(2) development

of community resources and social
supports;

(3)

prevention;

(4)

a

view of problems as arising from individual
-environment interaction; and
(5)

an active (seeking) mode of delivery"
(p. 18).

A similar ideological

concensus was noted also by D'Augelli (1980) and
by Raber (1981) in his

dissertation on the essential skills and qualities of
C&E specialists.
These values, perhaps more than anything else, offer
a definition of
the "ideal" C&E role.

The values also place emphasis on community em-

powerment as one of the preferred orientations to prevention.
If the history of prevention as opposed to direct service
is a

history of struggles in conflicting ideologies or paradigms, then the
role

Bergner (1981) no.es a
number of Issues of seaff
".esistanca" to
prevention activities,
resistances which highlight
the differences in
professional identity and values
between clinicians and
preventionoriented C.E staff. While
not necessarily contradictory,
the values of
the two are in different
dialects. Bergner notes as
an example that
both share the value of
"helping people," but clinicians
frequently
experience an Indirect service
role as depriving the client
of service.
C^E prevention staff maintain
a sense that their co^unity
interventions
promote health and helping
resources even though they .ay
have to wait
several years and take quiet
credit for far removed "ripple"
effects
(Todd and Armstrong, 1984).
As different ideologies it is
easy to
imagine the barriers which existed
to a full acceptance or even
understanding of the C5E approach by
direct treatment-oriented CMHCs.
Late Developments in C&E:

1978-198 3

Even as C&E was the youngest child of
the CMHC services, frequently

bom

after the 1974 amendments, host CMHCs were
rapidly aging in their

seed funding cycles:

many graduated before 1981 and most could
read

the writing on the wall.

C&E itself developed rapidly and appeared

to reach for a new level of sophistication
just as the CMHC Act itself

was being repealed.

The Staff College of NIMH initiated technical

assistance workshops for C&E development, offered in
cities around
the nation starting in 1978.

The technical assistance was designed to

offer training and sharing of resources to executive directors
and
C&E directors and staff.

NIMH had begun to exert a more thorough
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influ.„ce th.o.gh its annual

sUe

visits to the teciplents of
C.E grants

(illustrated in the data of
this wot.).

A Prevention Council (now
the

Executive Council of the
Prevention Section) was forbad
in the National
Council of Co^nlty Mental
Health Centers (NCCMHC)
fostering further
,
self-l„prove^nt and innovation by
CSE staff In prevention
activities.
In 1979, NIMH convened the
firfet National
ij-rst
^
iNacionai rx.p
C&E Conference,
allowing C&E
staff to "network- with,
train and empower themselves.
The field had
developed a distinct professional
identity which, while diverse,
was
maturing rapidly.
Despite the developing sophistication
of C&E units, agreed upon
definitions or guidelines for C&E
within service agencies remained

vague at best.

The NIMH guidelines offered little
basis for evaluation

of C&E activities, nor could a
center's commitment to C&E services be

judged with any consistency.

The Joint Commission on Accreditation
of

Hospitals issued its "Principles for
Accreditation of Community
Mental Health Service Programs" in 1973
(later revised, 1981).

The

JCAH accreditation was considered useful
in qualifying for some

third-party payment plans and included C&E-like
activities under its
Service Function Area (i.e., prevention) and its
Citizen Participation
and Research and Evaluation Areas.

Scrutiny of the actual conditions of

accreditation, however, revealed extremely minimal or
optional standards which would be met in almost any catchment area
(JCAH, 1981).
As David Snow and Tom Wolff suggested, these guidelines
once again indi-

cated that prevention was not the task of mental health service
providers

60

These patterns seem to
stem from continuing
ambxvalence about whether
programs of mentfl
""'^
prevention
aJe to hrri'^'i°"
^""^^
essential components of
^Jn^ ? I

f

"ss!

39)'

p

«

Negotiations were being conducted
at that time with NIMH by
C&E
directors who sought new C.E
guidelines and a definition of
C.E within
the upcoming Mental Health
Systems Act of 1980 (Snow and
Wolff, 1983).
Tom Wolff, then Chair of the
Council on Prevention, directed
a Task Force
and Subcommittee in the
development of NCCMHC guidelines
for C&E
services in CMHCs.

The effort represented an
attempt by C.E specialists

to define themselves in the
absence of appropriate action by
NIMH.

The process of drafting the
guidelines in itself illustrated the
maturing
professional identity in the field.
Published first under separate

cover in 1982 (Snow and Swift,
1981) and later in the NIMH-funded

journal. Consultation (Snow and Wolff,
1983), the "Recommended Policies
and Procedures for C&E Services"
provided definition along five

dimensions:
(3)

(1)

mission, goals and service domain;

program planning;

(4)

(2)

organization;

fiscal and contract management; and
(5)

ethical principles.
The primary mission and goal of C&E services
id identified by the

authors as "primary prevention and the promotion of
individual and

system development" (Snow and Swift, 1981,
p. 3).

Service

dimensions are organized in three categories:

training and

(1)

education; (2) consultation; and (3) community network development.
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organizationally the C.E unit is
to have a budget (or
fiscal cost center
within the center budget)
Staff structure can be specialist
or
generalist, but is to be specified
in designated portions of
FTEs
.

within the center's budget.

The director is to be a specialist
(and

full time if possible) with
equal organizational standing to
that of
other program directors. The
C&E cost center should document
billing
and accounting procedures which
protect C&E fees and grant dollars

from being diverted to other
programs (a standing problem with some
of
the ghost budgets submitted by
centers to NIMH)

.

Perhaps most prophet-

ically the "Policies" recommends a
permanent subsidy by the center for
C&E services, to permit a stable core
of C&E staff to offer some minimum
of services regardless of the ability
of clients to pay fees.

This final provision is most illuminating
in "Policies" which

were published the same year that all
remaining C&E grants were expiring.
It suggests that the authors believed that
a C&E philosophy of service

could not exist on a strict fee-f or-service basis.

It remains to

be seen what kind of enduring influence the "Policies"
may have on

the course of C&E.
It has already been observed that C&E was often one
of the first

services to be reduced or cut with the graduation of the center
from
federal funding (Naierman et al.

,

1978).

In their article, "Leadership

Strategies and Values in Times of Scarcity
note that values shift with necessity.

"

(1982), Kraft and Kraft

In times of relative prosperity

organizational leaders manage on the basis of questions such as, "Why
are we doing this? and Ought we to be doing this?" (p.

179).

During
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ti.es Of scarcity and
shrinking resources, however,
the questions
change to. "How can we
survive? and What can we
afford (in dollars)?While such a shift in concern
(p. 178).
was true for centers overall,
it was particularly true
for the question of C.E.
its mission, and its
survival.
In n.any cases the C&E
activity which survived the
graduation of CMHCs fro. federal
dollars revealed an orientation
or goal
structure .ore attuned to survival
than to previous C.E values.
Perhaps
what is most surprising is
the degree to which C&E
services preserved
significant vestiges of the previous
ideology.
The plight of C&E was predicted
to be a dire one.

In their review

of conference participants in
the NIMH Graduation Conference.
Woy and

Mazade (1982) cite the prediction
of federal experts that, "there
will
be an immediate cessation of
indirect services such as consultation/

education" (p.357).

The exceptional vulnerability of C&E
to cuts is

explained in part by the observation that
indirect services were never
the central task of CMHCs (Snow and
Newton. 1976).

Retrospectively.

Backer and his associates (1983) suggest three
particular vulnerabilities
of C&E.

First, they note that C&E was tied closely to
the field of

prevention and shared in "the numerous peaks and
valleys of the prevention movement."

Despite the Task Panel on Prevention and its conclusions

in 1978, there was no more of an observable
national mandate then for pre-

vention services than in

1963).

Second

,

the long range, indirect goals of

C&E made it difficult to evaluate, measure or document its
impact.

It

was hard to see its worth in the same light as a therapy session
with
a troubled family.

Third, they observed that C&E was largely action
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oriented, failing to develop
.uch of a body of literature,
especially
in the establishment
of scientific press.
As To. Wolff observed,
"connnunity consultants
don't write" (Armstrong,
1981).

Bergner (1981) suggested that
one of the sources of
vulnerability
for C&E was that center
directors did not know how to
manage the
function in such a way as to
preserve it. She notes additional
vulnerabilities including:
(1) lack of definition in the
original
legislation; (2) the moral press
and practical imperative of
demand for
direct service; and (3) a lack
of competent C&E specialists.
Bergner
suggests that the four most common
reasons for C&E "failure" (elimination) were financial instability,
lack of community support,
lack of program evaluation, and
a lack of institutional protection.

She

concludes that "the most common reason
for the collapse of consultation

programs is their reliance on federal
monies" (p. 244).

While prag-

matically true, such observations fail
to note that "C&E" was created
by federal monies and that its original
mission frequently reflected
its role as a public service.

Many survival tips were offered to C&E directors.
on "Action Strategies for Survival" (Goplerud
et al

.

,

The NCCMHC study
1983) suggested

that C&E units teach other people in the community
to do their own
C&E.

Centers might "transfer" C&E that didn't make money to
other

agencies and examine any C&E given away for free strictly
on the basis
of its dollar worth as advertising.

C&E that survived was going to

have to change its techniques and target populations in "directing
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services toward paying
markets" such as employee
assistance pi.
Lans
(EAPs) With companies.
Health promotion, organizational
consulting and
behavioral courses such as
stress .anage.ent and parent
training
were to be targeted at those
with the .oney and interest
to pay for the
services.
"Needs assessment" changed
to "marketing." Survival
could
be enhanced through the
separation of C.E fro. the .ental
health center,
which was now increasingly
associated with the chronic,
deinstitutionalized patient, a group with
which many of the potential C&E
clients
would not want to be associated.
In establishing separate and
more plush
professional offices, the C.E unit
could become the marketing arm
of the
mental health center to business,
industry, and middle and upper class
clientele. Raber (1983) offers the
successful marketing of his
'

"Growth Associates" in Kansas as a
model for survival of C&E as "a

department of personal and professional
growth services."

He notes

that "traditional C&E" represents
only a small part of the overall

unit activities, which range from
management training and organizational

development to inpatient hospitalization under
the auspices of their
EAP
EAPs were widely touted early on as one of
the keys to C&E survival.

Sodano and Woy surveyed a number of centers and
C&E directors to
examine the role of EAPs in supporting and altering
C&E activities.

They note that the new initiatives with industry were
not likely to
replace lost federal revenues and threatened to divert dollars
and attention from "the values of educating and developing
the

community at large" (Sodano and Woy, 1983, p. 82).

.
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These concerns reflect the
terrible dile^na faced by C&E
direct,
:ors
and staff.

While many saw the situation as
an exciting challenge, the

propensity of C&E staff toward
optimism verging on denial had been
observed (Backer et al.
1983).
D'Augelli (1980) noted that survival
,

would force a change in some of
the defining techniques and
target
populations and goals of C&E.

He predicted that C&E would become
an

increasingly more center-based service
to the "YAVIS" population
that had money.

Poor or hard-to-reach populations, as
well as favored

C&E activities such as community
organizing, social action or

consultation to natural caregivers, wo^ld
all disappear.
the dilemma as this:

"How to maintain a focus on the underserved
while

seeking third-party payments?"
(p. 19).
on EAP's by Sodano and Woy (1983)

"selling our souls."
ment.

He summarized

Key informants in the survey

spoke of serving "two cultures" and

There was considerable angst in the C&E move-

Survival and even properity could be had, but only at
the price

of change

As perhaps its last service to C&E, NIMH conducted a
national

evaluation of
programs

tonsultation and education services in mental health

through the Human Interaction Research Institute in Los

Angeles (Backer et al

.

,

1983

.).

The survey was conducted in January

of 1983, approximately five months after the last of the C&E
grants

had expired.

The "Final Report," issued in August of 1983, focuses on

survival strategies for C&E.

The report offers the most thorough

information to date on the state of C&E services after graduation from
federal monies.

.
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The subject pool consisted
c£ the cream o£ the crop

with regard to C6E.

of CMHCs

Recipients of

«E

grants (149). which could

be expected to have more
developed

C£,E

services than other CMHCs,

were surveyed along with
centers recommended to the
researchers for their
exceptional CSE units. A response
rate of 51% provided 91 useable
questionnaires. The data Indicated
only a 4% "failure" rate among
C4E
units, although the fate of
the other half of surveyed units
that never
responded left this figure open
to considerable debate.
As Tom Wolff
comments In an editorial, it's a
bit like mailing out a questionnaire
that asks if you are homeless ("1984)
T

Among those centers that continued
to offer C&E services, 24% no
longer had separate C&E units.

Backer and his associates comment that

this may not represent a significant
change:
...since there is considerable anecdotal
evidence
to suggest that many local agencies
from the be-

ginning did not really consider their C&E
projects
to be a separate part of the agency but
had to
report them that way because of federal funding
requirements, which now have been eliminated"
(p. 8081)

Perhaps more revealing was the fact that 41% of
surviving C&E units

anticipated changing their name in the near future,
assumedly to reflect
more accurately their altered roles based on new sources
of income.
The data describes the parameters of C&E services in those
centers

where it continued to be offered.

Organizationally, 21% of the centers

had specialist units, 26% used a generalist model and 56% reported

mixed structures.

Approximately 60% had full-time C&E directors, with

only 20% reporting quarter-time or less for the director's position.
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Most

CM

services had considerable
overlap

„Uh

clinical programs and
showed some Influence of marketing
pressures, as evidenced In Table
3,
reported «E activities. Almost
90% of the centers reported some
fori
of C«,E goals, listed in Table
4.
m.±le similar to earlier reported
goals, it is noteable that two
out of the six goals are
concerned

exclusively with C&E survival.
Income was a central concern for
obvious reasons.

The report listed

as one of its chief tasks a
number of successful innovations in fee

production by C&E projects.

The authors note, however, "that most

of the innovations reported in
this study are generating income, if at

all, just sufficient to offset costs"
(p. 81).

was $133,440 with a lowertoedian of

$9-2

,OaO

.

The average C&E budget

Almost one-fifth of

centers reported a drop in budget size from
the previous year.

Examining the impact of funding changes, 79% of
the centers
surveyed reported changes as a result of shifts in
funding and program

—

priorities

and more cuts were expected.

The cause and consequences of

these changes were strongly supported by surveyed
experts on the state
and county level.
The results were surprising if only in the high survival
rate of

reported C&E services.

While raw survival appeared to be possible, the

researchers note a change in the mission or ideology of continuing
services, as C&E staff:

.reconceptualize their roles in the mental health
service process, in order to redefine new areas of
impact that also provide long-term funding viability
and gain community support (p. 82).
.

.

.

Table

3

C&E Staff Activities

% of

N

Providing consultation & support
to
other professionals and social
service agencies.

respondents who
answered item (U=76)

47

62.0

47

62.0

35

46.0

19

25.0

Serving in a public relations
capacity.

19

25.0

Providing in-service training

13

17.0

Serving as a community resource
and referral center

12

16.0

Developing and disseminating
printed and audio visual materials

10

13.0

1

1.0

Providing information and educational programs regarding
selected populations.

Providing information and educational programs to the general
public
Providing technical assistance to
and education programs for private
industry and business.

for staff.

Conducting research

Agencies not responding

11

Note:
From Final Report: National Survey of Consultation and Education Programs by T.E. Backer, I. Levine and W.P. Erchul. Los
Angeles:
Consultation Research Program, Human Interaction Research
Institute, 1983.

Table 4

Typical C&E Goals

health services
Lit^Jr-''''

-i^ibilit:y and acceptance of
:nental
in the community.

^"'^'^ regarding mental health

concept''
3.

To increase knowledge and
skill level of staff member^
and community health service
practitioners tnrougn
through
continuing education programs.

4.

To encourage and facilitate
the establishment of
effective linkages among
agencies/organizations and
betterment of community mental

he^ui
5.

To continue to offer existing
C&E programs and
to establish new ones.

6.

To increase revenues by developing
fee-f or-service
programs, conducting fund-raising
activities, and
discovering new sources of funding.

Note:
From: Final Report
National Survey of Consultation
and Education Programs by T.E. Backer,
I. Le^nFl^^d
W.P. Erchul.
Los Angeles:
Consultation Research Program
Human Interactions Research Institute, 1983.
:
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This reconceptualizatlon
required a redefinition of the
^ssion o,
CSE services which, at
ti„es. directly contradicts
previous C.E values.
Backer and his associates
report the distress expressed
by „any
respondents

There is some movement today,
alarming to
many of the observers who
contributed to this
study, toward keeping only
those services that
produce service, clearly at variance
with some of
tne original philosophies of
community mental
health, prevention and C&E
(p. 83).

Without public funding, the finer
points of CMHC philosophy were

expendable as centers hustled to
maintain their central task of delivery
of direct clinical services.

The prospects appeared sobering and
particularly emotionally disturbing for C&E staff who developed a
professional identity in the previous

environment of federal funding.

As Backer and his associates state,

many of the responses were frustrated and
depressed in tone:
The emotional tone of a substantial number
of
respondents is bleak:
there are fears that C&E
simply won't survive the present set of problems,
and that without increased funding, good ideas
and even exploitable client opportunities simply
can't be realized (p. 81).

Part of the difficulty seemed to be a lack of experience
and continued

ambivalence on the part of center administrations about moving
whole-

heartedly into the entrepreneurial market of indirect services.

Many

directors were understandably hesitant to take the risk of investing the
significant amounts of dollars and time required for product development
and marketing in the private sector.

Public mental health service

systems were not structured for or experienced in risk-taking for
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profit enterprises,
regardless of ideological
conflicts.
The report concludes with
a list of promising
possibilities for
generating revenue (making
money). Although the authors
warn against
supposedly low-risk -'gold mine"
innovations in the tradition
of no
free lunches, they suggest
six areas of opportunity,
including:
(1) EAPs; (2) health promotion
andwelJness programs; (3) work
with the
deinstitutionalized chronic
populations; (4) private industry;
(5)

consultation to psychosocial
rehabilitation programs; and
(6) collaborative enterprises with health
maintenance organizations (HMOs)
hospitals and nursing homes.
Despite the promising nature of
these
areas of opportunity, the
authors conclude with the observation
that the
fate of C&E remains closely
tied to that of prevention as a
service

paradigm still struggling for
legitimacy in society:
^ recognition that many traditional
C&E efforts are simply not likely
to survive
without funding that comes on the
basis of a general
priority in the prevention area...
(p. 83).

The report of Backer and his associates
generated considerable
comment among C&E professionals, some
of which is usefully captured in
the editorials which followed a
synopsis of the findings published in

the journal. Consultation (Backer et al

.

,

1983 ).

taken as a basis for this present research.

The survey was also

Many of the comments about

the HIRI study refer as well to the findings
of this current research

and as such, are taken as a starting-point for
the discussion of results
in this present work.

CHAPTER

II

METHODOLOGY
The purpose of

.Ms

.esea.ch is to document
the current status
of
consultation an. education
services in a«Cs. This
research follows
that Of Backer and his
associates (1983 ) described
above and attempts
to address so.e
limitations in the methodology
of that study.
The
low response rate of
that survey (5«) and
the elite qualifications
of
the subject pool left
two ,uestlons unanswered:
(1) What happened
in the 49% of centers
that didnV respond? and
(2) How did the status
of C.E services differ
in those cmCs which did
not receive categorical
CSE grants and, therefore,
did not qualify for the
subject pool?
More than 8U of all OfflCs
never received a C.E grant,
yet were required
to provide C.E as a undated
service. The focus of this
research differs
from that of the HIRI study.
Instead of seeking to identify
survival
strategies as the HIRI study did
somewhat successfully, this
research is
primarily concerned with documenting
the changes in mission and

activities of C.E services along
with the changes in size and funding.
The goal of this study is more
descriptive in its attempt to examine
both
the raw survival rate and the
qualitative differences over time of CSE

services and the causes of such changes.

Finally, this research serves

as a follow-up to the HIRI study,
with data collected Ih years after
the previous survey and almost

grant funds from NIMH.

2

years after the expiration of all CSE

It is hoped that this time difference
will allow

some examination of trends hinted at in
the HIRI study.
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This research is historical
as well as current.

exa^ne changes over

I„ an atte.pt to

ti„e, a history of C.E
services was compile, for

each participating center.

The research also exa^nes
historical

variables such as the C.E
unit structure and size
in an atte.pt to
Identity those dimensions
which might have predicted
the present
survival of CiE services in
that
cnac center.
center

An=i
Analysis
was not expected to
•

reveal statistically
significant causal relationships.

Rather, it

"as hoped that certain
descriptive trends .Ight be
suggested in the
findings
The methodology was selected
in an attempt to promote
descriptively
detailed data, while allowing
for generalizations to be made
concerning
a group of centers
representative of the CMHC system. As
such, a combined case study/survey methodology
was developed. A C&E unit with
which
the researcher had extensive
familiarity was selected for a detailed

historical case study.

The case study examines the unit
along several

dimensions, including:
1.

2.
3.
A.

5.
6.

goals and objectives
organizational structure
funding patterns
project activities
staffing
impact and outcome of activities

These dimensions were examined along the seven
years of the unit's

existence from 1976 to 1982.

Trends and details of this case were

examined both to document the precise nature of C&E
activities in one
CMHC and to offer some suggestions as to the cause
of its demise with the

end of its C&E grant.
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Relevant variables were
then .taken from the case
study and
applied to other centers.
It was felt that a high
rate of respon.
ise was
needed In the survey to
allow conclusions to be made
which pertained
to the CMHC system as a
whole. The size of the CMHC
system,
however, and the pursuit
required for a high response rate
necessitated the selection of a small
subject pool. Previous research
reviewed
above had also predicted that
state environments would become

increasingly central to the
development of CMHCs after graduation
from
federal funding.
It was noted that state
environments differed widely
in the support available for
a CMHC model of mental health
services.

Data from national surveys such
as the HIRI study necessarily
obscured
these differences.
In an attempt to limit the
subject pool size
and in recognition of these state
differences. CMHCs in the state of

Massachusetts were selected for the survey.

The survey pool was

defined by the NIMH 1981 "Directory of
Federally Funded CMHCs" (NIMH.
1981) which listed all CMHCs in Massachusetts
that received federal

NIMH grants during the final grant cycle, 1981-82.
A questionnaire was designed based on the HIRI
questionnaire and
on the findings of the case study (see
Appendix A for a copy of the

questionnaire).

The survey was conducted using the NIMH directory.

All 25 Massachusetts CMHCs were contacted.

An attempt was made to

contact more than one person in each center with preferred
respondents

being executive directors.

C&E directors, or former C&E directors.

The

survey was administered by telephone or in-person interviews with mail
survey forms used as a back-up when requested.
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m

addition to the survey,
several othet sources were
used to augment
the data. An archival
review was ^de o, the
grant records of
all CSE grants made In
Massachusetts (29 grants over
six years)
State Depart^nt of Mental
Health documents were reviewed
to examine
in greater detail the
current state environment
In which CMHCs operate.
Documents reviewed Included
the Dh« "Proposed Budget
for Fiscal Year
1986" (July, 1985 to June,
1986), the Dffl "1985 Block Grant
Proposalsubmitted to the federal
government, and various DMH memos
pertaining
to the budgets and services
of DMH partnership clinics
(a majority of
CMHCs in this state also have
DMH "partnership" contracts).

mm

Finally, state and federal experts
were interviewed where possible
to gain further clarification
of the data and expert opinions
as to

trends evident In CSE services.

Experts Interviewed by phone or in

person included:
Dr. Leon Nicks, currently
Administrator of
Region I (New England) of the Public
Health
Service and former Director of ADAMHA
for
Region I, representing ADAMHA and the
PHS
Institutes, including NIMH, and participant
in the drafting of the 1975 NIMH
regulations
encoded in the 1975 CMHC Act amendments.

Brian Flynn, currently with the NIMH Cuban
Refugee Project and formerly a Region I
Administrator and C&E Technical Consultant
for NIMH
Dr. Richard Woy, currently Clinical Director
of the Dorchester Mental Health Program and

former NIMH College Staff member and Acting
Chief of the Program Analysis Branch, Office
of Program Development and Analysis, NIMH
(reported on the NIMH Conference for
Graduating CMHCs)
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Elizabeth Punk, Executive
Director of the
Massachusetts Association
of Mental Health
«=<i-Ltn
Service Providers
John Lichten, Acting
Associate Commissioner
Massachusetts Department of
Mental H^Slth

"

Milton Wolk, Assistant
Director of Health
Education Massachusetts
Department of
Public Health

Harry Schulman, President
of the Massachusetts
Association of Mental Health
Service Provider!

---^

H^alth^C^ni::

Dr Thomas Wolff, former
Chair of the Council
on Prevention, National
Council of CMHCs and
former C&E Director at
Franklin/Hampshire CMHC.

A standardized questionnaire
was not used for the interviews
of experts
listed above.

As such, the results are
included in the reported case

study, survey results and
discussion section where relevant to
an understanding of the data.

The collected data is reported
in four sections.

study of a C&E unit is presented
in detail.

First, the case

Second, six case

histories are presented of those C&E
units in Massachusetts which
received NIMH C&E grants.

The case histories integrate NIMH
archival

data with questionnaire data from this
survey.

The third section

reviews the survey data for all 25 CMHCs
in the state, including the
centers reveiwed as case studies.

which received C&E grants

(6)

Comparisons are made between centers

and those which did not (19).

Finally,

the history and current status of mental
health services on the state

level in Massachusetts are reviewed as an aide to
the interpretation of
data.

In review, the questions
this research seeks to
address .ay be
summarized as follows:

m

CMHCs xn Massachusetts and
what are they
^^^''^^^ ^-^^
state since graduation from
statTslnce
federal funds?

-^h-

2.

How does the current profile
of C&E services
in organization, goal or
activity from
the pre-1981
profile?

3.

Did any pre-1981 variables
in C&E structure
funding, or service orientation
seem to predict
later survival of C&E services
in that CMHC?

What consequences do the changes
observed carry
tor the prevention mission
of CMHCs in this
state?

CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Section

1:

_A.Cas^jtudy of the Rise and F.ll
of
C&E
Services in

r>n»

rm^r

Introduction
The subject of this case
study is the C.E unit of the
Franklin/
Hampshire Community Mental
Health Center (F/H CMHC) located
in

Northampton, Massachusetts.

The catchment area for the
center consists

of two largely rural counties
spanning the upper Connecticut
River

valley and foothills of the
Berkshire mountains in western
Massachusetts
The three major towns include
the county seats, Northampton
and
Greenfield, along with Amherst.

The area is known academically
for its

four colleges, including Amherst,
Hampshire

,

Mount Holyoke and Smith,

as well as the University of
Massachusetts.

This particular unit was chosen because
of its unique reputation
and because of the researcher's
familiarity with the center and the

C&E unit, having been employed by the
center in various capacities

from 1979-1983.

The C&E unit was directed by Tom Wolff,
former Chair

of the NCCMHC Council on Prevention
and recipient of the 1984 NCCMHC

Award for Distinguished Service in Consultation,
Education and Prevention
During its approximately eh years of existence,
the C&E unit reached
7.5 FTE specialist staff positions at its peak (1979-80),
received

over $438,000 in NIMH C&E grants and $370,000 in federal
grants from

other sources, and completed three nationally noted model
projects in
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P~,o„.

sta„ p.e.e«e. attentively

C.E

at national ana
.e^lonal

conferences, hosted two
regional conferences on
prevention, and
published several papers and
technical reports (Wolff and
Crisci, 1,7,.
Armstrong, 1,81a, 1,81b;
Peterson and Hutchinson,
1,82; Wolff, 1982;
Warner, Hutchinson, Shannon
and Armstrong, 1,82;
Armstrong and Warner,
1982; Snow and Wolff, 1,83;
Wolff, 1,84; Todd and
Armstrong, 1,84).
The case study is based
in large part on an
unpublished history
of the unit,

"The Rise and Fall of a
C.E Unit" written in draft
form in

1983 by Tom Wolff.

The researcher assisted Dr.
Wolff in compilation

of data for the history.

This case study represents
an edit of Dr.

Wolffs manuscript combined with
data from extensive interviews
with
Dr. Wolff and review of
I/,6CMHC documents and NIMH CSE
Grant Proposals

submitted by F/H CMHC.
In 1970. NIMH staffing and
construction grants were awarded to a

consortium of mental health agencies
representing Franklin and Hampshire
counties. The fiscal conduit or
designated recipient was a general
hospital.

Funds were used to support the services
provided by the

agencies, as well as to build and staff
an inpatient psychiatric unit
at the hospital.

With the increase in mandated services
required by

legislation in 1975, the hospital management
decided that the funds

were too costly to administer and withdrew
from the consortium.
The remaining agencies, joined by a few others
to round out the
list of required services, decided to create
an independent administra-

tive office which would function simply as a
fiffc^l conduit for the grants

A new CMHC board was formed in 1975 representing the
consortium of

app.ox.„ateX,

.

a.encU..

Boa.a

...e.

conduce. . n...^ .3e..e„.

the elae.l,. children,
an. victi.. o£ sexual
assault and domestic

violence.

Board „e....s „.o.e and

su.M„ed

.o Nl«.

for operations and
na C&E grants
pran^o in the name
of the newly-formed

nonprofit corporation, the
Franklin/Hampshire CMHC.
Notices of awards ror
for the<?P
or-or,*-.
tnese grants
arrivedj in October, 1976.
An
executive director was hired
in December, 1976 to
administer the
funds.
The only service function
to be delivered directly
by F/H CMHC
was the new C.E services.
A director of C.E, Tom Wolff,
was hired in
April, 1977 with four C&E
staff (representing 3 PTEs)
hired by
May, 1977.
The executive director,
assistant and secretary all
shared
the same basement offices
with the C.E unit. The C.E unit
actually
shared the same room, making
intra-unit communication rather
•

.

,

unavoidable

-

everyone knew what everyone else
was doing.

One may note that the C&E and
administration functions began after

monies were awarded.

The executive director used the
unspent funds

from the operations grant to hire
additional administrative staff.

This

was the beginning of a steady expansion
which marked F/H CMHC as an
"empire builder" among area service
providers.

The executive director

steadily brought more and more of the
service functions inhouse with
the support of NIMH, which favored
a strong administrative structure

with line authority over funded staff
positions (permitting greater direct

accountability to NIMH).

By 1983, F^H CMHC had approximately 10 service
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programs and four subcontractors.

Services included outpatient

Clinics, half-way houses,
emergency services.
day-treat.ent MR
and MH case .anage.ent
alcohol counseling and
,
early childhood
developmental screening
programs.
.

The C&E staff consisted
of one man. the director
and a clinical
psychologist, and four women,
MSWs and master's level
human service
workers. Staff were hired
based on their expertise with
and interest
in working with the three
at-risk populations identified
by the Board's
needs assessment. These
populations remained a focus of
C.E throughout
the unit's existence,
guiding the specialization of
staff and their
development of contacts and
reputation. The three major federal
grants
awarded later for prevention
projects were all within these areas.
The C&E director, Tom Wolff,
identifies three phases which

describe the history of the unit,
including:
Start -Up Phase;
Big Boom Phase:
Collapse:

June, 1977 to March, 1979
April, 1979 to June, 1981
July, 1981 to September, 1982

The dates are rough approximations
of periods of change, often marked
by the award or expiration of major
grants.

phases is evidenced in Figures

1

and

2

,

income and FTE staff positions by year.

The curve of these three

which chart the C&E total
It should be noted, as suggested

by the names, that the phases reflected
staff spirits and feelings,
as well as raw dollar and staff hour
figures.

With the seed funding

process the staff was hired on what amounts to a race
against the clock
to become self-sufficient.

As such, the Unit was painfully future-

conscious and the changes in feelings, plans and even roles
during each

Full-Tlme Equivalent Staff Positions in Specialized
Consultation and Education Services at Franklin/
Hampshire Community Mental Health Center.
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FIG. 2:

Yearly Budget and Sources of Income for the Consultation
and Education Unit of Franklin/Hampshire Community
Mental Health Center.
Key
National Institute of Mental Health C&E Grant

NIMH

-

AoA

- Agency on Aging Model Projects Grant

LEAA

- Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Grant

NCAAN - National Child Abuse and Neglect Model
Projects Grant
Other - Fees and Smaller Contracts
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Of the .hree phases
typically occurred

see weeks or .onths before
the
actual Changes in funding
or staff positions.
As such, the
dates

chosen represent a rough
compronase between these
variables.
Start -Up Phase;

Jun e, 1977 to March. 1979

The Start-Up Phase is
re.e.bered fondly by staff
.e.bers as a ti.e
of excitement and close
staff unity. This unity was
evidenced in
the development of an explicit
mission statement which remained

essentially unchanged throughout
the unit's history.

It can be argued

that it was this unity around
mission which both led to the unit's

success (by focusing resources)
and to the unit's later demise
(by
limiting flexibility)
The mission was expressed in four
principles
.

and six goals (see Table 5,F/HCMHC
C&E Goals and Objectives).

The

four principles of service delivery
included:
1.

Prevention and health promotion

2.

Development of individual and community
competence

3.

Reliance on individuals and groups in the
community to be the agents of service delivery
and change in their own communities

4.

Promotion of collaboration among area service
agencies

The organization of the C&E unit was to be that of
a specialist unit

which pursued its prevention goals as one service of the
center.

The

C&E director had direct access to the executive director (indeed,
he

was half of the administration at first).

While apparently well

defined, issues of boundary definition with administration developed

quickly.

Throughout the three phases there were pressures placed on C&E
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Table

5

Franklln/Han.pshire Connnunity
Mental Health Center
C&E Goals and Objectives

I.

Promote Individual Family and
Community Competence
A.

Objectives
'
'

2
2.

II.

^.

—•

To educate caregivers (service
delivers, teachers, paraprof essionals) to more effectively
learn people's needs
and to Identify and use resources
to meet them
To increase caregiver's emphasis
on preventive
programming

Impact Organizational Practices
A.

Objectives
1.

2.

To help organizations find new ways to
solve problems
To optimize staff performance

Foster Coalitions of Community Resources
A.

Objectives
1.

2.

V.

TeZlT:

Objectives
1.

IV.

=

To support community
strengths by fostering social
^^^^-^-^
aiding"

Broaden the Scope of Caregivers
A.

III.

individual and family

competence to cope
witrnT''?^^
developmental and transitional
periods and stres s
^

To promote collaborative problem-solving among
community groups
To exchange needs and resources within the community

Influence Social Policy
A.

Objectives
1.

To increase awareness of and information about the impact
of social policy on people, with special attention to
policies with a preventive focus
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Table

5

(continued)

uZTol IZTrill
A.

Of

Me«al Health a„a Know-

Objectives

2.

infonnatlon about .ental
health
rlTonrcTs'
Increase knowledge and change
attitudes about .ental

IZlTl^^TcT'''^'

-^"-^"i^y

Of .ental
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to perform center-wide
tsQi^o o
u
tasks
such
as public ralattons
(advertising)

ana

..a. „.i.i„,.

,,,,,

^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
extends .Hrou.Hout the
.Hree phases, resisted
s.ongi, durin, .he
rst

U

support ,or C.B

-re

ain

sta„

positions.

Perhaps the one

Une

.hat „as

dr^l

ahsolutel, „as around case
consultation.

A request fro. rhe
executive director „as „ade
in .he .irst ,ear
to send one of .he
C.E
elder specialists to a
nursing ho.e .o do
rei^ursahle case consultation
The C.E director supported
the elder specialist's
refusal, pointing out
that it did not fi. .he
prevention mandate. While
s.aff .rainings were
later conducted with nursing
ho.e staff, case
consultation was not.
An Aside on the Limits of
NIMH na^a

Boundary definitions were
most clearly violated in
financial
records and budget figures.
CSE never had an identifiable
budget or
cost center accounting of
income and expenses. One
could never tell
much about the CSE budget from
the NIMH C4E grant proposals
submitted,
despite the extensive reporting
requirements (see Table 6 E/a.CMHC
CSE
.

Budgets in Grant Proposals)
This was the case across centers
and is due to problems with the

application process.

The budgets submitted were
projections of the

future, not statements.of current or
past budgets.

In the case of

F/HCMHCand many other centers, they were
estimations because C&E
was not a distinct budget line in center
accounting.

As applications for

funds, the proposals tended to be rather
optimistic, especially about

future income.

This is due in part to the NIMH allocation
formula used
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Table

6

Franklin/Hampshire Community
Mental Hp.^^K r
C.E Grant Proposal
BudgLs (•n'dSlars^''^'^^

Year

Federal

1976

81,866

1977

106,500

1978

106,500

Other

TOTAT.

81,866
106,500

1979

1980

20,000

50,000

64,000

50,000

46,000

14,000

12,000

153,000

18,000

15,000

163,000

310,000

12,000

5,000

216,000

329,000
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or i„co„e.

income to

wMchevar was lower.

,uaUf, for

Center, resularl,
over-e.l„a.ea C.H

a larger award and
penalties were not as a
.nla

exercised over such estimations
dLions.

NTMH
NIMH rr..
was concerned that C&E
become

self-sufficient and liked to see
increasing C!^v
^
f
C&E funds
columns for "Applicant,"
"State," "Local," and
"Other."
assumedly meant that C&E was
producing income above and

m

.
the
C&E budget

This

beyond the
NIMH grant and that the center
was devoting additional
resources to
C&E.
In the case of F/H CMHC,
these factors combined to
create optimistic

or ghost accounting in the
grant proposals.

A more accurate measure of

the C&E unit could generally
be had from the list of
personnel salaries
paid for by the grant.
In the case of F/H CMHC there
was regularly

some padding, but less so than
with the budgets.

An administrative

assistant was partially supported for
many years as a part-time C&E

research and evaluation specialist.
plight of administration in CMHCs.
DMH contracts,

f ee-f or-service and

This padding reflected a general

Various funding sources, such as
insurance were extremely limited

in their use and administration turned
frequently to grants,

including the C&E grant, to cover administrative
overhead.

Padding was also evident in the grant proposals in
the list of
auxilliary C&E staff positions paid for by other sources.

This list was

meant to be a back-up for the high projected income figures
submitted.

At one point in the
third year (1979-80),
the C.E staff
consisted on
paper of 22 people representing
11 FTE positions.
In fact
the core
specialist unit was up too 7
/o5 FTE
P
FTP with
w-i
o
some
additional funds going to
staff in a prevention
agency C.E was supporting,
so the figures weren't
so far off.
one could never figure
out, however, the actual
size
and structure of the C&E
unit from the NIMH records
alone.
.

Internal organization of the
C&E unit during the first
phase
was rather flexible.
Connnunication between staff was
high, due in
part to their all sharing one
office.
The clarity of the unit's
mission also contributed to a
strong sense of team spirit
and support.
A regular weekly meeting based
on the case conference model
was used
to keep staff informed of
individual projects. This allowed
for
group supervision and a sharing
of resources and contacts.

It also

permitted a certain flexibility in role
as consultants were able to
fill-in for each other based on
familiarity with the people and projects
The dense internal organization and
clear mission no doubt contributed
to the rapid development of a positive
reputation in the community.

Staff activities during the Start-Up Phase
were characterized
by diversity and extensive contacts.

The C&E unit, during this phase,

was most able to respond quickly to requests
for service from diverse
groups and agencies.

A needs assessment was conducted in which over

100 groups and agencies were interviewed and familiarized
with C&E

services ("dog and pony shows").

Films were distributed, program

consultation was developed, community forums were joined or created
and relationships built.

Service could be offered for free and quickly
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„a.,onal an. .e,.ona.
speakers at low cost
co«?f ^r.
to the coMHunity
and served to further
public
awareness of the unU and
Us ,oaU. The C.H director
observed
later tHat tHis phase
effective!, introduced
prevention as a valuable
form of activity to the
conmunity:
^^^-^--^^V understood the
concept
^oncent'if"'
of prevention and was
very willing to
engage us in project
development in that frea

to fund those activities
(Wolf,

1983, Note 5).

The rural, scattered
population and relative small
agency si.e did
not readily offer fee-f
or-service funding large enough
to support C.E
as it was being practiced
at F/H CMHC.
As the staff noted frequently
in strategy meetings and
retreats through the three
phases, the demand
for fee-paying or reimbursable
services was not prevention-oriented,
but
rather clinically-oriented. The
C&E staff maintained the
perception
that Without public funding, the
prevention focus and target populations

would have to be changed in order
to generate funds.

Negotiations with

the Area Office of the Massachusetts
DMH had not yielded any state

monies for C&E and the staff could
anticipate their NIMH funding
declining.

Grant writing was turned to as

a

temporary solution to carry

on the growth of C&E services until
such time as state and local dollars

were more available.

populations.

Grant topics were chosen in line with the
target

In March,

1979 a two-year, $180,000 Model Projects
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in

Sep..,e..

,3-„o„.H ,90.000

suppo. onsoins wc. „UH
.ape an. ao„e=«c
violence.
the Big Boom Phase.

Blg_Booin Phase:

April

3. .esan

iq7q

Activities during this phase
were expanded in volume,
but
narrowed in scope due to the
grant project funding.
The expanded
but increasingly specialized
staff grew to 7.5 FTE in
1979-80

and "contact hours- in 1980-81
totalled more than 24.000
hours reaching more
than 9,600 people.
The estimated budget
peaked in 1979-80 at around
$235,000.
Despite these increases, staff
were unable to continue
ongoing

needs assessment interviews
and were able to respond.to
local
requests for service only when
paid and when time allowed.
The AoA project involved
3.5 FTE and was focused on the
support
systems of elders in three rural
townships. Middle-generation key

support relatives and local natural
caregivers were targeted for

consultation and support.

Elder forums were held to conduct
needs

assessment and community organizing.

Education and program consultation

was provided to elder clubs and
agencies and community education, including

mass media, was co-sponsored with these
groups.

Workshops for the

public were provided and mutual help
programs, including a support group
for key support relatives, were developed.

In all, the project reached

a number of individuals and groups
with support and information.

Elder

housing was successfully lobbied for and attained
by citizen participants.

95

An Elder Service Tpclf
Task rv^
Group of county
service providers
was forced
Infor^Uo. concerning the
„odel project „as
dlsse^nated In a
regional conference on
prevention and elders,
featuring Maggie KuHn
.He ere. Panthers,
.u^erous conference
presentations, publications
and manuals were produced
(see list above)
The

LEM

grant supported ongoing
work with a network
of agencies
concerned with rape and
domestic violence. Protocols
for rape crises
were developed with the
police, district attorney's
office, local
hospitals and social service
agencies.
Rape prevention education
was developed for school
children, featuring films
and materials
on such topics as acquaintance
rape.
Program consultation was
provided to a women's shelter
for domestic violence and
a women's
counseling program. Research on
domestic violence was conducted
and published in local papers.

Despite the restriction of the
grants, or perhaps because of
their
focus, several other projects
developed. A mutual help directory
for
two counties was developed,
printed and widely distributed using
other

agencies and donations of in-kind
services from a printer, a newspaper
and an insurance company.

Training and program consultation

contracts were developed with local and
state agencies based on
the unit's expertise.

There were increasing solid partnerships

established with local agencies and groups,
both through the contracts
and through the grant projects (which
permitted extensive free service

within the project guidelines)

.

The t^nit was increasingly represented

oa co„unity .cards and
co™.Utees

access to area decision
.akers.

(

s™e

o(

Us

creation)

„Uh

While local funds were
restricted '

during 1980-81, 42 local
funding sources .ade up
al.ost one-sixth
of the estimated C&E budget.
The prevention activities
evidenced in C.E services
during the Big
BOO. Phase offer a useful
insight into the debate
over whether C.E
was ever truely prevention.
This unit was explicitly
preventionoriented in its goals and Mssion.
Despite that fact, the
prevention
practiced evidenced a typical C&E
style of integrating .any
.odes of
intervention. Connnunity interventions,
unlike academic experiments,
are not simply dropped on a
captive audience. Access to
populations
is negotiated along personal
contacts and interests.

One rural

town involved in the AoA grant
project took a human service worker
(whose time had been donated by the
county) and put him to work painting
the fire house.

wanted.

That's what they felt they needed and
that's what they

In some cases the diversity of
activities which characterized

the C&E services were not pure primary
prevention.

reflected the realities of community work.

This diversity

Consultants started with

groups or agencies where they were (much as
clinicians do with clients)
and attempted through the course of the
relationship to foster a shared

definition of the problems.

In this case, C&E consultants encouraged

a preventive perspective and sought to empower
individuals and groups

through education, training and organizing, based on a systemic
outlook.
The complexity of this process was difficult to document
or evaluate
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e„ect..

.He C.B

s.a„ ,.e,.„U. .e„a..e.
„UH

Hu.o. on „e„3pape.
Ha. ,ee„ developed
o.,,.„aU. .H„u,H C.B
con.ul.aUons
The .o.el ausseseed
tHat creeu He .a.e„
o„l, at a aiatance.
Aa .ueh
the C,E style of
prevention was not conducive
eltHer to academic
research style projects or
to hard sell marketing.

a«.cu. tH«

A second oHservatlon should
be .ade concerning
prevention and the
reduction In demand for direct
service.

The services of the CSE
unit

frequently Increased demand
for clinical service on
the center.
In
educating populations about
the nature of mental health
and Illness,
WE services promoted the Identification
of persons in need of
treat-

-nt.

As an outreach service,
CSE also provided many of
the residents

with their only personal
contact with someone from the
center.
Consultants were often advised by well
meaning residents that they
shouldn't
even mention that they were from
a mental health center.
The CSE
services and staff provided Hard
to reach populations with a link
to
direct services.

The generallst role that many
of the consultants

adopted, while typical of rural
mental health (Flynn, 1978), also

reflected the fact that they were often
the only folks getting out
of the office.

As a result of CSE prevention projects,
the center

eventually Hired an elder mental health
clinician and an incest/rape
counselor.

Clearly, prevention, CSE style, did not reduce
demand for

clinical services.
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Despite the relative
prosperity of the Big Boo.
Phase, pressure
to find future funding
sources continued to build.
The Unit was
heavily dependent on ti.e-li.i.ed
grants for funding. NIMH
site
visitors also expressed concerns.
The 1978 site visit
notes in
NIMH files expressed cautions
that the unit was not
integrated enough
with the -overall service
pattern" of the center. No
specific
suggestions for change were .ade
however, possibly because
"one of the
most exciting programs of the
center" owed much of its
reputation to
its specialized team structure
(NIMH C&E Grant Proposal 374-03.
Region 1, 1978-1979).
,

The following year, 1979, NIMH
site visitors elaborated on
their

concerns and noted the strengths and
weaknesses of the unit.

In

particular they recommended a greater
emphasis be placed on fee-forservice case consultation using a mixed
model structure to integrate
other CMHC staff time:
This C&E program also differs from others
in funding strategy.
Rather than seeking contracts for
individual case or school programs, this group
uses a university type grant seeking approach.
While this may develop a much more in-depth
project
type approach with a concomitant development
of
staff expertise in specialized subject areas, it
is vulnerable since the funding is soft and
time-limited. The unanswered question is whether
the center could benefit even more from an equal
emphasis on case and program consultation on a
contract or fee-f or-service basis utilizing other
staff members in a coordinated, center-wide balanced
C&E service system. This approach should emphasize
not only prevention, but selected, reimbursable
consultation activities (Site Visit Report, NIMH C&E
Grant Proposal 374-04, 1979-1980).

It is

slg„i«.ant that

officers

feU compelled

to suggest ch ange
in the goals, .isslon
and structure of
what the report
itself ch aracteri.ed as, ..one of the
cou„tr,.s .ost notahle
prevention programs.
Prevention did not appear
to be d
a iiscaiiy
fiscally viable
vl.hl. service for
CMHCs.
Attempts to respond to these
reco^endations produced little

to a grant project and
was able, as a result,
to develop a number
of

service contracts with .any
schools.

Despite this work, and
other

existing state and local
contracts for program
consultation and
training, a saturation point
seemed to exist.
Locally-generated
income reached its plateau
and began to drop.
A marketing survey
commissioned by the center indicated
that the general public in
the
area would only support workshop
services at about $2 per hour,

far

below cost.

An attempt to offer a series of
training workshops for

the public produced extremely
low attendance ("workshops for
empty

chairs").

A significant gap still existed with
the state DMH, which

would not fund C&E.
Internal organizational issues began to
arise.

The C&E unit was

simultaneously very busy (with ongoing
projects) and very worried.
Consultants were hired and staff retreats were
arranged to facilitate
team building and planning around survival
strategies.

Despite these

efforts, the director and staff began to show
signs of "burn out."
Staff evidenced an increasing ability to
aggressively seek fees and

negotiate contracts, but reported considerable conflict
over their

mixed roles in refusing service to former clients, and
being forced
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into more case consultation
ation.

qtaff were rightly
.
Staff
concerned about job
,

security and began to loo.
elsewhere for employment.

The unit too.
on an embattled feeling
with regard to the center
at large.
Programs
throughout the center were
facing
cing the thr*..^
threat of^ severe cutbacks
as the
NIMH funds began to diminish.
Financi^,!
i-inancial rw.
crises occurred regularly
as the center administration
struggled with little success
to develop
a long range plan.
The experience within the
C.E unit reflected on
a small scale the stress
within the center at large.

As the Big Boom Phase
approached an end. the unit
learned that it
had been awarded a grant from
the National Center for
Child Abuse
and Neglect (NCCAN) to develop
and disseminate a prevention
curriculum
to be used in elementary
and junior high school classes.
The grant
was for $100,000 for a period
of about one and one-half
years. While
the money would support the
child expert and an assistant,
much of
the award would go towards
purchasing the materials and expertise

needed to develop and produce the
curriculum, and to part-time auxilliary
staff in the field used to disseminate
the material and train school
teachers.

The grant in itself would certainly not
support the C&E

unit.

Funding sources dried up quickly.

The AoA and LEAA grants expired

in the spring of 1981 and the last
NIMH C&E award was made on a

diminished scale ($43,170, down from a peak of
$106,500).

The NIMH

Prevention Center, created by the Mental Health Systems
Act of
1980 and spared by the block grants of 1981, was being
approached for

grants, but looked like it was going to be more research than
service
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oriented.

On the state level
vei, TitlP
Yv ^training
.
.
Title XX
funds had been so
.is„.„aged
the cene.al o„U.
.Hat e.e ,ov.™e„.
f„.e the account
in 198.. cu«aiU„, the
o„X, Hope^ by C.E ata»
of .evelopin, .o.e
contracts.
Other state funding sources
were feeling budget
crunches as
well. The Department of
Elder Affairs, which had
awarded the unit

m

contracts worth $20,000. and
thought highly of the wor.
done, expressed
reservations that the services
should „ore properly be
funded by the
State DMH.

Collapse Phase:

July

,

1981 to June.

IQfl-^

The clear impetus for the
crises faced by the
C&E unit was not just the decline
in the NIMH
C&E grant, but a much more
pervasive assault
on all levels of prevention
funding in mental
health (Wolff, 1983, Note 6 )

Within six months of President Reagan
taking office, the C&E unit
received four refusals of grant
applications from major federal
agencies which had funded prevention.

These results were surprising

and disappointing, considering the
previous high rate of success the

unit had enjoyed with similar applications.

The NIMH Prevention

Center "went research," with little apparent
opportunity for prevention
service funding at that time.

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act

of 1981 sent all ADAMHA funds (reduced
by 25%) to the state.

The

Massachusetts DMH refused to fund C&E despite some desperate
lobbying made by C&E directors (through the Massachusetts
Coalition on
Consultation, Education and Prevention) in an attempt to have
an
Office for Prevention created.

Cuts in federal dollars were felt

widely on the local level by agencies which had previously contracted
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budgets.

The „oney for C.E dried
up faster than spit
on a griddle.
The NCAAN project supported
some C.E staff during
1981-82. A
prevention curriculum was
developed and eventually
dlsseMnated. often
"Uh teacher training, to 40 sites
In schools and
organization. The
funding was limited, however,
and C.E staff PTEs dropped
to four In
the summer of 1981 and
down to one by the summer
of 1982.

A variety of strategies were
used In an attempt to keep
C.E staff,
with their resources of
knowledge and co^uilty contacts.
In the employ
of the center.
The CSE director became the
adult outpatient cUnlc
director, and C.E was merged with
the clinic.
C6E staff worked with
case managers to develop
resources for the chronic client
and perform
community education about
deinstitutionalization. Public relations
for the center was performed
under the auspices of the administration

budget.

CiE staff provided consultation
and direct clinical

supervision to clinic staff.

An EAP was attempted but developed
far too

late and with no long-term backing,
with little success.
the few remaining

C6,E

Eventually,

staff were placed in clinic positions
as fee-for-

servlce or salaried staff. From September. 1982
until June. 1983 there
was a quarter-time

CS.E

coordinator position.

By June of 1983, all

previous CSE staff had left the center and there
was no service designated
as "CSE."
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canter-Wide the CMHC Had
experienced a 20. reduction
in staff
necessitated by budget
crises. The
ine executive Hdirector, who had been
there five years and
was general!
generally supportive
of C&E and
the CMHC

and ol. ones siven
.p o. lost .„ other agencies
as 0^« pressed fo.
a
consolidation of services
servicec: in m,^
the area. Most changes
were toward the
development of services
rvlces for
fm- ru^
the „k
chronic, deinstitutionalized
client
Staff morale plummeted and
a unionization campaign
was successfully
organized. The new executive
director promised Improved
management
and planning functions
that would streamline
the services and marshal
the resources of F/H_CMHC.

m

Current Status of C&E at F/H
CMHC

A follow-up interview was
conducted in the fall of 198A
with
Mike Murphy, a newly hired
director of training for the
center. He
reported that there was "no C&E."
Historically, he reported that
the
agency had "scraznbled. - cut
back on non-chargeable services
and

revampedits pricing and fee collection
process.

The center's budget

was stable at over three million
dollars, with a staff of 108 FTE

positions.

Many of the previous services remained,
including outpatient

clinics, developmental screening,
family services, and daycare

run-away shelters for adolescents.

Emergency services (screening state

hospital admissions), deinstitutionalized
client case management, and

protective services had all grown.

A forensic team had been added for

court consultations.

While no C&E unit existed, some C&E-like functions
continued.
forensic team and child clinic staff did case consultations.

The

Mr. Murphy

performs inhouse training and develops manpower through
volunteer and

student programs.

Some P
public soeaknn.,
speaking is performed
by staff and
administration when requested.
-,•

There was no immediate infPT-oe«- ^
interest expressed in
redeveloping C&E
services, unless
was interested in
funding something like
public
relations. There was no
plan or apparent resources
to develop
prevention programming.

M^cusslcn

of

.

Implications of the

C;,^^

A number of variables contributed
to the rise and fall
of C.E at
F/H CMHC. This unit was unique
in its focus on discrete
prevention

projects and the associated grant
funding mechanism.

It is possible,
however, that the case reveals
issues and themes co»on to
the history
of other C&E units.

Tom Wolff (1983, Note
prevention.

7)

points to society-wide and
systemic issues of

The problem, he suggests, rests
in the failure of "main-

stream" society to place a lasting
and durable emphasis on prevention,
as opposed to remediation.

This failure in priority filters
down through

the agencies of government and is
evident in the meager support for

prevention units when placed in a
remediation/treatment service agency.
Local communities can be educated and
convinced as to the usefulness
of prevention, but often do not have
the resources to support such
a service

(much as they don't have the resources to
support outpatient

services without state funding).

Dr. Wolff also notes a frustrating

split between academic and mental health
professionals on the
one hand and prevention practitioners on the
other.

Closely involved
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in the nattonal and state
lobbying efforts around
the Mental Health
system and 0»lbus Budget
Reconciliation Acts, he
expressed frustration with the silence by
academes and the American
Psychological
Association in the face of
dismantling of the CMHC Act.
Their
concerns seeded to be .ore with
research and training dollars
than
with service.

Funding is clearly a central,
if not the central issue.

Dr. Wolff

suggested that without public
protection and funding, C.E can
continue but prevention will not.

m

the case of this C&E unit,
the rol.

of their perceived prevention
mission was central.

The mission

guided the staff and director in
their pursuit of funding.

Fee-forservice consultation and contracts
were pursued half-heartedly and
too late in large part because it
was seen as violating the goals
and mission of C&E.

Basically, it would have been a different
job

with a different philosophy.
to survival.

The mission did not seem very conducive

While a variety of events contributed to
the lack of

funding, in large part the C&E unit depended on
federal grants because

no one else wanted or could afford to pay for
major prevention programs
to disempowered or unorganized constituencies.

Most of the services

were proactive and sought to create demand where there
was none.

Often

the communities resisted focusing attention on topics
such as isolated

elders, incest, rape and domestic violence.

Certainly from the per-

spective of this C&E unit, sophisticated mental health promotion and

prevention projects targeted at high-risk, needy populations in the
community at large could only be supported by state or federal funding.

C.E

couU continue,

A ^ior sMft

but not

th.

s™.

m

prevention pMlosophy

populations was needed,
.ovln, away f.o. the
hard
to reach se^en.s of
.he eo„„Uy who are
rarel, seen in ..ea..en.
settings.
instead, a population
had to he .arreted
which was already
seen in and preferred by
existing clinical services,
na.ely. the
employed, insured, and less
disabled population.
The organizational structure
of the specialized tea.
contributed
to the strengths and
weaknesses of the unit. The
tea. approach
allowed specialized staff to
develop expertise with
targeted high-risk
populations.
It greatly facilitated
co^^unity reputation and the

development of contacts.
ment of resources.

It allowed for group
planning and develop-

The structure protected the
prevention projects

from encroachment by demand for
direct service.

"

It also prohibited

the integration of C.E techniques
or prevention philosophy into
the rest
of the center.
A currency of exchange was never
established by the

center which allowed for rotation of
staff or services on a formal
level, although the C&E staff worked
at the center before- anyone
else

and were well known personally
throughout the center.

The structure

left the unit vulnerable to being jetisoned
just as it promoted the

sophistication of its product.
As a result, the enduring impact of the C&E
services may be found

more in the community served than in the host center.

Themes of

social support, organizing and natural helping resources
are more

commonly addressed in planning and training by area agencies.

In the

case of the LEAA grant project on rape and domestic violence,
the
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grant ended, but "an
all the pieces"
continued Independently.
Rape
crises p.otocols .e.ain
in place, a ,ene„l
hospital continues
-ainin, and runs a batterers
group, a shelter
exists and puhlie
awareness and concern Has
continued to focus on
the issue.
Elder
service agencies continue
to collaborate in
a tasU force and
advocate .utual support
prevention approaches.
A Mayor's Tas. .orce
on Deinstitutionalization,
facilitated hy the C.E
director durln,
a to™ crises over a
flood of former state
hospital patients,
continued long after the
C.H unit was dissolved
The sexual abuse
curriculum „as disseminated
to numerous schools
and was purchased by at
least one child guidance
clinic in Springfield,
which reported through the
survey that it is even now looking
for public funding to start
up a
prevention project based on the
curriculum.
In all, the impacts of
the
C«,E services endured,
but were not to be found in
the host CMHC.
.

.

A question unanswered by this
case study is that of mixed
or generalist CSE services.

It is possible that prevention
and CSE might

have survived in the center if
it had been more thoroughly
Integrated.
It is possible that the
prevention so delivered would have had
less

of a developed, primary prevention
technology, but it might have survived.

Whether this would fulfill a "prevention
mission" Is unclear.

For this

to have taken place, the center
administrator would have had to have

more power and control over the CiE unit
and would have had to promote
the prevention mission himself rather
than leaving this up to the

specialist team.

In general, better management, long-range
planning,

and control of programs might have helped to
control the effect of
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budge, cises.

Whether or no. he.er
ad.inisC.at.on f.o. .he
execuuve ad..n.s..a.o. .o...
have preserved a
preven.on ..ss.on o.
any noUceahXe i.p.e.
.3 unclear, h. douh..ul
.he .e.e.rche.,

.

Grant-Funded

UnT7^J£^Z^Z^^^^^-^

The data in this study is
organized into three subsets
of CMHCs
in Massachusetts.
As of 1981, there were
25 federally designated
CMHCs in the state, receiving
different forms of NIMH grant

of a C.E unit

(F/H C>^C)

.

The second level, reported
in this section,

is that of brief case
studies of the other five C.E
grant recipients
in the state.
The third subset is that of
all CMHCs in the state,

including those

19

centers that did not receive C.E
grants as part of

their NIMH funding packages.

Data for all three subsets was

gathered in the C&E survey conducted
for this study.

Additional, more

detailed data was collected for the case
studies based on NIMH
records, interviews, and additional
reports submitted to the

researcher by the centers.

Response Rate and Limits of the Data

While the overall response rate (80%) of the C&E
survey will be

discussed in the third section of this chapter, some
comment is

necessary here pertaining to the case studies.

Of the six C&E grant

recipients, representatives from five of the centers responded
to the
survey, offering some measure of current functioning.

NIMH records
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of 29 separate grants
over six years
(1976-1981) „ere reviewed

providing so.e historical
data for

aU

si. of the case
studies'

the Solomon Carter
Fuller Mental Health Center
(SCF)
While records
suggest that six C.E grants
had been awarded, records
fro. only the
two „ost recent years were
available. Apparently the
four earlier
.

years had been awarded to a
different source (a change
was frequently
made as NIMH encouraged
gea state
statp DNfH
o>-^o
ccj;mh area
offices
which received CMHC

grants to fonn private non-profit
corporations to administer the
grants). Additionally, SCF
was unique in using its
full operations
grant to fund C.E services,
creating a huge G&E unit of
.ore than 30
FTEs, only a fraction of which
was described in the C&E
grant data.
Finally, SCF has yet to respond
to the survey, although a
large C&E
unit continues and a response is
"in the mail." As a result,
data on
what may be (historically and
currently) the largest C&E unit in
the
state has been excluded from the
case studies and survey data.

A comment is relevant here also on the
conditions of access
to NIMH grant data.

A thorough search was not conducted for
the SCF

operations grant data and missing C&E files in
large part due to the

transitional phase of NIMH district office functions.

All NIMH district

offices have been functionally cl6sed, with some
former NIMH personnel

continuing in Public Health Service district office
positions.

NIMH

and PHS officials on both the federal and district level
were extremely

helpful in providing the fullest access possible to data.

Unfortunately,

all NIMH records were in the process of being packed up and sent
to
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regional warehouses for
storaea
storage..
a leisurely review
of records

-

t^o
.
The timing
wasn't the greatest
for
•

the final C.E grant
record to

be reviewed h. this
researcher .as placed in
a cardhoard hox and
shipped
out right then and there.

Other limits to the data
have been illustrated
above in the

WHCMHC

CE

case study,

financial and organisational
descriptions of the

units contained in

of "ghost data."

Uim

files appeared to suffer
the sa.e problems

While roughly reliable,
accurate measures of C.E

operating budgets were impossible.

Review of the grant proposals
was

often a process of interpretation
and detective work, reading
lists
of specific personnel salaries
and attempting to identify
the actual
C&E staff from descriptions of
unit activity. Generally, a
fairly
accurate measure of specialist C&E
FTEs was reflected in the list
of
personnel.

The overall projected budget
figures and ascribed sources

of funding did not, however,
appear to be very reliable.

A final significant difficulty involved
the reality of CMHC
structure.

While this dilemma will be illustrated
more clearly in the

case studies, in general the problem
was that CMHCs were not always

discrete, identifiable entities.

non-profit corporations.
including:

(1)

NIMH preferred to fund private,

There were generally two structures for these,

a fiscal conduit office which was
basically an office

established to administer CMHC funds for six or seven
semi-autonomous
service agencies; and (2) a non-profit corporation
that provided half
or more of the services inhouse, with direct line
control.

structure was the one promoted by NIMH.

This second

Additionally, however, the

Ill

state DMH service
structure 1^
IS and was very
dominant in the state.
It is also extremely
complex.

originally established to
administer Inpatient
services for the
-tail. 111 ana retarded (state
hospitals

_d

and schools).
B^„
.nto outpatient services
In the 1930s with
the hlrth cl partnership
contracts with child ^Idance
clinics. Partnership
contracts allowed
=tate employees to be placed
In private, non-profit
clinics, which
ware supported by local
.ental health associations.
Currently.
remains split between being
a direct provider of
services and a funder
of services to be delivered
by vendor organizations.
DMH Is divided
organizationally Into a central
office and 40 area offices.
(Regional
offices were abolished as
unnecessary and replaced the sa-e
year.

1978

With district offices, which
vary in authority and function.)

Funding for direct services
comes both from central office
and area
office accounts, but much of the
control is exerted by area offices.
As a result, the structure and
profile of DMH services varies widely

from area to area dependent in large
part on the outlook of the area
director. This variance in service
profile was actually measured in
1984 by DMH in its "Mental Health Resources"
survey (DMH, 1985).
At the moment, DMH administers seven
operating state hospitals,

seven state schools or developmental
centers, and two state-wide
Inpatient specialty units.

In addition, the state fully owns and

operates ten "CMHCs" of its own which were often
related to, but not
the same as, federally funded CMHCs.

The state administers

approxi-

mately 50 partnership clinic contracts for child
and adult outpatient
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services and has innumerable
vendor contracts for
a
^ wide range of mental
heaUh and .en.al .eta..aUo„
services (especUU.
case

rasiaencas.

aa.-.ea..„

a servica-cost,

a„a e.e.,e„c. 3e„.caa)

„HU.

_.,e„e„t
a.a pa..

,L

lump-sum, or unit-cost
basis.

Returning to the ,uestion
of the definition of
federal CMHCs. the
centers can be categorized
roughl, by their affiliation
to .m.
Of 25 CMHCs:

eight recipients were
state-o^ed

C^O,Cs (which included
the D«H area office,
making the area director
also the center's

executive director); one was
an area office; and

16

were private non-

profit corporations of some
form.

Currently, looking at the
agencies which made up the
former federal
CMHCs, of the 25 "CMHC groups"
in 1984:
received federal block grant
awards
administered and awarded by DMH
14 have partnership clinic contracts
(at a minimum)
8 are wholly state-owned CMHCs
1 is an area office
15

The numbers total to more than
25 because they overlap,

m

one case, a

federal CMHC also included a wholly
state-owned CMHC/area office, two

partnership clinics with associated
private non-profit corporations and
mental health associations, numerous
separate agencies, and the
department of psychiatry from a city hospital.

Such an overlap is not

uncommon

Whatever organizing-

influence the CMHC grants had in fostering

a particular structure has now dissolved
as agencies are organized

m

line with current sources of income, in large
part from DMH.

As

su ch, the question arises as to how to measure
current C&E in a center
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tha. is not now and
to so.e deg.ee
never was a discrete
entity

CE

units .i,.. exist in
agencies .onnerly
associated witH tHe CHHC
Civen the complexity of
the service structures,
However, it is very

did not hear of the..

The problem was both
one of surveying the

homeless and of surveying a
population which had moved
several times
in the past few years.
People sometimes remembered
that C.E had been
around, but weren't ,uite
sure where they had moved
to.
in itself,

This situation,

represents a major finding of
this research,

NIMH Funding

S tructure

and the C&E Grant

Fm^ r.^.

The case studies begin with
an examination of the
environment
which they shared in common.
NIMH funding policies. All
CMHC grant
packages were awarded and monitored
by the District I, New England
Office
of NIMH, located in Boston.

offices in lump sums.

CMHC funds were allocated to the
district

It was then left up to district
administrators,

using federal guidelines and formulas,
to approve applications, set
dollar amounts for awards and specify
any conditions or demands to be
made of the recipient center.

Annual site visits and grant application

reviews were held for each grant.

Review boards typically included

representatives of federal and state health service
planning commissions,
the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health (which had "minimal influence,"

Note 8). and NIMH.

Representatives from city planning offices and other

key agencies were included as appropriate.

Despite the wide represen-

tation involved, the central policy decisions and opinions
were made
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Lgna-

^ees.

AS such, the Massachusetts

OfflC

grant awards („ith
thei.
Lr

conditions of approval) very
.uch represented a
co.pro^se between
the current realities
of the state's .entai
health s.ste. and the
district office -s philosophy
about how ^ntal health
services should
be delivered.
While involving DMH
officials very little in
the actual
decisions, the
grant syste. can be seen
as a lobbying „echa„is„
designed to bring about enduring
changes on the state and
local level.

Nm

The 25 federally-designated
CMHCs in Massachusetts received
one of
four grant packages In
1980. Including:
(1) basic suEEort (an
operations or staffing grant);
(2) specialized
(for centers which
had completed their basic
grant support cycle and were
receiving conversion, children's, financial
distress, or C.E grants);
(3) construction
(for centers that received funds
only for construction of physical

su^

plants)
;

and (4) no funding (for centers
currently qualified but with-

out funding)

There were of ten not enough funds sent to
the district level to
fund all centers which had qualified.

NIMH ranked centers according to

different priorities and low-priority centers
might have to wait

several years before funds were actually sent
to the center.

Of the

25 CMHCs, the frequency of grant packages awarded in
1980 were as

follows
13
7

3
2

Basic Support
Specialized Support
Const ruction -Only
Not Currently Funded
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Of the seven specialized

«E

suppo« recipients, six
a«Cs receive.

grants as part of their
package.

The selection „f
those centers
that were approved for
funding of C.E grants
„as based first on
the age
Of the cmc in its grant
cycle.
described above. C.E
grants were

^

considered in part to be
specialized support for those
centers which
had or were close to
exhausting their basic
grant supports.

The C.E

categorical grant could provide
a base for a service
which Mght be the
.est endangered by the
expiration of general operations
or staffing
grants. As such, the older
CMHCs tended to get the C.E
grants and,
this state, the older CMHCs
tended to be the state owned
QBC/area
offices. Out of six CM grant
recipients, five were state-owned
QfflC/
area offices and only one was
created originally as a private
non-profit
corporation (F/HCMHC)
This means that the CiE grant
projects were
hosted by generally larger centers
that were direct extensions of
the

m

.

DMH area office.

This is particularly relevant when
considering the income sources

tracked by NIMH for C&E services in the
six centers.

Total dollar sums

are listed below for C&E grants awarded
to Massachusetts CMHCs:

Grants received:
29
Awarded over 6 years:
1976-1981
Total dollar sum:
$2,175,612
Grant award: (ave.)
^75 Q21
Total reported C&E budget revenue :$6, 015,944
Annual C&E budget:
(ave.)
$207,446
The reliability of total budget revenues reported is
questionable as

discussed above.

The identified sources of revenue are divided by

categories which probably overlap.

reported as:

(1)

Categories of revenue were

federal; (2) state;

(3)

applicant;

(4)

local;
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the center
administrations
iTdcions, with
u
subtotals
switchina
witcning from one
column

a„o.H» .ep.„..„,

an.

^^^^ „^ ^^^^^^^^^^^
^

ana ope..e.

^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^^^^

a«C/a.a o.^ce.

Clear as to definition.

so„.ce3 o, .epo„e.

,,,,^^„

^^^^

Mereinc i-u.
iierging
these categories
juries ^^,
to Improve
reliability

C« .v.u.

„^

can

Of di„i„,.Hi„,
,..e.a. p„een.a,es of

the

^^^^^^^^^

"appuc...

..ppo„

addUion of .atchin, ,^,3
put up

, ^^^^^

^^^^Z

^^^^

,y

state, center
other
The reality o, these
resources is challensed
so.e„hat
the case studies which
follow and the precipitous
disappearance o,
C5E units Which characterized
the C.E grant projects.

sources.

Ma_ssachusetts Mental

He.Uh

Mass Mental" («HC)

r».. . r/Vinfen

is a state CMHC/area
office with a large

budget and staff of indeter^inant
size.
ured,

they can

rorr „„..„„

While staff and budget are
meas-

be added up ten different
ways depending on how one

defines the organization and the
CMHC part of it
state-owned centers.

.

This is true of all

GustaBaggis, Area Director of the
West-Ros-Park

CMHC/area office, offered an exa,nple.

The Uest-Ros-Park CMHC/area

office has a budget line for 54.6
million with 222 state employees
and 80 contract employees.

State contracts are not included in
this

accoun t, although vendors receiving
state dollars through the area office
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Table

7

Sources of Reported C&E
Revenue

Percentages
1976-1981
1981

NIMH

C&E Grants „

36

29

State/Applicant Sources

41

45

Local/Other Sources

24

26

101

100

alone

may have been considered
.
^ part of th^
the n
West-Ros-Park
CMHC.
A total
of over $13 million in
state
ace budeet
budget funds
f„nHo may go to
servicing people
currently residents of or
recently from (as with
state hospital
inpatients) the W-R-P catchment
area. While more will
be said of
W-R-P in the third section
of this cnapter,
chapter it iis mentioned
here as
an example of how budget
and .taf£ measurements
posed a bit of a
dilemma when looking at NIMH
Q«Cs. As MM, reviewers co»e„ted
on
t,

"

the Mass Mental 1979

«E

grant proposal:

"The organizational chart
Is

the one document In an otherwise
excellently prepared application
that is illegible."

The record of C&E at Mass Mental
picks up in 1978 with the award
of the third C&E grant.
Records for the first two years
were not

located for review, but the third
year grant (#608-03) suggests
that C&E was attempting to formalize
and strengthen its position in
the organization.

The unit was structured as a mixed
model with a

specialist core and some responsibility for
generalist C&E conducted
throughout the rest of the center.

The long range goals, summarized

below, offer a good example of a specialist
C&E orientation:
1

.

2.

3.

4.

To sustain and expand community helping
networks and provide C&E to informal
helpers
To provide continuing education and
inservices to promote professional skill
levels in areas of high need, including:
elder issues, rape crises, domestic
violence and systems and families in
crises
To provide mental health education to
the general public.
To move the unit into a more central position
within MMHC and promote C&E services to the
center.
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-

"a.e a. a ,oal .He
o.sa„i..„,

.

^^^^^^^

the sa.e orsa„,.,„,
.ecHni,ues .o sai„ en..,

cen.er as .hey did In tHe
communl.y.
y.

iiost
Most

HuUa .„ppo„

.He

of .h.
.He big specialized

CSE units were better
at this
thfs uirt,
with ,-u
the community than
they were
With their ca„.ers. The
m.C C.E unit was unusual In
spelling out
their objectives for cen.er
relations early on and
clearly. They are
summarized below:
1.

2.
J.

To identify and prioritize
populations for
C&E services in MMHC
catchment.
To identify the scope,
range and type of
existing C&E activities within
MMHC
To strengthen the
organization of C&E
activities within MMHC.

These objectives highlight an
important point about C&E services
in centers.
Most centers reported (usually
without measurements,
but with reasonable evidence)
that their staff routinely
did C&E-like
things as part of the clinical
role.
This generalist C&E was

usually unmonitored and uncoordinated.

It was usually controlled
by

program directors of other services
and not the C&E unit.

Centers

would point this out when they submitted
proposals which showed

matching state or dollars twice as large
as the C&E grant.

What they

were saying basically was, "Hey, we
fund a baseline of C&E throughout
the center as part of our daily clinical
operations.

If you want to fund

a specialist unit, great, but consider
some rough percentage of our
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""""

even a„ .„a.„e.. o,
„Ha.

cente.. ..eH

-JO. s„„e.s

in an

a.^p.

of this section.

^^C

.,e„e.Us.. C.C

as Mass Men.al a„a

generalist C&E was done.

The

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^

C.K

Ca....ase/So.e„.ne. ev.

ana

c™....

ou. how ™.eh ane
„,a. .,na of

Generaiist C&E
^eneraiist
r/iF is
discussed more at the
end
•

unU con^ucea

staff ana innovative
p.og.a™.

a

va.U.. o. acUvUies.
„UH

a aive.se

I.ey p.oviaea bilingual
cental health

education ana networking
wi.H »ino.i.,-language
populations. Co™,uni.,
organising ana aeveloping
was a .a,o. orientation,
a 'helping network
philosophy" which was con„entea
on hy NIMH reviewers
of the 1979 grant
proposal.

The reviewers were,

"i^ressea with the philosophical
base

Which supported other groups
ana organizations as the
primary proviaers
of C&E."

Mental health courses were
provided (including sex education
in
Catholic schools) and in-services
were given with many human
service
agencies and the police department.
Public housing initiations for
the
elderly were organized, a babysitting
collaborative was established
and C&E staff helped facilitate
school desegregation parent councils
(at a time and in a city where
mandated racial desegregation of schools

was an explosive issue).

Mental health fairs were promoted,
libraries

supported in developing mental health
resources. C&E open houses given
and a media project organized with the
Spanish-speaking community.

Also, an EAP was begun with Beth-Israel
Hospital, a major contract
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and an early success
In the state
for rsp
C5E units moving
Into EAP
In all, though,
there were difficulties
icuities of money
„
and staff similar
,
,
to that
of F/H' CMHC. Table
8 Illustrates
.
the specialized
PTEs In CiE
units funded with NIMH
catesor<^»i
-"gorlcal grants. While
MMHC enjoyed a large
specialist CSE core until
the end.
end It
<r shrank
^
from 9.1 FTEs to
6.1 FTEs
in four years, despite
their successes with
EAP Income.
HIKH.
its
•

,

m

^Hat mixed state and
private employees.

With an increased
tightening in

the enforcement and
control over the use of
state staff positions,
the
integration of state and
private staff in one
center was often
c-lfficult.
A dual salary structure
existed between state
slots and
contracted slots or private
non-profit staff. c.E was
not a state

priority and even In state
owned CMHCs, C.E staff
were often contract or
private positions which could
be eliminated or switched
to other
programs.

In the case of

miO, under NIMH pressure,

the center finally
formed a private non-profit
corporation to administer the
CMHC funds.
The C.E staff positions
were transferred to this
corporation, Vlnfen. In

the last year of the grant,
1981-1982.
The staff reported other
difflcultes.

With the press for survival

dollars they noted that they lacked
the development time to enter

systems and develop and market
income-producing services.

In a way, the

time ran short on them, before they
could switch gears to the survivalist
C&E service profile.

From the perspective of a prevention,
needs-

assessment oriented service, they noted that
with developing projects
and reputation a demand developed very
quickly.

They found themselves
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being asked for C&E
services and reacting ^
to requests,
with little
time left to develop
contact TH^^,
-^"F <-uucacts
with new erouD«;
^^P^- tk,^^^s experience mirrors
that of F/a CMHC in
discovering
ring that there
th.. is a need
and demand for
publicly - supported C&E
services.
Finally, they reported
problems moving into the
system
Clinical staff reported
that they had less
and less time for
C.E as
well as a felt lack of
skill, resources or
experience. The very
extensive and highly reputed
psychiatric and psychological
training
program at MMHC did not include
consultation as a topic.
There was
a general lack of
integration into the center.

During the last year of
existence, the C&E unit made
a striking
effort to shift into work
with business and industry.
The staff
positions were reorganized into
market and program managers
in an
attempt to develop new paying
markets while not sacrificing
ongoing
community goals. One community
education project, the Fenway
Players,
became semi-autonomous
The Fenway Players used theatre
to perform
community education around various
issues in a powerful, often moving
medium. At least two other C&E
units around Boston supported similar
.

"Players" theatres.

EAPs continued to be important for
income, along

with new programs such as an industrial
human resource management
program.
In the end, it was clear that the C&E
unit would be closed.

Vinfen

had become truely independent, but was largely
reliant on state
contracts.

C&E was not supporting itself.

As Dr. Nicks, author of

the NIMH grant closeout report, reported in
September, 1982:
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Of all of the
federally funded Ci^v
.
"""^'^
state, this is the
^he
onlv un^TL
survive beyond the
^^^^ ""^^^
?
state has adoptl^
^he
a 0011"
services fro/^DM
Blo'ck^GLn^ T^H^''"^
though such services,
whLh Ire :;it:f'/"'"
prevention and health
to be supported by
''''' ^^^^^^
ees oT third-party
M^d
ments.
reimburse-

Z/

J

In follow-up calls
to MMHC and Vinfen
Corporation
•--i^Hwracion

th. researcher
the
was told that there were
wpr^ no longer
any Identifiable
CSE staff and
that there were no
records to indicate
where •-lie
the staff
scatr was now.
One
person thought the
i-iic iormer
former o&E
rav ^^
6
director mieht
mignt Hp
n working somewhere
be "oh
still
in Boston with kids."
,

i

The MMHC received a
total of ,403.003 fro.
NIMH for four years
for
C.E services, with a
total C.E budget estimated
by the center

adminstration (in grant
applications) at Just under
$1,000,000.

Cambridge/Somerville CommnnUy
Mental HP.^^h r....^
The Cambridge/Somerville
CMHC is. or was. another
one of those
CMHCs Which defied definition,
much to the frustration of
both NIMH and
the C&E director.
A site visitor from NIMH
described the center in a
March, 1979 report with a
mixture of frustration and awe
as an:

...indeterminant mixture of a government
bureaucracy, a consortium of non-profit
agencies
a lead agency model, an
employment program, an
extended training program, a citizen's
advocacy
organization, and. to perhaps the
smallest
degree, a private, non-profit human
service
delivery business.

'

The center received numerous
refusals for increases in C&E grant size

and was placed on conditional status
several times, probably suffering
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in the end with
smaller grants
eranrc than they
might have received.
NIMH
critics wanted the center
services to
' '°
""^^-^ direct line
authority
,
ot, the
executive director
T>,^
ctor.
The
executive director,
as area director,
did control some services
rvices. but
h.,^ others
^-u
were delivered by
vendor or
partnership contracts
racts.
rr-in^^
^
Critxcs also wanted
C&E generalist
activities
to be under direct
control of a C&E uj.rector.
director
Thi
This was another center
where considerable soecialicsf
specialist C&E energies
went into just trying
to
document and influence
generalist C.E. The C.E
director, at one point
lamented all of the different
boards, directors and
program heads
she had to negotiate with
to develop some overall
plan.
NIMH critics

were probably irritated
somewhat by the C/S proposals
which were a
bit too honest.
The proposals indicated
-grant" and "non grant" C.E.
"Grant" C&E were specialist
positions supported by NIMH
monies.
"Non
grant" C&E was a breakdown of
the center's overall sources
of revenue.
The argument was that
administration figured roughly 5% of
staff
time went to C&E-like services.
So they multiplied the center

resources by .05 and listed those as
in-kind center support for C&E,
a mathematical exercise which
was noted with little humor by
grant

reviewers
The C&E unit here was labelled as
mixed, with generalist and

specialist C&E.

A large segment of the specialist core
was represen-

ted by Community Training Resources
(CTR)

.

CTR, begun in 1972,

had provided inservice, continuing education,
and workshop trainings
for area human service professionals in a
variety of areas.

The

organization was small and
efficient

-v.

and tuition from
the start which covered
a good fraction
of operating . .
costs.
It had
and still enjoys, a
fine reputation
P tatxon for the
th. quality
i
of trainings put
on h. its ..faenlt...
of experts who wor.
on a per-training
hasis. Xhe
-del is univalent to that
of an adult education
center designed ..
especially for professional
helpers and focused
on topical needs
and
•

state and seems to have
staying power as one

«E

service that

survives, if on a shoestring
budget.
The C4E director was
separate from CTR and faced
the issues of

internal organizational concerns
as the director sought
to document and
organize generallst C.E
resources across 17 discrete
programs. Perseverence on her part, combined
with NIMH pressure, produced
some results.
Although never given line authority,
she was able to successfully
organize a C4E committee with
13 members from 9 programs.
A C.E plan was
written with six C4E goals:
(1) agency support (case
consultation);
(2)

networking; (3) service development
(training);

(4)

community

education; (5) prevention; and
(6) self/mutual help promotion.

populations and agencies were identified,
including:

Target

children and

adolescents, elders, the retarded,
chronic deinstitutionalized, alcohol
prevention, and work with school, legal
systems and health delivery
agencies.

In all. this committee offered an
excellent example of a

mixed model.

The specialist CSE director could pursue
a variety of

community development projects while at the same
time facilitating

a
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team of generalist C&E
practitioners
itioners.

rh.
The .team met to set
goals

view projects, and promote
their own levels ui
of sKiii.
skill
model also reflected the
ne reali>i»=
realities „r
of the center's

re-

,

Th.
ihe generalist

structure and Its

direct service priorities.

Ihe C.E tea. acted
as an Influece within

system, purposeful!, promoting
an Indirect approach
and setting a goal
Of encouraging more diverse
«E activities than Just case
consultation
Resource surveys conducted by
the C.E director indicate
some success
with an expansion in new kinds
of activities reported
hy clinical staff.
Percentages of generalist hours
by activity were compared
between 1977
and 1981 as listed in Table
9.
The results suggest a trend
in generalist style toward more training,
public education, and Interagency
coordination.
As withF/HXMHC and

mUC,

the specialist C.E director
position did

not survive the end of NIMH funds.

From a peak of five FTE specialized

CSE positions, there are now two,
found in the enduring OTR program.
The C&E committee no xuuger
jloneer exxsts
exi<?f<5 and
ar>A r.^
^„
no t,i
plan
coordinating
goals or

setting target populations exists in
a formal way.

Generalist C&E

has reverted to the programs and seems
to be varied and diverse.

with CTR, C/S agencies include services
such as

Along

medical liaison

consulting, child and adolescent case consulting,
a geriatric team for

consulting to nursing homes, a court clinic, and
education programs
for families of inpatients.

Alcohol education is supported by an

alcohol outpatient clinic and networking continues with many
collaborative

interagency committees focusing on school children, abuses and
neglected
children, elders and the mentally retarded.

An active inservice

Table

9

Types of Generalist C.E
Activity in the Cambridge/
Somerville CMHC, by
percentage*

Type of G eneralist C&E
Activity

Percent ages
1980

1977

Case consultation

Program consultation

54

43

30

21

16

20

Training
Public education^
7

Interagency coordination^
10

100

^hese activities were not identified
separately

100

categories when the data was collected
in 1977, in part
because they were rare
as
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and training programs
also ll„ks many of the
agencies.
AS the area director
explained. ,ro. the
center's perspective
the
C.E coordination and
documentation were haslcaUy
"eaRewor." forced
on the center by federal
regulations. If „E „as
done In an enduring
manner. It was only In the
context of the ongoing
direct service of
various agencies and programs.
Ihls see^s to continue
and even prosper
If anything is lacking It
would be the Influence
toward diverse styles
of indirect service and
a .ore primary prevention
focus encouraged by
the former C&E director.
The Ca.bridge/Somerville area
office also felt the impacts
of federal
cuts for prevention monies. The
C&E director collaborated with
a

nationally recognized alcoholism
prevention project,

CASPAR, which

specialized in educational curriculums
and peer training models for
school-aged children. NIAAA model
project funds were cut and CASPAR
was unable to maintain itself on the

income from sales of its curriculum,

widely praised as it was.

CASPAR remains in existence, but at a

considerably smaller size than before.

Harry C. Solomon Community Mental Health Center
Based in Lowell, the Harry C. Solomon CMHC is also
a state-owned

CMHC/area office.
urban,

It, like the other state-owned CMHCs

,

serves an

ethnically mixed, predominantly working class population.

center received its first C&E grant in 1976 for $154,930.

The

During the

next six years, a specialist C&E unit pursued a variety of activities

serving at-risk and target populations.

The specialized FTE staff
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m

positions P
peaked
aKea In 1978
iq7« at
approximately 10
iu.j/i,
375 Ar-r.
.
dropping
quickly
thereafter to 2 FTEs in

^

1981.

Sta. .ere assigned

to specific
activities and target

and included the
following C&E services:

pop.l...

Outreach to Hispanic
population
Consultation, training
with police
Consultation, education
with elderly
Consultation and organizing
around Lusing
and resource development
for the
deinstitutionalized
Community education to
groups and agencies
Program development with
business/indust^

Ch^Jd^Ln^::^?^^^^^^^^^^-^

volunteer'training

Client advocacy
Rape prevention and
treatment
in all, the activities
reflected a diversity
typical of active specialized

C&E units, with a wide range
of target groups.

The course of development
over time was one of direct
correlation
to the size of the C&E
grant.
The grant dollars peaked in
1979 at
$117,730 and the C.E FTEs peaked at
10.375.

The grant dollars dropped

the next year to $63,322
and the C&E FTEs dropped to
5.7.

NIMH

comments on applications criticized
the center for not allocating

shared funds to C&E and the C&E unit
for not providing income.

Actually,

the unit did report income
ranging from $6,000 to $9,000 a
year.

The

center also did report putting up
matching funds, doubling the total
federal grant of $513,531 with a reported
total C&E budget of $1,067,827.
The C&E unit was not integrated into
the ongoing task of the center,

however, probably did not receive that much
in matching funds, and

preferred to continue serving the populations it
had as long as possible.

'
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over

v„.„>,3

spe.UZU,
^^^^^

consultation (which „ay
have gone private or
at least end.,
dL
u
ended when
that
staff person left,, and
the Hispanic liaison
service. The rape
prevention prosra. „as
spnn-off to a local
co^unlt, ,ro.p that
continued
the „or. hased on Its
co^lt^nt to the Issues,
.ear the end there was
a C&E director, a
part-time educator
tor, a part-time
oart t^r.. volunteer
i
coordinator,
and a part-time trainer
as C&E staff.
The last year of the
grant there were only two
PTEs and the
stated goal was to establish
an information and
referral network that
would survive the end of the
federal dollars.

A follow-up interview with the
current C&E coordinator

(

a former

C&E staff member) indicated
that he continues services
such as
public relations and speaking,
volunteer development and staff

inservices.

Able to devote only 20% of
his time to C&E, his chief

role involves administrative
duties and grant writing.

The respondent

identified several crucial variables
that he felt accounted for the

disappearance of C&E.

He pointed out the lack of a
mandate from DMH

for indirect services or prevention.

The center, itself, is restricted

in its flexibility in the use of
staff by rigidly defined and allocated

"state" slots.
Cuts in the total DMH staff size statewide
had filtered down to the

service level, with increased service demand and
fewer staff.

He felt

there were real possibilities in the future
for C&E-like work with the

Hispanic and Indochinese populations, case management
of chronic
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deinstitutionalized
•

u
,
and w-n-u
„Uh schools
and nursing ho.es.

ities required money,
however
owever, ..r,^
and support

fron, the

tion.

Bay Cove /Tuft s New En.1.„H m...-,
The C.E

unu

at Bay Cove was

in doing a lot with
very

„I

The opp„„u„-

center adminlstra-

,_lJn_^j_^

si.Uar

to tHat of
Ca..ridge/So.ervUle

United specialist resources.

They received
their first grant In
1,76 for 555,284 and over
the next six years
received the smallest average
grant amounts ($53,000)
of any of the six
grant projects. The
shortfall resulted fro„
their receiving basically even funding across
the years, instead of
large early grants of
over 5100,000 that would
then shrink ,ulcKly.
all likelihood, this
contributed to a more stable
condition.

m

The center received much of
the same criticisms from
NIMH as did
the Cambridge/Somerville
CMHC; namely, that it was an
organizational

blur of DMH area office, partnership
clinics, agencies and a hospital/
university. NIMH critics also were
concerned, as with C/SCMHC, that
the C&E director did not have
enough authority over generalist
activities

and did not have a high enough
standing in the organization.

The C&E unit was based on a somewhat
unique vendor model where a
C&E specialist team of two PTEs
supervised vendor contracts.

first three years, C&E funded
to deliver C&E services.

For the

four vendor agencies outside the CMHC

During the last three years, actual funds

were not given out, but the C&E director signed
detailed contracts with
programs within the CMHC for generalist C&E services.

It is probable
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that this system reflected
NIMH., concern

„Uh

authority over gener
The syste. o, detailed
intemaily-si^ea contracts
is
probably the .ost sophisticated
and for.ali.ed
coordination of
generalist C.E revealed in
this survey and offers
an ideal for the
successful generalist model.

alist C.E.

The external vendor agencies
represented organizations
that already
specialized in some for. of C.E
or prevention and were
closely linked
to target populations.
The agencies received peak
funding the first
year with $28,290 going to
four agencies to fund
prevention in alcoholism, particularly with the
fetal alcohol syndrome and
C.E services to
elderly and Chinese populations.
These monies shrank with the
C&E
budget and were no longer contracted
out after the third year.

Simultaneously, however, the C&E specialist
team extended control
over generalist inhouse C&E resources.

A needs assessment and resource

identification survey was conducted internally
to identify the ongoing
generalist activities.

A C&E seminar, similar to the C/SCMHC
C&E

committee, served to coordinate goals and
received the praise of NIMH

reviewers for promoting effective collaboration
between CMHC programs
and other agencies.

With continued NIMH pressure to increase direct

C&E authority, however, the C&E director drew
up and signed annual

contracts for specific personnel to do specific projects
part-time
out of 15 different programs.

While it seems that this moment was

fleeting (1980-1981) with the C&E director soon leaving
and the
contract system dropped, it offers an ideal of coordinating authority

over generalist C&E.

The programs each had a representative in the
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supervision.

The C.E director was
able, on the --"-ucr
other hand
nand, to promote
the Planned and
purposeful u.e of indirect
services center-wide
in addition to generalist
C.E coordination,
the specialist tepursued a variety of
activities, including
co^unity and .inorit,
population education, contracted
case consultation and
training to
agencies, outreach and
organising of .utual help
groups. . hilingual
rape prevention brochure
was produced, along with
organised educational
events and brochures (including
a calendar) for the
Chinese population
Alcohol education and
prevention activities were
continued with C.E
staff.
The unit .ade money (up
to $15,000 annually)
fro. EAPs, consulting and training contracts,
and a series of successful
conferences for
professionals on topics such as
battered children, elder needs
and
teenage delinquents.
Finally, a prevention/education
periodical
for the parents of newborn
children, 'Pierre the. Pelican,"
was distributed by CSE through various health
clinics.
,

In the last year, the CiE
director noted that survival issues

threatened the goals of the unit.

While there were some

EAJ?

contracts,

the CiE director of the past five
years had left and taken many connections

with her.

This happens often, as consultation
relationships often take

years to build and are as tied to the person
as they are to the institution, regardless of whether in business
or community consultation.

The

current director explained that the mission
of CSE was to acquaint

community caregivers and residents with resources
and educate them about
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^en.a.

.aU.

.sues .Hro.,.

was a .rea. Xocal
...res.

services.

She reported

...

^^.^
there
c.. services,
..ere .a. .eve.opea
a hesi-

tancy to call on C&E
services because agencies
h.d
had no money and
were
not used to paying
for C&E services.
Dr. iNxctcs,
Nicks former
.
for™. administrative
head Of NIMH in New
England, co^ented that
C.E in Massachusetts
more
•

barrier to survival when
pressures to charge increased,
any case
the pressure to charge
was perceived as
contradictory to the C.E
mis sion
when onl^ for-fee services
could be offered.

m

^

Survival strategies in the
last year included interest
in prevention
funds from the Department of
Public Health, along with
plans for seminars
in stress management, decision
making, and time management.
EAP and
conference projects were also
viewed hopefully.
In follow-up attempts, the
researcher was unable to locate
anyone

who could or would comment on
C&E.

Phone calls weren't returned,

nor was the questionnaire, which
wasn't surprising because there
was
no one to address it to.

It is possible that C&E continues,
certainly

probably that C&E-like services exist.

Mental Health conferences are

still sponsored by Tufts University
and the Medical Center.

The Medical

Center has an occupational health program
and is looking into entrepre-

neural

investments into health promotion/illness
prevention services

with business and industry.
reported, however.

There was no identifiable C&E unit
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Solomon Carter Fullpr

r^r™-

As noted above, data
on the Solomon
c i
Carter Fuller (SCF)
OMC is
extremely limited. It
is a large urban,
v
state-o«,ed CMHC/area
office
In the past, the
center is reported
to have used ICS
its full
tuil o
.
operations
grant (often ten times
laro^^
larger *-u
than average CiE
grants) to fund a
large
specialist CSE team, with PTir
FTE positions in
excess of 30. The
CSE grant
was used to fund one
CSE project,
proiect th»
r„
the Community Programs
Against Sexual
Assault. With approximately
six FTE positions
(five full time)
the
CPASA developed extensive
clinical and preventive
expertise In Issues
Of sexual assault.
Staff conducted co^unity
research to document
related Issues and provided
extensive training for
clinical staff
Community organizing, networking
and education was used
to mobilize
forces for both prevention
and treatment. The full
CSE unit also
included a clergy project.
Hispanic consultation project,
and smaller
prevention and education projects
placed throughout the center's
programs. The NIMH reviewers
were generally pleased with
the center's
CSE. though they wanted it
to bill more for CSE
services.
During
closeout they comment with pleasure
asure on tne
==.
K
the cenro,
center assuming
responsibility
for continuing their C&E unit
and its services. There is
currently a
full time C&E director and some
specialist unit of unreported size.
-

•

Brief Su mmary of Survey Data on Case
Studies

A review of the data indicates that of
six CMHCs with C&E grantfunded projects, three now have some
identifiable person or unit called
(or associated with) C&E.

This is a raw survival ratio of 50%.
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Of tHe 3..

. .

a»e«o..

o.,an..«„„.,
^^^^^

cu„e„.,.

0,

^^^^^^

,,,,,

^^^^^
^ ^^^^
t.«e posUion. anotHe.
.evot.s 80. of He.
...e .o C.B, an. ..e
.Hi..
devotes 10-20% of his
time
ime to C&E.
C&F
t>,
The organizational
levels are not
clear, and are probably
not comparable
'luxe given thp
f
i
the .complex
structures
of the CMHCs.

The real change Is
found In tha. of
speclaU.ed .TE staff positions
C.E.
The PTES all peaked
between 1978 and 1980.
Taking the peak
PTE number for the five
C.H units where complete
data Is available, the
total number of specialized
CiE FTEs was approximately
34.
There was
an average specialized
CSE tea. of 6.8 FTE
positions InflveMCs.

-

currently, for the five CMHCs.
the total reported FTEs
for specialized
CiE is approximately
2.2, for an average of 1.1 BTE
positions In two
CMHCs.
In the past, there were five
C&E units based on a mixed
model of a

specialist team and some level of
authority over generalist activities.
One unit appeared to be chiefly
specialist, with little reported
involvement in generalist resources.
Currently, there is little clear
data.
In
one center a specialist team
continues as a discrete program,
without a

mandate to coordinate generalist C&E.
time C&E work.

In another, one person does part

In the third, there is a specialist
unit with

indeterminate relationship to the rest of the
center.

an
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Discussion of Results of r,..
c.^jr-

A discussion of the results
of the case studies
Is useful here to
highlight so.e tentative
conclusions „hlch can then
be exa^ned in
light of the full survey data.
The first observation is
that the recipients of

often not coherent organizations.

cmc

grants were

It was hard to "find"
the CMHC even

when they were designated as
such and expected to at least
try to look
like one.
In follow-up contacts, the
agencies have changed, the
collaborative networks have shifted,
and the constellations of
the
programs have realligned along different
funding sources, in large
part DMH.

NIMH tended to encourage discrete,
private non-profit

corporations which had direct line authority
over services.
the larger, older,

s t ate -dominated

this was not the case.

With

CMHCs which received C&E grants,

If anything, the younger centers
reviewed in

the next section were more likely to
fit the NIMH model.

It is not

surprising that unreliable data was reported to
NIMH given the reality
of CMHC structures and their priorities.

This is especially the case

with reported matching revenues.
The C&E grant projects did not assume a very survivable
form.
of the specialist C&E vanished quickly.

Most

In general, it seems that the

major vulnerability was that specialist C&E services were not considered
the chief task of the agency.

largely separate programs
center services.

,

As a result, C&E specialist teams were

unintegrated in the ongoing work of the other

When C&E funding disappeared, the C&E units were unable
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to generate survival
Income.

inis f>n„™
This
failure seeiis to reflect
a lack of

bis .oney market for the C.E
services.

Units that .Id pursue
EAPs or
training Institutes enjoyed
modest results at hest
Ko one „as going
to get rich. Also, the
training Institute that
did survive does so
on
a cost basis v^th some
modest help from the center.
The activity does
not f>„d other «E activities.
Specialist C.E that endures
does so
in extremely modest form.
One can only speculate
that If a
.

significant

CS.E

unit remains at Solomon
Carter Fuller, It Is only

through an act of the area director,
who had decided that it does
represent a task central to the agency.
Generalist C&E. however, poses an
intriguMg

mystery.

Many of the

centers argued that program staff
routinely did C&E-like activities
as
part of their direct service jobs.
Three of the C&E units even tried
to

measure generalist C&E.

The Camb ridge /Somervi lie C&E unit
estimated

that their center of approximately 435
FTE staff positions produced

about 12,630 hours of generalist C&E in
1977

.

The Bay Cove unit estima-

ted their center (approximately 400
FTE positions) produced 18.000 hours
of generalist C&E in 1977.

The "Mass Mental" C&E unit reported that

in 1977 their center (somewhere between 350
and 400 FTE positions) pro-

duced 37,864 hours of generalist C&E.

These are significant resources

if the measurements are correct.

There are two trends relevant to generalist C&E;

type and amount.

The sur^/ey by both C/S and Bay Cove indicated that 50% or more
of these
services took the form of case consutlation

.

The survey at C/S seemed to

document that active specialist coordination promoted a more diverse
range in types of generalist C&E, away from case consultation and toward

training, education and
networking
it^tworicmg ^r-n-u
with agencies.

Many of the
specialist C.E units participated
in or created
coordinating co^ittees
for collaborative agencies.
These con^ittees see.
to continue in
many cases. It is possible,
though, that without the
specialist
influence, most generalist C&E
is case-oriented.
In terms of amount, though
widespread, the Mass Mental
C.E unit

documented a 77% drop in generalist
C.E hours between 1977
and 1978
(from 3,147 hours/sample month
to 722 hours/sample month).
The figure
seemed to then remain stable through
1980 at around 8,700 hours
per
year.
The drop coincides with a time
when many financial pressures
were increasing on centers in
general.
By 1982, many centers reported
staff cuts and an increased reliance
on fee-f or-service hourly
staff
and measured production quotas (factory
mental health).

It seems likely

that generalist C&E activities by
clinical staff were significantly

reduced by these pressures.

It also seems likely that some
level of

generalist C&E will endure and return when and
if time permits.

While

somewhat of a luxury, some generalist C&E
activities appear to be

inherently associated with direct service delivery,
i.e., unavoidable.
Partnership clinics, through their organization, the
Massachusetts

Association of Mental Health Providers have in fact reported
that
current funding mechanisms do not cover the cost of unavoidable
indirect
and non-reimburseable hours provided by clinical staff (Note

9)

.

As

such, some indirect service and C&E-like activities appear to maintain
a baseline.
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A second observation
is relevantrelevant concerning
clinical consultation
While usually pursued by
specialist C.E staff
least f.e.uently in
.heir activities, case
consultation regains a
viable and rei.burseable
service in clinical programs.
The
ine birrh
of many new
birth of
!>.
geriatric
•

^6

-dlcal Uaison, cou. and cMla
consuUln, .ea.s

™Us

or
s.^i.st .ha.
case consulting „ay even
be becoMng „ore
specialize, and f„„all.ed
D«H has,
fact. Instructed all Area
Offices to provide case
consultation to nursing homes and
a courts,
courts in ,^ovtpart
response to public and
political pressure produced by
.t,
the increase
inrre;,Q*.
.
y cne
chronic deinstitutionalized
state patients seen in their
systems.

m

m
-,-

m

•

A final area of discussion is
that of the nature

of services lost.
While some generalist C&E service
endures in case consultation
and

clinical programs, many would argue
that these services were never
the
thrust of specialist C&E. Clearly
the diverse community development,

education and prevention services
pursued with at-risk and hard-to-reach
populations have largely disappeared.

As one interviewee explained,

"Now, we just pay lip service to
community organizing and prevention."

C&E, as evidenced in the larger specialist
units funded by C&E

grants
,

seemed to represent a general commitment to
indirect service

more than prevention, per se

.

Activities often focused on promoting

a collaboration, coordination and sharing
of resources between agencies

and community groups.

C&E specialists helped to improve professional

helper skill levels and generally multiply the resources
available in an
area through efficiency of coordination.
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resources they may have
"prevented"
prevented some
.nn,o
experiences of distress
by
promoting a sense of
empowerment
powerment and
^nH .community.
They could not be

expec...

giving

then, a

„

^^^^^^^^^^

link to the formal
service syste,„.

AS a result, it is
probable that specialist
C.E helped keep clinical
services in touch with
minority populations.
..Direct service.,
as

defined by fifty ^„utes in
a stranger.s office
across to™ is
surprisingly uninviting to
a number of populations
who nonetheless
-y experience considerable handicaps. As such,
specialist outreach
C.E activities often
translated ..direct service',
for both the residents
and for the professionals
in the Cmc.
This kind of active co^nity
involvenent allowed professionals
to stay in touch with, be
alerted to
and trained in issues relevant
to the populations.
It doesn't see. to
be a coincidence that CM
specialists often focused on issues
long

neglected by clinical services such
as alcoholism, sexual assault,
domestic violence, and racism issues
which are now receiving considerable
attention as major causes of psychological
disorder and distress.

Many of these efforts were considered
explicitly preventive in goal
by specialist CSE staff.

Few of the projects reached the
sophistication

of a formal research-oriented prevention
program.

If anything, CSE

represented a king of practitioner. s prevention
theory which integrated
preventive goals with other goals, such as service
coordination,

empowerment and the translation of direct service issues
between residents
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and the community mental
health center.
In all, specialist C&E
seemed to
o represent ^n^h
both an invaluable
bridge
to the community and a
forcp nf
-tr^r,
torce
of innovation in
mental health services

innovations which included,
but weren't restricted
to, primary prevention projects. These are
the services lost
with the demise of
specialist C&E as practiced in
the case examples.

Section 3:

Survey of C&E Sp..h...
Massachusetts CMHCs

y,^^^.
"

Response Rate
The overall response rate for
the survey of C.E services
in former
CMHCS is 80% (20 of 25), or
83% of those centers that
received C.E grants
(5

of 6) and 79% of those centers
that received only basic
operations

or construction grants or a
"non-funded" status (15 of 19).

As Table
illustrates,
10
the issue of how to define the
respondent CMHC was
best resolved by referring to
"constellations" rather than centers.

(Throughout this text the term "center"
refers generally to various

agency constellations, as discussed below.)

Most

,

if not all, of

the CMHCs acted as a vendor in
subcontracting out funds for some of
the 12 mandated services to other agencies.

Applications to NIMH

routinely included a stack of collaborative contracts
with those
agencies which would fill out the service gaps and
comprise the CMHC

constellation.
The recipient of the NIMH grants, the designated CMHC, was held

responsible for meeting the conditions of the grants and, just as
importantly, the reporting of requirements to NIMH.

These recipient

office /vendor constellationsand
AS can be seen in
Table 10
10,

whUe
trh-fi^

•

non-profit corporations.
private non-profit
corporations

were the numerically
.ost ,re,ue„t CMHC
for. (16 of 25)
the
DMH-owned CMHC/area offices
received categorical
cti-cgoricai C&E
CSE grants most
f^eouentl,. Hesponse rates
range fro. 62.3. of
.^«-o^ed CMHC/area
ofHces. to 8..5, of private
non-profit corporations,
to 100, of area
office constellations
(n=l)
The private non-profit
corporations could have
also heen divided
into two different .odels.
Including:
(1, consortium models
and (2)
key agency models. Ihe
consortium model, which was
fairly rare
consists o, an administrative
office or fiscal conduit
which silply
meets the monitoring reauirp^^1Pn^o
g requirements of <-u
the grants while sending
all
monies out to subcontracted
agencies. The only services
likely to be

provided by the corporate fiscal
conduit were C.E services,
all others
being delivered by the
constellation agencies that formed
the

consortium umbrella corporation
in the first place.

In the key agency

model, a majority of services
would be delivered in-house by
a single
agency whose corporate administration
would receive the NIMH funds.

The case history of the Franklin
/Hampshire CMHC is that of a transition
from a consortium model to a key
agency model. The data collected
did
not permit a reliable identification
between these two forms in past
CMHC structure, although the key
agency seemed to have been the most

frequent by far.
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Source of Data
The i.sue. of cu..en.

".e.

a. .He

OBC .ea„Uio„

Have .eco.e .o.e
complex „.tH

,or^. a«C con.eUaUon
Ha. cHan.ea „UH

The Hloc. g.a„ts that
replaced

Cmc

sources

funding we.e mandated
to continue

sole-source g.ant award, to
fot„e. CMHCs througH
their re.alnl„, ,eat.
of ellglHlUty.
only 9 o, the f„„er 25
CMHCs ate Usted
DMH as
eligible for sole-source
awards past September,
1984 and of these,
at

least one consortium .odel
Is known to have
dissolved In July of 1984

the block grant system
may
De seen as
aq ha.Hr,„
having ^terminated any
y be
generally

meaningful previous definition
of the CMHC.
The question became one,
then, of whom to contact
for the survey
interview or questionnaire. The
interviewer typically contacted
the
agency listed in the
1981 Directory of QfflCs and introduced
himself as doing a survey on C.E
services in that state. The
responses
were highly diagnostic, rather
like a projective test.
The person on
the phone might immediately
recognize the term "C&E" and refer
the

mm

researcher to the C&E director or related
staff.

A referral to a clinic

director usually meant that the C&E unit
had only recently been
dissolved and/or merged into an outpatient
clinic.

An opposite, but

equally well-informed, first response was
sometimes, "Oh, yes, we used
to have a C&E unit but it's gone now!"

This may or may not have been

entirely true as further questioning often revealed
specialized case

consulting teams or generalist C&E.
"Oh, what is that?"

A final response was that of,

This was usually followed by a detailed inquiry

'
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into who the researcher
was and .rh.f
what agency he
represented, along with
a referral to
administration,
all
-LJcases the
cases,
thP responses

m

impression of a system memory
ry of C&E.
C&F

gave some

Th.This

memory was found to
have

completely faded in only
four of the systems
contacted.
References were accepted
through multiple persons
and/or agencies
until a "system nominated"
respondent was identified,
i. all cases
attempts were made to interview
more than one respondent
per system
With a 50% success rate.
The number of sources
used to compile
the

by multiple sources.

Contacts were made with
currently employed staff

in all the systems for
which data is reported.

Table

11

illustrates the breakdown of survey
respondents by role

and current employment.

As indicated, almost half
(48%) of the

respondents were current or former
C&E directors or coordinators
of
C&E-like specialities. The use of
past employees was necessary
to fill
in gaps in the system memory where
possible

.

The respondents represented

a range of years employed by
the agency of one to fifteen
years, with an

average of 5.3 years of professional
history with the agency.

In many

cases, however, even where there was
a current C&E director, there was

only a faint memory of what the C&E activities
and staff size had been
three or four years ago.
The respondents listed do not represent
individually completed

questionnaires.

A completed questionnaire from one source was

extremely rare.

People answered what they could, estimating many vari-

ables.

Some variables, such as the number of generalist C&E hours
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Table 11

Interviewees by Occupational
Posit ion

Executive Director of
center or agency
C&E Director or

coordinator

21
10

16

Business Manager or
personnel office staff
Clinic Director
DMH Area Director

DMH Area Office Staff

Total

48

15

2
2
1

26

2

6

2

6

1

3

33

99
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provided by staff, are
frequently „ot measured.
Others ssuch
ucners,
H as the
CMHC budget and number
of FTE Dn=!^^-(^
positions, were either
reported as a
definite measure, estimated,
or aitticult
difficult to adefine
given the CMHC
constellation.

m

Four case examples
Illustrate

certain variables for former
a

Omc

the harriers to
measuring
constellations.

One example is that
of

D>«-o™ed CMHC/area office/vendor
constellation which includes

one

agency that speciali.es in
prevention-oriented parent
education.
If one takes that particular
agency

as the CMHC, then one
gets a very

^all center

that is .00. specialised
in C.E.

if. on the other hand,
one wants to take the full
constenp^^nn
constellation as representative
of the
CMHC, then a full research
project is Itself necessary
to define and
measure the appropriate operating
budget and FTE staff size
of the

constellation.

A second example is that of
another DMH-owned CMHC/area
office/
vendor constellation which does
not have C&E. but has a
specialist
C&E-like unit which is so large it
skews the data for the survey.
The area director is committed
to indirect services as the
preferred

mode of intervention and a "key to
managing resources for the

chronic deinstitutionalized client."

The community service office

of this center maintains a staff of
15 FTE positions, who conduct

case management via a variety of C&E-like
activities such as training, networking, case and program
consultation and organizational

and community development.

While outstanding, the unit is large

enough and unique enough in case management services
to skew the

A third example Is
.Hat of a private
non-proHt fo^er CMHC
(^e. a«e„c. .odel) „Hlch
op., .o cHanse Us
service profUe „he„
CMHC ..„ds endea. KatHer
than sact.ace .he
center to the .nHUere.
influence of the OMH area
office hy sl^m^ a
partnership contract
(" puppetshlp.. was .he ter„
used,, the ad^nlstrators
decided to
rely on fees, third-party
payors and „ora directly

defined DMH service
contracts (07 .onles) which
It could chose to
compete for or not
as It liked.
The D^« area office
subsequently set up its own
CMHC
and sponsors .any C.E
services such as training
of professionals.
The former Cmc agency was
designated here as the survey
respondent
even though it represents
a smaller proportion
of the area services
than it once did, including
C&E.

A final example is offered by
profit corporation.

a consortium model private
non-

The CMHC in this case consisted
of an executive

director and office staff and a
C&E director.

After the last sole

source block grant award was received
in the Spring of 1984, the
CMHC
office was dissolved. Three out of
four former vendor agencies were
contacted, along with the former executive
director.

Interviews

revealed that the former specialist C&E
services were gone, but one
agency has a C&E coordinator who works in
a traditional style.

The

other two agencies have extensive generalist
C&E and speciality
case consulting teams.

One also has a primary prevention program
for

sexual abuse and incest, temporarily held in limbo
while a financial

sponsor can be found.

The other is launching a specialist, semi-

151

autonomous EAP program
which was ^-Loai^ed
cloaked in secrecy
because of
area competition,
in^peding a measure
of rit
FTE staff npositions
or
activities.

m

in all, It is very
.uch

UUe

comparing apples,
oranges an,

recalled with varying
degrees of vividness.
Definiti on of "Sp e cialist
In the past,

C.!,F"

the definition of C.E
was varied and diverse,

if

measure.

As might he imagined,
the loss of a mandate
for something
called
has contributed to a
greater blurring of
definitional
boundaries. The question of
how to define "specialist
C.E" services
in the present and the
rules adopted to answer that
question

represent some of the major
findings of the survey.
In a number of systems the
C&E label is gone, but staff
specialize
in C&E-like work under a
different label.

A "Consulting Center-

offers consultation and training
to business and industry.

"EAP"

programs coordinate clinical referral
and treatment with supervisor
training and health education. A
"community services team" provides
"C&E-like" case management.

Training institutes and prevention
programs

continue under their own names.
The major roles adopted refer to what
specialist C&E is not.

Current specialty case consulting teams
(i.e., nursing home/geriatric,
court clinic and child teams) are considered
here to be an extension
of developments in direct clinic
services.

They frequently began

before C&E units were dissolved and tend to have
a much more restricted.
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explicitly clinical mandate.

As such,
surh ^K
they are not defined
as

specialist C&E, but arp no^^^
noted as a new and
significant development
relating to C&E.

specialist

-aff teaming

«H

also could not be
„,olly defined

i„-House

or research and
evaluation activities.

A specialty
in center public relations
was accepted because
Interviews revealed
the use of CSE-Uke
con»unlty education
techniques.
A specialist In C.E had to
devote

a

discrete and measureable

portion of their time (more
than 50% in most cases)
to indirect
activities (other than case
consultation) focused in the
co^nlty.
Such specialists typically
also performed case consultation,
in-house
training, public relations,
and other activities
frequently argued to
be outside of the proper
definition of CM. These actlvlMas
are

noted below

.

Generalist C&E activities also were
found to frequently include
similarities to specialist C&E activities.
Generalist C&E also
reached a diverse range of populations
traditionally served by C&E.

Generalist C&E is reported here as

a

separate service, however, from

specialist C&E.

Amplification of Changes Over Time
This survey is designed to offer an indication
of change over
time in C&E services, comparing pre-1981
federally funded services

with current, 1984, services.

The changes reported in various

centers followed similar trends over this time, but
had different
schedules.

While a general shrinkage in specialist C&E staff time
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is reported, centers
oeakpH
'

"
-fr,

•

'""'^

positions at
C&E actUr-{i--i
actxvxtxes began
shifting in type and
target
populations as early as
1979 in some centers
nters, although
althn H not as
frequently
as a.te. .s:. „UH
cHan^es ,oUo^„, t..
sa. ,e„e.a. ai.ctions.
It IS the conclusion
of the researcher
i-^ner, based on
nn coimnents
solicited
during interviews, that
C&E services began
to reflect .
^
emerging issues
Of cente. sponsorship
an. f^,i„,
,,3, ^„
^^^^^
«he.. the .ported hlstor,
allocs this chanse to
.e discussed, the
"before" data reported
here reflects the earlier
traditional C.E
data.
This technique serves
to a.pll£, to so^e
degree the changes
reported In the service of
clarifying a trend. While
this technique
does act somewhat as a
preconceived conclusion In
shaping the data,
a clear and powerful
trend would he observed
If reported strictly on
the basis of two chronological
dates.
The Ideal technique, that
of

different times.

•

reporting all variables for
each of the past ten years,
would have been
too lengthy and beyond the
accuracy of the frequently
estimated data
which was reported. An
appropriate "before" and "after"
orientation
is used and more detailed
changes over time are noted where
they
seemed particularly powerful or
were readily measureable in a
reliable
fashion

Data is reported for C&E grant
projects and non-C&E grant recipients
separately where the data revealed differing
trends between these two
groups
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Specialized

C.^v

r-j rr

Table 12 illustrates
the raw survival
rate of s """^
specialized
.
C&F
^
C&E service
(either a unit or a c,inci
single person) in
CMHCs
While
the respondent pool
is generally
li.i.ed to 20 i-encers
centers in this
th.
survey
.

m

(a«).

The average .a„
survival rate is 63..
or 50. ot the C.E
gran,
projects and 69. of the
non-C.E grant recipients.

Organizational Standlnp

of_;j;^^^^^^^^^^^_ClE

organisational standing was
measured by the presence
„ithin the
-nter of a full-ti.e director
of C.E
(see Table 13) and by
the

organizational standing of the
director (see Table U,
The frequency
of full-time (80% or mnrp^ rnv
more) C&E directors
dropped from 100% to 58%
.

in

those centers with a
specialist
«ixisL start.
staff
p
19 full-time directors to

7

Th^ ^total
^
The
number dropped from
i

full-time directors.

It is also noteworthy that many of the
currently measured directors
are directors of
a unit of one person,
making them more of a coordinator
or service

representative than a director, as
changes in title sometimes
indicate.
Organizational standing of directors
was measured for 16 centers.
The variable examined whether
or not the specialist director
or sole
staff person had equal organizational
standing with other CMHC

program directors and/or direct line
access to the center executive
director.

The data reported indicates a clear
slip down the organi-

zational tree by specialist C&E staff (see
Table 14).

In those centers

with specialist C&E staff, 88% of the
directors formerly had equal
standing, while currently only 45% have
equivalency with program

directors of other services.

Table 12

Specialist C&E Service
in Massachusetts

C&E Grant Projects

Pre-1981
1984
%

Surviving

6
3

50%

Non-C&E Grant Projects
Pre-1981
1984
%

Surviving

13
9

69%

Totals for all CMHCs
Pre-1981
1984
%

Surviving

19
12

63%
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Table 13

Full-Time C&E Director
Positions in Those CMHCs
wxth Specialist C&E
Services

Yes

Full-Tlme Director
No
% Yes

C&E Grant Projects

Pre-1981
1984

6

0

2

1

13

0

5

4

100
67

Non-C&E Grant Project?
Pre-1981
1984

100
55

13
9

Totals for All CMHCs

Pre-1981
1984

19

0

7

5

100
58

10
12

Table 14

Organizational Level of r^ir n,With Speciauft'cfEl:^^::

"^'^

program directors and/or
has
direct access to
executive director

C&E Grant Pro-jects

Pre-1981
80
50

1984

Non-C&E Grant Pro jects
Pre-1981
1984

10

91

11

44

9

14

88

16

5

45

9

4

Totals for Combined CMHCs
Pre-1981
1984
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Peak-Year ^P^cA ali^t_CS,E_Sta^^
The measure of peak-year
specialist C.E PTE staff
positions is
perhaps the .ost revealing
numerical measure of
change. Table 13
reports the changes over
ti.e separately for
C.E grant projects
and non-recipients of
C.E grants; while
Table 16 illustrates
the
changes for the respondent
pool as a whole.
The C.E unit size of C.E
grant projects (n=5) has
collapsed fro.
an average of 6.8 to an
average of .4 PTEs, or an
average of 1.1 ptes
between the 2 centers that
currently report specialist
C.E.

Specialist C.E staff ti.e in
non-grant recipients was
smaller to
begin With and shows less
change.
The average specialist
C.E PTE

expanded fro. 3.2 to 3.4 staff
positions, although the total
number
dropped. When averaged across
all 15 centers in this category,
the
average dropped from 2.8 to 2.1
PTE staff positions.

The data is

also skewed by one center which
has recently created a C&E-like
team
of more than 15 PTE positions.
Exclusion of the data from that

center amplifies the shrinkage over
time and condenses the variance,

with the overall average for 14 centers
shrinking from 2.8 to 1.1 PTE

specialist C&E staff positions.
The total for combined groups (see Table
16) indicates a smaller

average C&E unit in centers with specialist
staff, dropping from 4.2
to 3.0 PTEs.

Taken across all 20 respondents, the total number

of specialist staff dropped 56%, with the
average specialist PTEs

dropping from 3.8 to 1.7.

When this data is again corrected by exclu-

sion of the one unique current C&E unit, the drop in
average number
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Table 16

Totals for Peak-Year
Number of FTE Staff p
.
'^^^^^^^^^
for Specialist C&E
Se^^ce
•

Pre-1981

Number of Centers

1984

1984.
j

18.0

11.0

10.0

Sum FTE

I

75.5

33.2

18.2
j

Mean FTE per Center

4.2

3.0
1

Standard Deviation

3.0

4.2

1.8
^-^

i

Mean FTE for all Centers
contacted
(including those without
specialist

3.8

1.7
j

1.0

C&E)

(n=20)

(n=19)
i

of specialist staff
across all centers
center. is =even
greater, showing a
decline fro. 3.8 to 1.0
specialist «E PTE
positions.
The data reveals that
there has been a
significant decrease In
the unit sue and
of specialist C.E
staff throughout the
centers. The drop Is „ost
significant In former C.E
grant projects
Which declined £ro„ an
average unit sUe of
«re than twice that of
other centers to less than
a third the average
of specialist staff

fre„

positions currently found In
non-grant recipient centers.
that the receipt of a

CM

It appears

categorical grant was associated
with a

highly unstable CiE structure
or orientation over tl.e
and ™ay even
have mitigated against survival.
The peak years selected for
these comparisons reflect a
general
growth curve in the number of C&E
specialist positions. For 16

systems where accurate data was
available, 75% (12) either reached
or were at their peak in specialist
staff size in the three years

between 1978 and 1980.

Another 12.5% peaked in 1981. while
the remain-

ing centers (12.5%) peaked before
1978.

Organizational Model of Specialist C&E
Three types of specialist C&E units were
indicated by the data.
The "specialist core with authority over
generalist" type represented
a specialist team whose director had some level
of authority over

C&E services center-wide, including the part-time
C&E services delivered

by clinical staff in other programs (generalist C&E).

This authority

ranged from written contracts to in-name-only authority.

A second

type, or "separate specialist core", featured a specialist team with
no authority over or responsibility for generalist C&E.

A third type.

162

o.

_

"specaus.

^

^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

out to other agencies fnr rx.17
for CSE projects.

Table 17 reports the
standings
by organizational model
for all on
20 respondents.
A trend is evident
toward a separate specialist
core CB2^
(827 of
nf .current
specialist C&E units)
and away from some
authority
J over gciieraiist
generalise ckf
C&E services (72% of
specialist C&E units in the
past).
1-

Goal Orientation

Specific goals of C&E units
are too complex and/or
poorly
recalled to analyze in detail.
A general orientation or
type of goal
structure was suggested, however,
by the data.
Four types of orientation for specialist C&E
services were identified, based
on key
phrases or words reported.
The
xat: rirst
f
first type,
evn*.
tu^^ of^ needs
that
assessment/
at-risk populations, was based on
the goal of delivering services
that were most needed to the
populations most underserved and/or
at
risk of developing disorders.
The second type, that of marketing
C&E products, seeks to develop

C&E-like service products and related
target audiences with the

primary goal of making money.

A third type, the mixed type,

incorporates needs assessment and marketing
goals in a kind of
compromise, often structurally established in
different sub-units or
projects.

Finally, in some systems (different over time),
C&E was

used primarily as a public relations arm of the center.
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Table 17

Organizational Models of
Speciali St C&E Units

Model
Specialist team with authority
over generalist C&E
activities

__Pre-198l

13

1984

72

0

(mixed)

Specialist team with no connection to generalist C&E
activities
Specialist Core/Vendor

3
^

o

^

11

n

82

A growing diversity o£
goal orlencatlons Is
apparent In Table
Where S3.

18

W

specialist nnlts (,or .Hie.
data Is available,
a ne^.s
assess.ent/at-rlsk population
orientation In the past, only
27'/
tamtam that goal as a sole
orientation. A .ajcrlty of
C.E specialist
units (36%) currently have
oo a
y nave marketing as
primary goal, while 27%
have a mixed orientation.

Activities of Specialist C&E
Staff:

Tr.H.-

-.1

Past and current activities
were reported in narrative
form by
respondents. Activity categories
were then developed using key
words
and phrases in the responses.
In a majority of cases,
responses

reflected a common language of
activity labels similar to that
reported by Ketterer and Bader
(1977) and reviewed above.

This

technique of data collection (narrative)
and coding (retrospectively

constructed categories) serves to highlight
the focus in perceptions
by respondents.
used.

All data, including NIMH files and
reports, were

The data is often limited, however, by
the lack of accurate

memory within the respondent system.

As such, the results do not

offer a completely accurate record of past
activities.

The results,

instead, serve to illustrate general past concerns
and activity priorities, as contrasted with current activity
priorities.

A trend was apparent in changes in activity over time.

A group

of activities emerged over time and were typically not
present in

the first years of the C&E unit's existence.

The results have been

divided into two activity groups to reflect this trend.

Traditional

C&E activities (the earlier focus of C&E units) are reported in
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Table 18

Goal Orientation of
Special! St C&E Units

Goal Orient atinn

Needs assessment /high-risk
populations

Pre-1981
Number P errpnt
10

83

_

1984

Number
3

Pe rrpnt
27

Marketing of C&E products
36

Mixed needs assessment and
marketing
Center-wide public relations

27

Table 19.

Contemporary C&E activities
LLies are listed
U.r.A in Table
.
20.
in
some cases the activities
actually
-Liy overlap
overlan and
.nH where
u
appropriate
are tabulated in both
tables.

A difference typically
exists, hcweve.. 1„
perspective. Mental
health education and training
serves as a useful
Illustration
Traditional C.E In Massachusetts
Included ^ntal health
education to
the general public and
to specific at-risk
target populations.
Training was offered to area
professionals in various topics.
Modes
of intervention in these
areas included pamphlets
and publications,
newspaper articles, radio, and
cable and broadcast television,
public
speaking, workshops, seminars,
film showings, educational
fairs and
events, to mention a few.

One particular for™ of
education/training

developed over time, that of health
promotion/mental health education
workshops. These workshops often
focus on behavioral approaches
to
weight, stress or general lifestyle
managen,ent. including active

planning for predictable life transitions.

These workshops were

developed as more clearly defined packages
than many of the other

education/training activities.

They represent a developed form of

CiE project which Integrates prevention
education with a marketing

strategy.

The workshops are typically sold, not
given away, and may

be marketed to business and industry,
human service professionals and

agencies, and to segments of the general population.

This activity

is reported below as a "contemporary"
(rather than "traditional")

CSE activity because it represents a developing
form which has become

increasingly more common with time.
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Table 19

Traditional Activities
of

^r.^

Activity'

Mental health

educatioTiT^:;;:;::;:^

Community organizing/development
Trainings, inservices,
continuing education for mental health
workers

.

-

rre-1981
_(n=18)

V.

67%

61%
-)U%

'''sr?^ice°''''°r''°"
service providers

50%

Focused mental health
education for
high-risk target populations

50%

Case consultation
(unspecified)

Program consultation
(unspecified)
Sexual assault prevention/early
intervention
Substance abuse prevention
Domestic violence prevention/early
intervention

Mutual help/support groups
Conferences

9%

55%
18%

XO/o

36%

33%

27%

50%

18%

39%

18%

11%

0%

33%

17%

28%

9%

28%

9%

11%

45%

6%

0%

6%

9%

Client advocacy

Volunteer coordination for CMHC

45%

44%

Publications
CMHC public relations

1984
(n=:^
1 N
11— 11)
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Table 20

New Areas of Speciall<?f rnv ^ ^^^^/'^t^^ity by Percent of
CmCs With
litt Specialist
.

T

Service

64%

Health promotion/mental
health education
workshops and seminars (i.e
stress
weight, habit, or life
transition
management)

64%

'

Organizational consulting to
business and industry (B/I)
Management training for B/I
CMHC inhouse staff training

Medical liaison with hospitals

27%

27%
36%
18%

CMHC board training
9%

Case management
9%

A review of t.adUional
C.E activities
liste. in TaMe
reveals a decease in
t.e
f.e.uenc. of offe.in.s
in

U

1.

of t.e

categories reported.

.

Outstanding urops
occurred in community
6 drops occurr.H
organizing and development
nt CbU
(617 to
^n Q''/^
P
9^), networking (50%
to 18%),
focused education for at-T-icU
at risk populations
(50% to
•

-i

18%), and in

prevention projects.

c&E units eviaenced
evidenced

. surprising
.
a
similarity
in prevention/earlv
ly identi
f
-fo^t-,xdentification projects
focused on sexual
assault

domestic violence and
substance abuse

reflectnn.
reriectmg common concerns

across the state.

Increases were reported
rp^)nr^aH in training
to human service
professionals
(50% to 55%) and particularly in
public relations activities
for
the CMHC (11% to 45%).
•

.

Developments in contemporary
C&E activities have replaced
those traditional activities
which are seen to have
diminished in
frequency.
In general, contemporary
activities reflect a growth in
services oriented to the private
sector of business, industry
and
the paying individual as well
as services to the host CMHC
system.

Health promotion/mental health
education workshops and employee
assistance programs are offered by
64% of those CMHC systems which
have surviving specialist C&E
services.

More than a quarter of the

systems with specialist C&E staff offer
organizational consulting,

development and management training services
to business and industry.
More than a third function as a component
of the internal staff

training unit within the host CMHC system.

A speciality in liaison

consultation to psychiatric and medical hospital settings
was
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reported infrequently
(18.). but .ay represent

a new developing
trend
The tables of activities
(Tables 19 and 20) report
the percentage
of C.E specialist units
that routinely
participated in each activity.
The total number drops
with the number of existing
C« specialist staff
and units in the state. As <s„rh
AS such, 102 responses
were coded under the
"pre-1981" colu™, in Table
19, while only 66 responses
are coded in
the "currenf colu^s of
Tables 19 and 20 co,nbined.
The percentages
reported serve to illustrate
what specialist CSE staff
do as a group.

Populations Served
The changes in populations
served reflect the same trends
apparent
in changes in C&E activity.
Table 21 lists past and current
populations served by three groups of
general audiences, target populations
and frequent organizations. There
is a decrease in the frequency
of

services to the general public (67% to
45%) and to most target
populations.

Increases are evident in services to business
and

industry (6% to 64%)

,

human service agencies and professionals

(61% to 73%), and to the host CMHC system (11% to
55%).

This latter

increase may reflect a greater comfort and honesty
with reporting
services to the host center, services which were
criticized in the
past as inappropriate to C&E.

It also probably reflects a greater

integration of C&E within the CMHC system.

Sources of Financial Support
The change in percentage of free services offered is one of the

most powerful measures of change in C&E activities and should have
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Table 21

Populations Served by
Specialist C&E By Percent
of CMHCs with
Specialist Service

Pre-1981

General Categories
General public
Human service agencies and
professionals
Business and industry
CMHC internal staff and
needs

(n=18)

67%
61%
6%
11%

1984
(n=ll)

45%
73%
64%
55%

Target Pop ulat ions

Children
Elders
Women
Minorities
Clergy
Adolescents
Police
Physicians
Mentally retarded
Chronic deinstitutionalized
patients
Unemployed

44%
39%
39%
28%
28%
17%
17%
11%
11%
11%
0%

27%
18%
18%
27%
0%
9%
9%
0%
0%
9%
9%

Frequent Agencies
Schools
Elder service providers
Hospitals
Nursing homes
Housing authority or residence managers
Legal system

44%
28%
17%
17%
11%
11%

36%
18%
27%
27%
9%

0%
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been „ore explicitly
measured by the survey.

Ihe change 1.
in percent
Of service, delivered
at to.en cr no charge
has ejected the^
changes
in types of services
and
na DODu1flHr^r.o
populations served. Many,
if not all, of the
changes reflect the pursuit
^.
P rsuit of inr^^o
income andj financial
stability. Free

services offered currently
often are done so on a
^ar.eting ti.etahle
wxth the generation of fees
or paying clientele
for the Cmc syste.
a specific, measured
objective.
The

^ior

sources of financial support
for specialist

difficult to measure because
accurate
are not kept
.

CM

CM

are

budgets often were not and

Many respondents and data
sources (such as NIMH

records) were unable to provide
reliable data pertaining to
sources
of income.
The researcher
ic able
aKi^^ to
t-^ ^cc
researcner is
offer some estimates which do,

however, possibly
f

suepest a trend,
suggest
frpnH -if
if not a precise measure, of

change in sources of financial
support.

A majority of CMHC systems with
specialist C&E in the past
relied on NIMH operations and C&E grants
as major sources of support
for the activities (at least 83%).

In the years prior to 1981, fees

were a major source of support for only
about 20% of the CMHC systems
in funding their specialist C&E.

Currently, NIMH grants are gone.

Fees provide a major source of

support in around 64% of the CMHC systems for the
specialist C&E which
is sponsored.

Employee Assistance Program (EAP) contracts provide a

major source of support of specialist C&E in about 36% of the
CMHC
systems with such services.

Support from the general operating budgets

of CMHCs is more apparent now because C&E simply would not exist
as a

specialist service in many
ludiiy (_ases
cases w-f
wxthout^ it. DiffPT•^.T1^
Dirrerent forms of DMH
support comprise a „aJ.rU,
o, the incce sources
£or .ental health
services in general In this
state and ahout 45.
of the specialist
«H staff Identified In the survey
drew Indirect support
fro.
the for. of state slots
or contract .onles.
other sources of
support include block grants,
hospital budget lines,
third-party
billings, and general operating
budgets of the sponsor
agency.

«m

Despite a focus on self-supporting
fees, specialist ME
services
remain significantly dependent
on multiple sources of
income.

Including limited amounts of
public funding.
Significant Chanp es

Respondents were asked to identify
significant changes which had
occurred in specialist C&E services
over the past three years. The
results reported below (see Table
22) illustrate those changes which
caught the respondents' attention.

Often, other measures suggest

that changes were more frequent
than reported in this section.

Examining all CMHC systems which formerly
sponsored specialist
C&E services (n=21)
of changes)

,

a total demise of specialist C&E (the
most extreme

occurred in 37% of the cases.

Examining the CMHC systems which continue to sponsor
specialist
C&E (n=ll), changes range from shrinkage in staff
FTEs (55%) to a

temporary demise of specialist services (18%).

Frequently reported

changes include a change in activities in response to demand on
the
CMHC to provide direct clinical services (45%)

,

changes in populations

served in pursuit of fiscal stability for C&E (36%), and changes in
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Table 22

Types of Changes in
Specialist r^F
and 1984, a/^epoltld

c;.

.

'.y'lllT^n^lT'''

Percent
A.

By percentage of all
former C5E specialist
unitsTotal demise of service

B.

By percentage of CMHCs
which continue to offer
oner
specialist serviceb

37%

Shrinkage in FTE positions
Change in activities in
response to press
ot direct service needs
of CMIiC
Change in population served
in pursuit of
financial stability for C&E
service
Limitations or curtailment of
free service
Changes in activities in pursuit
of income

55%
45%

36%

36%
for C&E

Temporary demise
Loss of organizational standing
Collapse of established human
service consulting network
Little or no community development
or prevention service
offered now (had been before)

27%
18%
18%
18%
18%

activities in order to
generate Cf^v
L&E ,income ^277^
i
^^//.).
Aa limitation
or
curtailment of free serv.ce
<?e.r-.T-!o^
„as .entlcned In
36% of the OfflC
system
still sponsoring
specialist CSE.
•

Crucial Variables Afferr.-n„

.

r..^^

Responaents were asUed to
Identify those "crucial
varlaMes" „Mch
caused or significantly
affected the changes In
specialist C.E
While these responses do
not represent causal
proof, they do offer
a sun^ary of the
perceptions and conclusions
of persons Involved
with
C.E services. These
responses captured so.e
of the .ore open and

revealing statements offered
during Interviews.

The cedents are

presented, therefore, both
numerically (see Table 23) and
In .elected
narrative format.

Categories of identified crucial
variables, as listed in Table
23,
include a wide range of issues.
Responses were taken from
multiple
sources, but grouped by CMHC
system, with 18 respondent
systems.
Of
these systems which formerly
sponsored specialist C&E, the loss
of NBIH

dollars was a reported crucial
variable for the fate of C&E in
94% of
the cases.
The press of the DMH service
and funding priorities was

identified as a significant force in
relation to 61% of the C&E
specialist services.

Other crucial variables included a
general fail-

ure in attempts to generate fees for
services (44%), the support, or

lack thereof, from the executive director
(39%), and the timing of
cuts in NIMH dollars with cuts on the local
level in agency and school

budgets (28%).

Conflicts with direct service staff impaired the
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Table 23

Crucxal Variables Effecting
Changes in C&E Specialist
Interviewees by Percent
Tf^'c^r
of CMHCs "I
Formerly Offering Specialist
Se^Jcea

Crucial Variable
P ercen t

Loss of NIMH dollars
94%

Press of DMH service and funding
priorities

61%

General failure of attempts by
unit to generate
ree-for-service income

44%

Support or lack thereof from
executive director
of center

39%

Timing of cuts in NIMH dollars with
cuts on local
level to agencies and schools
(including
Proposition 2^ and federal cuts)

28%

Conflict with direct service staff
Late entry into market, lack of proper
facilities
and/or lack of adequate investment of CMHC
money and staff time for EAP development
Cuts in center staff as a whole because of
block
grants or state budget

n=18

22%
22%

17%

smooth integration of
specialist
=^
P ciaiist r/^K
C&E services
with direct service
programs in 22% of respondent
systems
yi^tems tnat
that h.H
had specialist C&E.
The
conflicts took the torm
form of staff
Qt^f^ resistance
to shared roles and
cross referrals based on
a lack
lar> of ^
experience or training in
C&E,
feelings of resentment toward
C&E as a program that
did not pay its
way or as a program that
had sold-out to commercialism
(l.age problems
either way), and general
power struggles over lifted
resources.
Comments are reported below
in the belief that the
respondents'
own words provide the
richest source of data the
survey produced.
Identifying references to the
centers or programs have been
removed
where possible to protect
anonymity.
•

Narrati ve Comments on Crucial
Variables
"There was a balance of power
when federal and state officials

were both involved.

The state didn't have absolute
control

-

feds

encouraged more of a CMHC perspective
with emphasis on a full range
of services, whereas the state
sees itself as concerned with,

responsible for chronic care.
a very high priority.

Speaking whollistically

,

C&E is not

The state is the largest funding source
and

was required by federal block grant guidelines
to give C&E dollars
as one of five service categories.

any dollars to C&E.

There is no emphasis from the top /jDMH central

officej and within the centers,
you've got someone

C&E— that's

rare!

I'd be surprised if they give

it has varied depending on whether

center directorj who was enthusiastic about

Generally they hire someone to be a provider of
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reason

C&E."
•Ve didn't have the
internal

e«.a doUars

were one of the earlier
centers to lose our
to fill the grant-gap
earlier.

the other centers
time.

..

.

to support

OfflC

dollars

«E.

-

„e

„e had

.Oh, there „as so.a
resentment of

.Vet the other centers
all got cut at the
sa.e

Ours was more of a gradual
Droceq^
5 duud_ process.

before 2H proposition
2H

J

.

t7«
We

were out of the feds

„e cut back on the hours
of aE...„e

found different ways to work
C.E into a meaningful
financial situa-

not to be too competitive
Twith other EAPs

J

and we had an executive

director experienced with EAPs
who released staff time and
worked
together with us to develop it.
..Also, we've had less staff
turnover,
more consistency within ME... The
consultation is based on our
reputation, known staff, people
continue with the same consultant."
"The

rOMHj

area director decided that C5E
was a luxury."

"We decided to go on our own
/fas a center

J, rather than become

a DMH 'puppetship' ."

"The state wasn't interested

Tin C4eJ.

now.
"Our role was narrowed with DMH.'

DMH is half the center
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"The area director
in
rector in

»<;o

68 was very much Into C5E.

He took

positions to other agencies
as consultants.

„e worke. to infuse
^no„Xe.,e and expertise
with co^unity caregivers,
physicians, ciersy
The staff .i. .roups,
networking, education
to the co^unity.
training
organizational development. .A
new director cane in '74.
With the
hiring freeze, cutbacks,
people were called in
from agencies,
community boards .. .nurses went
from doing things like se.
ed'in catholic
schools to staff positions on
inpatient units
back into the
.

-

hospitals... The community infusion
began to wither away. .issues
of
^strust Cof CiE by administration
'what were they doing out
.

J

therer

.

Finally, after more hiring
cutbacks

.

more cuts through

attrition, the director resigns.

Now we're climbing out of the
pit.

The new director sees C&E
as

fundamental to our work, with some
additions.

Consultation is the

key to resource management,
especially with the chronic... If the

director himself goes out and says
things are going to change,

editorials get written about it... But the
wounds
will take years to heal.
abandonment.

We left them short

Now, we 're off on a new foot

.

-

Tin

the community_7

there's a legacy of

But you can't say what

would have happened if we hadn't cut back
Zfon C&eJ in the first place."
"C&E is a focus of conflicts that plague the
center in general."

"There was a tension with the direct service staff over
demand for

service and limited center resources."
"There was a value conflict among center staff, in an atmosphere
of limited resources, over the

'center as business

'.. .C&E

represented
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this new

.euuae C of

.He ce„.e. as a
„en.al

"The.e was a „isc.us.

ad^„...,aUon

HeaUH ..sinessj

o, ,„.,.ec.

se^.ce an.

out-of -center work hours."

Vorkshops weren't attended
as well as we had
hoped

-

Ulnd of
like giving a party and
no one coiKs....ixci.t;rrais
Referrals to th.
.
the outpatient
clinic didn't rise Tthrough
"7
gn C&E efforts
eff^r^« J,
so we have to reassess."
"Money fro. our innovations
went to other programs
Uke EAP
went to the outpatient
clinic."

-

-Prevention changed around the
block grants, graduating
from
operations grants. We were active
with
the state group

directors.

of C.E

No one would have asked
this question in the mid-'70s.

By fiscal year '82, there
was C.E goal displacement,
we were
covering our rear ends. NIMH
changed its position too. We
were
conflicted. They wanted C&E to be
the marketing arm, to bring
in
the middle class through clinical
ed groups, seduce the affluent

into the center and then refer
for clinical services to outpatient.
It was clinical education,
rather than prevention

to primary prevention than stress
management

system kept the state system on its toes

quality and orientation of other

ZT

-

service

J

..

-

.Also

,

there's more
the federal

it influenced the

vendors.

The state-level

bureaucracy is not ideologically committed to
prevention.
is gutted with clinically oriented
professionals.

This state

To be competitive

with EAPs you have to compete against private
practitioners and
clinical programs .. .The EAPs around here tend to be more
clinical.

181

is to sell it.

There area
arpn'^t ^
many professionals
sophisticated in

prevention."

A majority of

cmc

systems contacted reported
generalist C&E
activities.
It is li.ely that
they occur in .ost
systems, as illustrated in the case studies
presented in Sections 1 and
2 of this
chapter. There is Uttle
accurate knowledge of the
frequency or
type of generalist C.E
activities which occur.
Estimates by respondents suggest that at least
60% of generalist C.E is
case consultati on
which is so.eti.es rei.burseable
through Medicaid, DMH contracts,
and
some insurance policies.
Other activites include
education,

program consultation, training,
public speaking and lobbying
and
community organizing for mental
health services. Generalist
C&E
activities may be conducted by a
wide variety of staff, including

executive directors, program heads,
and clinical staff.

Populations targetted by generalist C&E
include a wide range of
groups.

Children and schools seem to be the focus
of 50% to 60%

of generalist activities.

Other groups include police, visiting nurse

associations, hospitals, senior centers, nursing
homes, physicians,

mentally retarded clients, housing managers,
courts and the state's
Department of Social Service (often around protective
services to
children)

.

While an estimation of the percentage of frequency in

contact is impossible on the basis of this survey,
generalist C&E

appears to reach many of the same populations as specialist C&E
(with

^

.
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perhaps the exception
of business and
industry)
While a measure of the
th^ f>-^^
frequency of generalist
CSE hours was
not possible, 4 of 20
sv<?^<:.n,o
systems reported
evidence of a decline
in the
number of C&E hours
delivered
vered. Evidence
Fv-f^«
reviewed in the next
section illustrates
sources of pressure on
. .
mental
health centers
which might be expected
to force
orce a decllnp
decline
generalist indirect
service time

m

Specialty case consulting
units seem to be on
the rise.
represent an efficient
packaging of direct
clinical

They

services for
human service organizations
that do not specialize
in mental health
services often include
psychiatric assessment and
diagnosis, treatment Plan recon^endation
and referral, case
management consultation,
and some training and
program consultation. The
most common team
appears to be the school/child
service agency consultation
team.
These teams often represent
ongoing collaborative agency
committees
as well as specialty case
consulting units within a mental
health
center.
Geriatric (or nursing home) teams
and court clinics (or

consulting teams) appear to be
second in frequency.

These units

have evolved in part as a direct
priority from DMH

The discharge

.

from state hospitals of large numbers
of chronic patients has

contributed to the sharp rise in the number
of such patients now
found in nursing homes.

Geriatric/nursing home consultation units

are, in part, an attempt by DMH to
maintain services and housing for

DMH clients out of state hospitals.

Court clinics were mandated by

DMH on the requests of legal systems throughout
the state for more

assistance in assessing
psychiatric issues in
g psychiatmV
criminal cases
involving juveniles
and adults
clults.
Th.
There ^have also
been some trainings for police in
areas such as
suicide risK
risk and n
prevention for
•

-.nee.
ana .He

„U.o..„e _,e.e„.

poUce

.e.een e„e.se„c. se^.es

.e.„..u„,,_,,,,,
_

^^^^^^^^

on the street.

A few discrete specieU.
u„Us provide C.E-Xi.e
services sucH .s

s.cre,ro„.
for
DMH)

eo.seUns

for .He u„e.pio,ed
and :.„.el

^norit, indigenous helpers

HeaUH .rainin,

(HotH bonded H. federal
,.„ds .Hro.,H
^

.

Summary of RpsnH-.
The results indicate
aicate that
that, on the average,
specialist C&E has
continued to survive, albeit
on a much smaller scale.
C.E services
were least disrupted in
those centers which never
received C.E
grants and, hence, did not
develop large specialist
units. C.E

specialty staff are much less
frequent throughout the systems,
with
units often comprised of a single
specialist.

There are fewer full-

time C&E directors and C&E
usually holds a lower organizational

standing than it once did.

Specialist C&E has shifted its foci
of

activities and populations in an
attempt to generate greater financial
stability. Business and industry,
fee-paying service providers, and

middle and upper class clientele have
been cultivated, along with the
host CMHC systems themselves.

Services have shifted away from
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conmunity development
and prevention
projects which
typically had
Pocly defined and financially
poor constituencies
Services have
Shifted .ore toward
pac.a.es which are
attractive as .ar.etahle
products to the ah ove
-mentioned audiences.
Crucial variables
affecting these changes
included the demise
of federal funding
service priorities from
DMH which overwhelmingly
emphasise the
chronic deinstitutionalized
client varl.hlo
^xient,
variable success of C&E
units
in successfully selling
their services
ivxces and the support
.
of center
executive directors.

GeneraUst C.E and speciality
case consulting tea^
continna
.o„e si„ilat activities,
though largely ao-inated
by clinical concerns
for specific cases.

Section 4:

Current Sta te Environment of C Mur.
and its Affects on'T&E

"C&E is a focus of conflicts
that plague the
center in general."
- Survey respondent

The statement above summarizes
the results of this section.

Many

of the current changes in
specialist C&E services reflect changes

made in the host centers as they
adapted to a changed financial
environment.

The history of the Massachusetts
Department of Mental

Health demonstrates that DMH has always
had a different mission than
that of the CMHCs.

DMH is the provider of last resort for
the most

chronically disabled, destitute and homeless.

The Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1981 cut the amount of federal
support available

and placed that money
undPr
ay under the direction of DhB.
The smaller block
grants caused a
significant fiscal crisis
In a
in
, n
k
number
of centers.

Programs were streamlined
and
end, in some cases,
staff were laid off
Significant numbers.
became the overwhelmingly
dominant

-

source,-of support for
mental health services,
with a coinciding
dominance of its service
priorities. Outpatient
services to the
working poor are threatened
with significant cutbacks.
Centers

have not only had to adapt
to

D«

priorities on services to
the

chronic delnstitutionalUed,
but are under pressure
because
reimbursement rates by DMH,
Medicaid and insurance
companies often
do not cover the cost
of service delivery.
Block grant funds are
not used Significantly for
ME and DMH does not, as a rule, fund
CSE.

Specialist and generalist

ME services

survived at all in a direct
service system.

are lucky to have

They probably do so by

making some Income and by
demonstrating the Importance of

a baseline of indirect services in
supporting the Center, its reputation
and connections and its direct
services.

The Department of Ment al Health
Mission and Budget
The history of state-funded mental
health services in Massachusetts
Is relevant to this study, but
beyond the scope of this work.

Briefly,

it enjoyed an illustrious beginning
with Dorthea Dix and moral treat-

ment, the first state hospital (Worcester,
1833) and the first

inpatient state school for the mentally retarded
(Femald, 1848).
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The Department of
Mental Health
neaith h.rr
began in 1919 as
a«? th^
the n
Department of
...
M«
.
Mental Diseases and
was created tn
' '° ^"^^^^^^ ^he 13 state
hospitals
-.

;
mental retardation.

—

•

-

•

Sharing of state

f.ds

Local -star»
state

cooperative clinics were
begun In
1939 to provide outpatient
services to the poor.
XhrousHout Us
hxstory. however, the
vast majority of the
OMH hudget has gone
to
state schools, state
hospitals and the co^nlt.
services needed
to support fonner
patients of these
Institutions.

The service profile
has shifted significantly
toward co„unity
services In the past thirty
years.
The state hospital
Inpatient
census peaked in the 1950s
with ahout 23.000 patients,
dropping
steadily to the low of about
2.000 in 1981. This trend
reflects the
impact of anti-psychotic
medications; the rising costs
of inpatient
services; the leadership of
DM, Co™„issioner Robert
Okin (1975 to 1979).
'
who believed in normalization
and deinstitutionalization;
and at least
Class
action suits brought on the
6
behalf of DMH patients, leading
to at least two consent
decrees (mental regardatlon
cases statewide
and mental health clients in
District 1)
«,ile this is an extremely
.

simplified history, it is reflected
in the "DM Fiscal Year 1986
Budget Narrative" and supported by
interviews conducted in this
survey.

A variety of factors favorably affected
the financial base of
CMHCs during this time, not the least
of which was the CMHC Act which

established a second mental health system in the
state.

Other events

.
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entailed .He inclusion
o£

3^,^^^

Medic.. ,„„,i„,.„,
,
policies to include at
least

^^^^^^^^
!5snn

^^^^^ ^^^^^

^^^^^^

f
^""^

outpatient services
(both in
Following the cuts
cut<!
-ir,
f
j
in
funds with block
8
grants, however
several other events
oeeurre..
^^^3^^
^^^^^^
Placing a statewide li.,t
on the real estate
tax hase of local
governments. Another
state law, M
u.b.L.
G L J72,
372 the Hospital
Cost
containment .cf (,,81)
placed a ceiling fot
all Hospitals on tHe
total dollar figure tHey
could bill to insurance
companies. IHis
llMt forced tHe elimination
or cutback of many
auxiliary mental
healtH services. DMH was
also targeted by the
legislature for
mismanagement and level funding
was cut or frozen tor
many Dm
accounts. Approximately
-Ly i,uuu
1 000 Dm
DMW o™r,i
employees were laid off in
1982,
including many state slot
direct service
axrect
^PT^r-too
personnel out of area
offices
i-y/b)

.

•

,

At the moment DMH annually
serves approximately
8,000 mental

health inpatients, 3,700
mentally retarded inpatients,
16,000
residents in community housing
and/or day treatment, and
80,000
clients through emergency,
outpatient or case management
services.
It's mission is to act as the
provider of last resort for the

destitute and the most severely
disabled.

The budget for fiscal year

1985 was approximately 602 million
dollars (the federal block grant,

by contrast, was only

9

million dollars).

It is extremely difficult

to break down the budget by
accounts to identify where money goes

precisely.

With the assistance of expert interviewees,
the researcher
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suggests that approximate!,
90

MlUon .oUats

goes to ^'^"1'^
*
'° . ,
mental
In the co»unlty
(that Is. excluding
excludtn. inpatient
-tt.ngs). The block
grant makes up
UL iu/o
,07 Of
p about
of th,this figure.
^
The
budget .cluaes about
,.00.000 for ..special
population., services
I.8e for
cultural/llngulstlc minorities,
the sight an.
hearing
impaired and a self-help
P center forfor fformer clients.
Most of this
-ney goes to training of
service providers.
There is no b d
.
'^"^
for C&E.
he.iri,
health .services
.

,

,

.

Block Grants Brine
""^-^"S

Ctita
t^uts

m
-ir,

c
Service

Dnn;:iT-Q

The comptroller General
Issued a ..Report to
the Congress.. In
193. (GAO. 1,8.) „hlch
evaluated the Implementation
by states of

grants appears to be debatable.

Backer and his associates
(1983).

along With many others,
refer to a 25% cut.

2U

cut from 1981 to 1982.

The GAG Indicates a

It also Indicates a
total cut In federal

dollars for mental health and
substance abuse services
from 1980 to
of
198.
26%. or 37X when corrected for
inflation. Interviews with
state experts suggest that
the funds in Massachusetts
dropped from

million dollars in categorical
grants to a 10 million dollar
block grant in mental health.
The GAG
15

report notes that few changes

m

services were caused by block
grants, but it also notes that
half of all centers surveyed had
cut their staff size.
John Lichten.

Acting Associate Commissioner of DMH.
reports that many centers

across ...

3..

.spon.e.

Placing

3.a„

cues is

nius„ate.

.

...

,,,,

f.e-,o.-se„,.e posU.ons.

^^^^^^

Xhe ,„,ac.

^^^^^

.He

,y .He Hu.,e. „f .He Sou.H

SHce Men.al „eaUH
Cen.er, a former CMHC
and cu„e„. Hlock
gran, reclpten..
Pede.al
to

.66

MlUon

dollars.

IHey los. approxi„a.ely
5430,000. Hu. .He
opera.l„g budge, dropped
fro. 4.7 .UUon
dollars In fiscal ,ear
1«2 (.nly. ,982 .0 .une ,982) .0
.
3.9 :^Uio„ dollars
in fiscal ,ear
1983.
THis is because .Hey no.
only los. .He federal
funds, bu.
also .he addl.lonal Income
whicH was genera.ed by
s.aff suppor.ed
by those funds. A 40%
cut in feder;,!
f„n^o produced
rederal funds
a 17% cut in
the total operating budget
line of the center.

DMH Becomes the Major Funder
of Mental He.lM.

..^^^^

The GAO report (1984) indicates
that the state share of
total
dollars spent in Massachusetts
for mental health and substance
abuse
services rose from 64% to 75%
between 1981 and 1983. The
influence
of state agencies rose even
more in assuming control of the
federal

block grants (22% of the 1983 total
according to GAO)

.

Surveys of 43 DMH partnership clinics
for fiscal year 1982 and
48 partnership clinics for fiscal year 1983
indicate that the DMH

share of these clinics' budgets rose
from 47% to 61%, even with
the block grants (Note 10).

A similar trend is reported by survey

respondents for those centers which are not
partnership clinics.
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Block Gra nt and DMH Missions Differ from CMHC
Mission
The DMH service mission, reviewed above, differs
from the CMHC

mission in placing most of its emphasis on treatment
of the chronically 111.

The mission of the block grants and Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1981, as described in the GAP report
(1984)
is similar to that of DMH.

While a provision is made in the legis-

lation that all funded CMHCs must provide five services, including
C&E, the mental health goal of the Act focuses first, in all
cases,

on the "chronically mentally ill."

This stands in sharp contrast

to the goal for substance abuse monies, which lists prevention
as the first service.

A provision is made that at least 20% of

block grant substance abuse funds go to prevention.

No such provision

is made for mental health.

Concerns of Mental Health Centers Currently
The trends described above threaten to produce major changes in

mental health services.

A number of interviewees in this survey

expressed concerns regarding the plight of mental health service in
general.

disappear.

A major concern is that services for the "working poor" will
The unfunded middle ground appears to be widening

between the destitute or chronically disabled and the person who can
afford private treatment.
CMHC mission addressed.)

(This is the very condition that the

Competition with health maintenance organi-

zations, along with new limits on insurance coverage and the hospital
cost ceilings have hastened a trend in public mental health agencies

-

see a

note.

^^^^
.He „a=.a....e.s
As.oCat.on of Hen.al

Providers and by DMH
employees (Note

-

too limited.

U

)

HeaU. Se„,.e

.

It is arsued that
services contracted
for and

provided for by DMH are
"undercosted
aercosted.

Tf
,
It is claimed
that contracts
•

do not provide enough
money. CMH staff slots
are cut and rates
of
reimbursement by the state
Kate Setting Co^lsslon
are too lo>, to
cover the actual costs
of service ueiivery.
dellverv
Th,This is ^due In part
to the considerable
amount of increct
Indrect services
ssrv,-.»
and case management
required to treat a severely
disturbed population.
•

It is estimated by the
Massachusetts Association of
Mental

Health service Providers
that less than
"tragically disabled" (Note

12

)

.

U

of the population Is

The focus on chronlcity
drains

funds from the previous base
services, "tearing apart" the
former
service profile,
it was noted in Interviews
that the previous
baseline of services provided
prevention of chronlcity through
early
identification and treatment, as in
child and family clinics.

Community Issues known to be
associated with psychological disorders
such as alcoholism, drug abuse.
Incest and rape go unaddressed.
One interviewee concluded:

Chronicity can be defined, measured and
documented. .Prevention of chronicity can
not be defined. .The major focus / of
DMH /
on the chronic patient pours its
dollars into
a great pit.
.

.

'

.

This is a conclusion
which may be hintPH
.^
^
hinted at
y
indirectly
by initial
DMH findings that
increasing
-Lng tne
the ovPr.n
overall service dollars
to areas
may simply seem to
increase demand for
more service s
•

•

Little Money for C&E in
the St;,fP
The end result of such
concerns is that mental
health provide rs
are in little shape to
support indirect or
prevention services unl ess
a general change in
thinking occurs which
reframes indirect servi
ces
as a "key to resource
management." This is unlikely

in the 1984 DMH block
grant budget for mental
health. 2.6. of the
9.965 million dollars is noted
as going to C.E.
This C.E total of

$263,284 is divided aaong only
three centers.

Interviews with

representatives of one of these
centers suggest that much of
this
money goes to general administration.

A 1984 statewide mental health
resource inventory, conducted by
DMH and reported in the "Block
Grant Proposal
for Fiscal Year 1985"

indicates that there are 52 C&E FTE
staff positions statewide

receiving $956,000 from various sources.

This represents only .49%

of the total dollars listed for
mental health services and only
.46% of the total mental health FTE positions
statewide.

Given the

current level of data analysis used for
this resource survey, there
is no available data on what these 52
positions actually represent

in the way of services.

The surveys of partnership clinics reported in DMH
memos (Note 13)

indicate that C&E services represented 2% of the partnership
clinic
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in .est cases).

The su^eys indicate
that the C.E h.dget

1

^38

Million dollars for these
43 centers was supported
,y federal (45^)
state (29%). and fee
and third-party
(12,) ,o„„,.
available for C.E for fiscal
year 1,83 for these
centers. The
surveys indicated, hoover,
the rise in the state
share of fnndin, that
next year (47% in 1982 to
6U in 1983, as federal grants to
centers
disappeared.
The data reviewed, in
suMnary, documents that the
block grants
in Massachusetts only
minimally fund C.E. The resource
Inventory
highlights the low status of C.E
in mental health service
across
the state.
The surveys of partnership
clinic budgets again illustrate the low status of CM, even
in 1981-82, and explain why
that
status would have dropped even
more given the changes In funding.

CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION

co«u„i., .en,.ee. C.H has
.i.,„,3Hea eno^ousl,

a. a special..
While stxll
Whxle
qfin ffound xn
about half of the
fonner CMHC
systems, C&E is a barely
measureable
le service,
service relative
r.i ^•
to other mental
health services. The artUrii--t^
activities and orientation
of surviving C&E
specialists has, b. necessity,
changed significantly
from that found
during the days of federal
sponsorship. This process
of change is
likely to continue and
even arrPi«>-o^^
accelerate with time as
current service
and funding forces reshape
the
<-ne structures
struct.,rp<= and
H
missions of the host
CMHC systems.

Within CMHCs,

.

•

•

I^e crucial variables
which have affected this
change are

illustrated with a descriptive
vividness by the data.

While
causality could not be tested
within the limits of the data
collected,
certain issues demonstrate a
weight of evidence merely by
their

constant re-emergence in the data.

Well developed specialty C&E

teams that delivered prevention
and health promotion services
to

at-risk populations were clearly
dependent on public financing.

The

very process of developing a
stable financial base for C&E appears
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to, of necessity
y-

goals

reHf»-FTn<=
rede„ne
that^ service toward
marketing oriented

Within the context of
the

system, the pres. o.
demands , or
direct clmicai service,
is an Irreslstable
force. This 1 s
especially true of services,
such as C.B. which
have lost their
categorical funding source.
C&E was not the
^cn
ru. major
task of these
direct service organizations
and
na certain!
certainly became extremely
vulnerable
the moment funding
stopped, placing C.E in
C^fflC

-

the .'overhead costs-'

category.

After advising numerous
C.E units to diversify
in search
of income, and after
chastizing the C.E units of
Massachusetts, in
particular, for "giving away
services," Dr. Leon Nicks

co^ents,

himself, that C.E by definition
required public funding.
This fact
was recognized by NIMH
officials as early as 1975 when
Dr. Nicks
and other administrators
drafted NIMH recommendations
adopted in the
CMHC ammendments which created
the categorical C&E grants.
In this situation, where
specialist C&E services continue,

the services either enjoy a
rare and unique support by an
executive

director or the services pay for
themselves, either directly or
by promoting the clinical services
of the center.

Predictive variables such as unit structure,
types of activities,
or size of the specialized team
appear to be generally subservient
to variables affecting CMHC systems
as a whole.

Money is tight and

center directors are not in the position to
promote a service or a

philosophy they are not paid to promote.
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The survival of
gen.rallst

«E and the growth
.rowth of, specialty
,
consulting
teains Is not
evidence
idence of ^K
the success of
one type of C4E
model over another.
Rather th.
'"^'^
"o^" '0 ^he dominance
Of d.rect Clinical
services within the
clinical .odel
Se
Services which
cling as close as
possible
direct Clinical
,
service are more likely
likelv to
^^ survive.
The Issue o, what
C.E is and
IS not becomes
central here.
Hpt-o
in,
Whxle always plagued
by a lack of
definition, probably as
a result of the
placement of C&E within
a
system with a different
central
rai task,
task th.
the claim that
generalist C&E
a .ore serviceable
for» stretches the
issue beyond recognition
Along the continuum of
services between Indirect
prevention and
health promotion and
direct clinical services,
generalist «E has
always tended to be „ore
clinical and less C.E.
The few studies
conducted by specialist tea^
in the state suggest
that specialist
C« services could Influence the
type and amount of
generalist
service, moving It .ore
toward a specialist .odel
of service.
The
sa„e forces which have
diminished specialist C.E services
can be
assumed to have affected
generalist services, di,ninishlng
the. in
quantity and promoting a
clinical orientation.
.

•

"

-

.

•

.

-,

^

-

The question of what defined
"true" C&E remains central to,
yet rather elusive in the
findings of this study.

The specialty

units which developed with CiE
and operations grants demonstrated
some uniformity of goal orientation
and activities, despite a wide

diversity of projects.

CiE services were based on a goal
of identi-

fying at-risk or underserved and needy
populations.

Activities were

.

indirect in nature and
syste. oriented, either
to agencies
co«„„it, groups, or the
public at
large.

I„ the case o£
training
professionals (one of the .ore
enduring activities),
C.E activities
often introduced both
ocn Clinical
cliniral and
ar,^
preventive needs of the
underserved populations to the
professional service system.

This was true, as well, of
the outreach functions
of C.E which
developed as a natural consequence
of C.E specialists
gaining entry
into coinmunities. When exa^ned
as a speciality, C&E
services were
preventive and more. Arguments
that C.E units did not "do
primary

prevention" miss the unique approach
which typified C&E services.
Through their role, C&E specialists

were more likely than other
CMHC

staff to be aware of both the needs
and the style of living of
local residents.

As such, C&E intervention technology
tended to

reflect local patterns of helping
and local patterns of concern and

interest.

If clinical interventions were
needed and acceptable,

C&E specialists functioned as one of
the CMHCs'more efficient

outreach referral services, much to the dismay
of prevention theorists
who argued that prevention should lower
service utilization.

Just as

often, C&E services translated the professional
resources of the

CMHC system into forms of intervention more
acceptable to and in

keeping with the lifestyles of hard-to-reach populations.

In the

translation, many of these resources were delivered in indirect
modes,
such as education, coalition development, and organizational

consulting

Discrete p......

CE

p_n.o.

p.o.ee.s were sponsor.

units and .He t.au.as
addressed

prising unifonnity.

Kape

.

^peCaUs.

such p.o.ects showed
a sur-

sexual assault, incest,
domestic violence

and substance abuse were
con^only addressed,
both through developed
educational curriculi and
through co::.unity
organizing and awareness campaigns. While not
sophisticated by .edical
standards of

^

primary prevention research,
it see.s a bit ironic
that these sa.e
issues appear to be receiving
ever increasing clinical
attention as
major factors in the cause
and treatment of
psychopathology
While
some of these projects continue
to be supported by C.E
specialists,
many have been either
significantly scaled-back in size
or transferred to community groups willing
and able to continue the
work as
a personal cause.
Such transfers may
.

be a hint as to the future

home of some primary prevention
in this state.
C&E specialty services also
delivered considerable case

consulting services.

Often these services were offered
in keeping with

the targeted at-risk populations.

Perhaps just as often these

services were provided on a request basis
to area agencies.

Case

consulting, as a needed function of C&E
services, appears to have

dropped off quickly.

The general constriction over time of the
ability

to offer case or program consultation
to local agencies reflected,
if anything, the potential size of demand
for such services and

the restricted C&E staff numbers which limited
specialist services

even at the peak of prosperity.

Some of these services continue in

specialty case consulting and generalist C&E, but it is argueable

wh.cH ..vo.e.

.o.

eaucat.o„., an.

p.o,._Uc

focused on specific groups.

Usues even „.e„

Implications for the
tne orevonn™
prevention mission of
the CMHC movement
suggested hy the fate of
specialist C.E services
are some„hat
limited. The prevention
mission of OHCs has been
debatable from
the start and certainly
the modest size of
C.E, even at Us peak
suggests that prevention
really „as never much of
a mission for
CMHCs
at least as far as money
and staff resources.
Editorial comments
on the study of C&E bv
oy Backer and
anr^ his
h-j ^
associates, written by such
C&E
experts as Marshal Swift and
NIMH officials James Stockdill
and
Risa Pomerantz, focus on the
shift in goals evidenced by
C&E.
While
by no .eans absolute, C&E
increasingly serves the routine
needs of
the CMHC system for indirect
services such as public relations
and
•

m-house training (Swift, 1983).

.

In serving the public, many
C&E

services have been reoriented away
from needy populations and toward
better functioning ("worried well")
populations either in the general
public or in business and industry
(Stockdill and Pomerantz, 1983).

While arguments that the workplace
has been too long ignored as

a

setting ripe for primary prevention
are logically valid and even
somewhat consoling, the rationalization
is apparent.

Services are

not being marketed to industry because
the science of mental health
service delivery (if there is one) has identified
work as the major
cause of psychopathology or the best intervention
point for prevention.
In the limited areas where workplace settings
are the optimal

points of intervention (as in alcoholism)

,

organizations have existed

.

.
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for so.e ttoe to
service .hose needs
(such as A.L.H.A.C.A.

This surve, of C.B
se^lces,

„

an.thln,, offers so.e
dis.urhlng
indications of a shift in
the CMHC ^ssion in
general, prevention
aside. The loss
threatened bv currenf
current changes is not
so much

the loss
Of prevention services
as it is a loss of
comprehensive direct
services. The review
of HMH grant co»entary,
as well as survey

interviews, suggest that
NIMH officials hoped,
through cmc grants
to promote a particular
profile and structure of
service delivery.
Private, nonprofit
corporations were to take
responsihility for
promoting a coordinated,
efficient service network.
This network
was to offer a comprehensive
range of services as defined
by the
five mandated services
(and in contrast to the
previous split between
state hospitals and expensive
private practice). In providing
comprehensive service that also
reflected local lifestyles, this
network was designed to reach
populations previously excluded
from
mental health services, either
through their lack of money,
their
lack of servere chronic
disability, or through their being
a member
of an ethnic or racial minority.

The current situation of service

priorities and funding sources in
Massachusetts runs the risk of

redesigning CMHC systems so that these
populations will no longer
be served.

Such an event would historically carry
a far more

powerful Impact on the CMHC mission than
would the demise of specialist
C&E services (even if CSE represented
"the best" of the CMHC mission,
as some have argued)

the f..„e Of speciaUst
C.H
.He

„ni

p.„..,i,

3o.a„Ha. .,„e.e„t

f.t„e Of p.i.„. p.eve«.o„
se„.ees in .en.al HeaUh

is survivias a„a

„iU

continue .o su„i.e as
a .i„i„al specialty

Within direct service
asencie.,
agencies.

mv specialists
C&E
typically have
•

needed skills in coinmunity
^nH ^training, and
y relations and
will also
continue to weave .ore
"traditional.. C.E values
into their roles as
opportunities per.it.
(The one exception to
this Mght he
•

•

found in
the high turnover of
C.E specialists as C.E
staff with .ore experience and .e.ory of past
values leave positions because
of the

frustrations associated with
the forced changes in
goal orientations
"You can only dance so long,',
one interviewee explained.)

Opportunities exist, first, for C.E
specialists to function as
marketing and public relations
experts for the center (.'the face
of
the CMHC to the connnunity;as it was described).

This role will

become increasingly more necessary
as centers search for referred

individuals who have insurance to keep
outpatient clinics afloat.
Service coordination will also remain
a basic foundation of quality
service (something still protected
as an explicit goal by many

administrators interviewed)

.

C&E will remain useful in its

networking capacity to the degree that
direct service staff don't
have the time to assume such responsibilities.

A second avenue appears to be that of entrepreneural
marketing
of training and consultative services.

C&E specialists are well

equipped to provide such services to human service
agencies.

As long

as such agencies
have money to
train st.ff
.
staff and
y
send staff to confer-

.„eve.. „UH
a=

Ha^a... .Ho„.„,

conference market
«.

,

.U-.no™ ......

an

H<=ai.-k
Health

3.00..

'

^^^^^

prcotloa and life transition
training

for the well-off
general public
^, u^
general
also regains a staple
for C.E income
Interviews sueeest
^^}^a^ r>^
ggest that
competition is growing
in this field also
wUh adnlt education and
co-unit, colleges offering
more classes'
topics ranging fro.
stress management to
parenting to nutrition
a.
exercise
•

.

-

The Business and
industry market is. of
course, a highl, touted
target for C.E growth.
Xhis potential remains,
in large part,

to be

realized.

Employee assistance
programs offer this potential
to
.ar.et both direct clinical
services (through referrals)
as well as
training and health
promotion/prevention education.
Many surviving
C.E specialist units in
this survey offer EAP
services as one product
Research by the National
Council of Co^unity Mental
Health Centers
(1984) suggests that more than
a quarter of Cf«Cs currently
offer
EAP services. The same
research documents
.

that most of these

programs do well to cover their
costs.

In their survey of key

informants, Sodano and Woy
(1983) came to a similar conclusion
and
warn of the potential shift
in goal orientation associated
with such
endeavors. EAP services may well
become a fairly co^on. self-support
ing program with a discrete
standing like that of other programs,
such
as outpatient clinics or day
rehabilitation programs.

EAPs will.

as such, support
EAPs

,

not C&E.

Consulting to business
and industry around
organizational i<
issues
and .anage.ent training
is another potential
field of growth for
C&E.
It is likely that
the successful C.E
units in such a .arket
Will increasingly co.e
to rese.hle other
business consulting fi^s
A .aster's degree in
business administration
.ay well become the most
desirable credential for
such a C&E expert.

A major problem with C.E
moving into most entreprenural
fields
is presented by the lack
of experience most
mental health administrators
have in entreprenural
projects.

Very few directors are
experienced

in designing and managing
such high-risk enterprises.

If anything,
CMHC systems are woefully
unequipped to undertake high-risk
investments. Many specialist C.E
units suffer, as a consequence,
a lack
of the investment capital
and management support to
successfully
pull off projects which might
well succeed.
It is likely, however,
that C&E specialists will maintain
some role as the marketing

entrepreneurs of CMHC systems.
Other possibilities include working
with health maintenance

organizations to provide education and
prevention services on a
subcontract basis.

This may be a limited market, as many
HMOs are

developing in-house mental health services
and, when subcontracts are
brought in, it is usually to provide strictly
controlled clinical
service.

If indirect services are threatened in CMHCs

,

they are

almost antithetical to mental health services as
provided by some of
the larger HMOs in this state.

Alcoholism prevention may be one
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-epuon

.His situation. But
it is iconic
that „a„, c.E
specialists have not .eveiope.
„o..i„, relationships
with the „eii

established alcoholism
treatment- and prevention
iireatment
network which
already exists in this
state.
So^e interviewees
suggested that the
competition for clinical
cases .ay force
ad^nistrators to try to elevate
the agencies'
reputations by seeking
eKing fl^PT-crI-^
accreditation as a Community
y
Mental Health
Service Provider by the Joint
Con^ission on Accreditation
of
Hospitals (JCAH). The JCAH
model for con^unity mental
health
providers (JCAH. 1981) includes
several provisions which
might
promote C.E specialty services.
Prevention (through public
information,
education, consultation, and
somatic intervention and
ecological
change) is listed as a service
required for accreditation,
along with
citizen participation requirements
of community development
and
planning. While providing one
of the more precisely defined
models
of community mental health,
the JCAH guidelines do little
or nothing
'

to enforce these particular
C&E-like requirements, as noted

previously by Snow and Wolff (1983).

The cost of meeting these require-

ments is high in general and interviewees
suggest that Medicaid

licensing is likely to remain the top priority
for most agencies.
This is particularly true of DMH facilities,
many of which have had
their Medicaid accrediations revoked.
The area of medical consulting offers one more
potential market
for C&E.

Some C&E specialists in the state currently provide

medical liaison and case consulting services to general medical

,
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hospitals and state
f o_yi_uiacrxc
psychiatrin
hospitals
F-Ltais.
•

^
to

^
be

Th<,«
These

,

limited fields.

dmH ar..

...

'^^^

are likely
^

doll
.
dollars
for
consulting in fho

aeagain

^^°-and

-spual ...
^^^^^^^^^^

a

sen.., Ho.pUal a..e.

aU

o. .Ha o.He.
p....e

consuUan.

-r^in..,.

She „o„.e.e. „Ha.
„oul. Happen „He„ sHe
Ha.
sta.
b^lllns fo. services
HerseU. THe Ue, .o
.a.icaU.-.elate. C.H
wen
He
.He aHUU. of HospUaU
-y
.o HUl sucH services
to
third-party payors. s.cH
as Medicaid an.
private insurance
companies
If SUCH services .o
<,naUfy, C.H units .a.
He aHU to o«er
inexpensive
services. witHout tHe
cost to Hospitals of
Having to maintain inhouse HeHavioral
.edicine or psycHiatric
liaison units.
All Of these future
possibilities carry clear
lapUcatlons for a
continued drift away fro.
traditional C.E goals. It
see.s likely,
also. tHat witH this
drift. tHe fate of primary
prevention in .ental
health Will become increasingly
separated fro. that of specialist
C.E services and of OfflCs
in general. Primary
prevention in .ental
health Has long carried the
signs of a paradigm without
a home.
Carolyn Swift, in Her comments
in the Backer study (C.
Swift. 1983) .

points out that preventively
oriented consultation and education
services have long been provided
by agencies other than CMHCs.

THe

. .
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question she identifie<? to
^
xs not Whether
.uch services will
continue
to exist, "but whether
thev win
they
Will ^continue to exist
in CMHC" (c. Swift
,

1983, p. 24).

The ..jor barrier to
prevention as hosted by
CMHCs Is that
Identified by Snow and
Newton (1976) and
co^ented on at length
hare; namely, that the
^in task of CMHCs has always
been that o,
direct service delivery,
not prevention. With
the rise in influence
of service priorities
fro.
this condition will
certainly not
change

Prevention is supported by
the state government,
but not by
DMH.
The Massachusetts Department
of Public Health funds
primary
prevention projects in alcoholism,
drug abuse and sexual assault,
along With a developmental
screening and early identification
program
for infants which delivers
significant secondary prevention
services
to parents and families.
These services are noteable
for their
efficient use of funds and expert
staff. Alcoholism prevention
is a

particularly good example.

DPH funds eight regional alcoholism

prevention centers across the state
which host teams of specialist
staff who use many C&E-style techniques.

It is probable that

primary prevention enjoys a more
supportive environment in DPH
because the department is, by design,
prevention oriented.

DPH

prevention services are often established as
discrete offices or
projects and thus do not suffer in competition
with direct service

mandates

.
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In the mental health
field DMH
rieid,
DMh is an
extension of the state
-f

Sove_.

U «ae.s

.He ex.ec..Uo„.

.He

,ove„o.

and the legislature.

These 1„.1.,,,.,3
.espona to the defends
of
their constituencies.
Without an active
cltl.en-hased constituency
no amount of agency-based
lobbying will produce
„ore dollars for
primary prevention. The
ne generation
senerpfinn of an energized
constituency
re,ulres several conditions.
A truely alarming event
„ust be sho>™
to he Widespread and
people „ust believe that
such tragedies can and
should have been prevented.
John Uchten, Acting
Associate
CoHMlssloner of Mental Health
Services, pointed out the
barriers In
mental health to achieving these
conditions. Taking the example
of
severe child abuse of Incest,
he pointed out that people
have a
strong aversion to either acknowledging
that It's common or to

accepting that they, or their
friends, or even people like the.,
could
even be remotely associated with
such actions. He summarizes:
"It's hard to get people to come
out for something like that"
(Note
14

)

.

Until CiE specialists, or other
advocates in the field

are able to use their skills to
effectively break down such barriers

and generate a citizen-based constituency,
primary prevention in

mental health will remain a minor paradigm
in mental health services.

REFERENCE NOTES

Information concerning DMH
partnership clinics
rxscai Year 1986 Narrative
Budget ("DMH 1qRA^
broad information on overall
spe^dinf' i!o DM
particularly useful.

^

their hu^..r

^ m!mL'°"

''^^^

The first memo, dated May
4, 1983, was directed to the
^^^^g^Area Directo^S"
nf DMH from ^T'''
of
Donna Mauch, Assistant Commissioner
for Mental
^^^'^^^^
staS fScal
yeJi 1 l2"anr;98f partnership
'
clinic services, staffing
Ind costs!

nSJT

The second memo was directed to
Frank Keefe, Secretary of the
Administration and Finance and John Mudd!
Acting Secretary of the Executive
Office of Human Services
from the Commissioner of Mental Health,
James J. Callahan, Jr.,
Ph.D
Dated January 31, 1984, the memo
reviewed the data
compiled from the attached "Partnership
Corporation Revenue
Survey conducted by Elizabeth L. Funk,
Executive Director of
the Association of Community Mental
Health Service Providers
Inc., of Massachusetts.

IctSr^L" 1

'

Personal interviews conducted in the course of
this research
with Elizabeth Funk and John Lichten Acting
Associate
Commissioner for Mental Health Services provided
explanatory
background for the reading of the DMH memos and
budgets.
,

Van der Koke, Bessel.
Post-traumatic stress syndrome and
endogenous opiates: A psychopharmacological theory of
dependence. Department of Psychiatry, Cambridge Hospital,
Cambridge, MA: Unpublished paper.

Information was gathered from a personal interview conducted
in
the course of this research with Harry Schulman, President
of
the Association of Community Mental Health Providers, Inc.,
of
Massachusetts, and Executive Director of theSouth Shore Mental
Health Center, Quincy, MA.
Wolff, T. The rise and fall of a C&E Unit. Franklin /Hampshire
Community Mental Health Center, Northampton, MA: Unpublished paper

This paper was prepared in draft form with the assistance of the
researcher. Much of the data for the case study presented in Section 1 of the Results Chapter of this work was collected by
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,

Dr. Wolff and the
researrh<.^

a

paper.
Preparation of this
Every attempt ^3 ^^'"^^^^
conclusions in the
^^^^^^^^
Wolffs
discussion of the
""^^^
discussion of the case
The
sJtiHv n
not be taken as a
^''^
^^^^^
staLLnt'orDr^w'ff
except when indicated.
^^^^^lusions
'
The rfseI;chP
for the discussion
of impUcIJiSnr? k^'!""'^" responsibility
study and any errors
^'^^
'^^^ ^^^^
w^ich
waxen might
mSit be confa
^-i^
discussion, and in the
dxscussxon,
.1°?^^^^^^
'
case
se^l'
'

.

—

L

sLy Useu!

Wolff, T., o£ cit.,
unpublished paper.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Co™,lssloner of Ment" HeaUh^,
"
Health, Co^onwealt^lf^MLLchu^It":?-

'^'=""8 Associate

°'

Ibid.

Jhf °™is:"orthfs"^::eircr:i?rrr\
'""^
Funk (see Reference Note

O.

*

^-r

-^^^ ^--'--^

m! fsirU^eleTeLlce^ltn^'
Sfh™„"j™ei:ff::s::iof:™)!

Elizabeth
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APPENDIX A
Survey Questionnaire

:

:

,

Revised 10/84

SURVEY OF CONSULTATION

&

EDUCATION SERVICES IN MASSACHUSETTS

NOTE: The following list is provided as an example
of some staff
services or activities commonly grouped under consultation

and/or education:

-

case consultation to school or other agencies
program consultation
mental health education for the general public
mental health education for target populations (i.e.
families of clients, highrisk populations)
public .relations/information on center services
training, inservices and workshops (internal or external
to center)
primary prevention projects
community organizing and development
consultation to business or industry

Respondent
Name

&

Address of Center:

Phone Number:
Date
:

Respondent's position

I.

&

number of years at center:

Current Description of Consultation, Education or Prevention
Services
1.

Do center staff engage in any form of consultation, education
or prevention services?
(If not, please advance to section II.)
If so, briefly describe those services:

SURVEY OF C&E

IV.

Description of Type and Size of
Mental Health Center:
What (financial/organizational)
..
type of mental
mental health
center is this?

2.

you^ce^Je"'^^

'-^^

""^^

°'

'^^'"^

currently offered by

f^^^^^le'^t staff size (including state
sJots'anS^
I'^i^'^'^T
Slots
under the
center's authority)?

^'

^^^^ year's approximate annual ooerating budget
!!5^5v,^^
of
the center overall (a total dollar

figure)?

What are the main sources of income for the center
overall
and the approximate proportion of the budget
accounted for
by each source?
(For example: Mass. DMH
55%; local qover
ments, 10%; Mass DSS
10%; f ee-for-service
15%; medicaid/
third-oarty, 10%)
,

,

6.

,

What towns are i a your catchment and what is the total population
of the catchment area?

SURVEY OF C&E
2.

What is the approximate number of fulltime equivalent (FTE)
staff positions or staff hours devoted to C&E services?

3.

Do any staff do C&E activities as (close to) 100% of their
work time? If so, what positions are specialized in this way?

Is there an organizational unit,

coordinator or director
responsible for any of these C&E services? If so, please
describe briefly the position or unit.

If there is a director or coordinator of one of the C&E services,
at what level of authority is this position within the center's
organization? (i.e., are they on the same level as program
directors, do they have direct access to the center director,
are they on the management team?)

6.

of the
Is there a budget line in the center's budget for any
If so, what is it? (are they?)
C&E services?
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7.

Is there a written goals statement
for any of the C&E services?

"b"

"It'?S„^!„'rs".L"?r"''

financially

„Uhi„

the center,

9.

II.
1.

History of C&E Services in the Center:
Briefly describe the history of development
of each of the C&E
services mentioned above and/or services
that were offered at
services, please note the changes
(and years
(ana
J^a^s of
oT tZ"r^°'
T'"
the change)
over the past 8 to 0 years of:
]

A.
B.
C.
u.

E.

Type of service
Approximate FTE staff positions or staff hours
Structure of staff (a unit? specialized staff involved
positions?)
Budget line
Goals

C&E Service
1.

2.

(If none,

please advance to section III.)

SURVEY OF C&E
3.

4.

(Please continue on back as
necessary.

wh.c. years, a? approxi^f
tlT^

T.l

J^vf

xfofr s%^?.%

'"^^^ influenced
°^
cou^!rof"?rE'2?;icef
services in your center
over the past 8 to 1

years?

SURVEY OF C&E

5.

Wer. financial or funding
i„ues a.o„, these

^i^r

factors?

"

ffni°cia^i^^?L^:?=r^^ i:i
for service
contracts, shifts in activitv on ^! (i.e., fee ^r^°""
to more
'"''^
'•mar.etabla%rod;«s^,°spe?SL:t?or"'
^t'eciaiization in one
field, etc..)

n-L^iraT-

7.

III.

How successful were these
strategies?

Future of CSE in Center
1

Do you anticipate any changes
in the quantity or type of

pL\srj^j:riL"Lle^?^/°^^

2.

the^next^^Helears

What factors do you anticipate effecting the
future
profile of C&E services offered by your
center?

How would you describe the possible future of
consultation,
education and prevention services in mental health
centers
in this state?

r

SURVEY OF C&E

What Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
Area is this
center in?
8.

Is the area office officially part of the center's
organization? (For example, in some centers, an area director
may also function as the executive center director.)

Please describe the center's financial relationship to
Mass DMH. For example, a partnership clinic; private vendor
for multiple DMH contracts; vendor "for single DMH contract,
etc.

.

.

Thankyou very much for your time and attention in completing this
questionnaire.
Please add any additional information and attach
descriptive pamphlets, etc..., as you think appropriate. Please
return this questionnaire in the enclosed envelope to:
David Armstrong
South Shore Mental Health Center
46 0 Quincy Avenue
Quincy, MA
02169
Also, please check to make sure that your name and address are
correctly filled in on the first page of this survey so that
I can return the summarized results to you.

I

